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Emery and Clayton (2004) proposed that corvids (e.g. crows, ravens, jays) may have 
evolved – convergently with apes – flexible and domain general cognitive tool-kits. In a 
similar vein, others have suggested that coleoid cephalopods (octopus, cuttlefish, squid) 
may have developed complex cognition convergently with large-brained vertebrates but 
current evidence is not sufficient to fully evaluate these propositions. The aim of my 
thesis is to gain further insight into these issues. 
 My first objective is to further our understanding of how deep the cognitive 
convergence between corvids and apes may be. To this end I report four empirical 
studies exploring cognitive complexity among different domains in a single species of 
corvids, the Eurasian jay (Garrulus glandarius). In Chapter 2, I investigate physical 
problem solving, finding that jays cannot spontaneously select functional tools 
according to their physical properties (i.e. size, shape) but can use novel tools – sticks – 
to solve a familiar task. In Chapter 3, I test whether future oriented caching in jays is 
underpinned by future planning abilities or by spontaneous predispositions; data do not 
support either hypotheses. In Chapters 4 and 5, I focus on social cognition. I find no 
indication that jays can integrate the visual perspective and current desire of competitors 
to protect their caches. Surprisingly, jays could also not respond to either of the two 
social cues independently, thus questioning the reliability of previously reported caching 
strategies. 
 My second objective is to lay theoretical and methodological groundwork for 
studying convergent cognitive evolution between cephalopods and large-brained 
vertebrates. Therefore, in Chapter 6 I propose an evolutionary hypothesis for the 
emergence of large brains and behavioural flexibility in cephalopods and put forward 
novel paradigms that may allow researchers to explore the cognitive underpinning of 
octopus’ complex behaviours. 
 I conclude by discussing the implication of my findings and future directions for 
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All animals must attain the same basic goals: acquire food, find shelters, avoid predators 
and sire offspring. Yet the complexity of the cognitive adaptations to fulfil these shared 
needs differ dramatically among species. Some groups of animals evolved flexible 
cognitive machineries to meet the challenges of surviving and reproducing, whereas 
other groups developed simple sets of hardwired predispositions for the same purpose. 
Understanding the processes leading to the emergence of cognitive sophistication is one 
of the most fascinating issues in evolutionary biology and comparative cognition. This is 
particularly the case when considering that intelligence is one of the characterizing 
features of our species. 
In this introductory chapter I will first present the main hypotheses for the 
evolution of intelligence, and review the evidence suggesting that complex cognition 
may have evolved multiple times independently in distantly related taxa. I will then turn 
my attention to two groups of large-brained animals, the corvids (birds in the crow 
family, which includes the jays, magpies and ravens) and the coleoid cephalopods 
(octopus, cuttlefish and squid), and outline unanswered key questions in regard to the 
evolution of their cognition. However, before doing so, it is essential to provide some 
background of what it is meant by ‘Intelligence’. 
 
 
1.1: WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE? 
 
‘Using the term animal intelligence is a calculated gamble. It has the substantial advantages of 
communicating the general topic of interest to a wide audience in many different fields and of 
emphasizing the broad range of phenomena to be included. But it also carries a substantial disadvantage. 
[…] When technical discussion begins, then, there is a risk of misunderstanding based on people's 
assuming different definitions of animal intelligence.’ (Kamil, 1994, page 21). 
 
‘Intelligence’ is a contentious word, lacking a univocal definition (Legg and Hutter, 
2007). At first, one may be prone to think that the ambiguity of the term results from its 
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wide applicability: humans, animals, as well as robots can be referred to as intelligent 
agents, both among scientists and non-specialists. Yet, no consensus exists even within 
specific research areas, nor when intelligence is used to describe only a specific class of 
agents. This is particularly true in the case of non-human animals, whose cognitive 
capacities vary dramatically among species, and who are the subject of investigation by a 
number of scientific fields (e.g. cognitive ecologists, comparative psychologists, 
evolutionary anthropologists) adopting different research approaches. 
According to some authors, animal intelligence can be defined as the ability of an 
organism to solve problems occurring in its natural and social environment (Roth, 2015; 
Roth and Dicke, 2005), whereas in others’ view animal intelligence should be thought as 
an aggregate of specific cognitive abilities that a species may have (cf. Roth and Dicke, 
2005; Shettleworth, 2010). Although far from being trivial, the issue of whether 
intelligence should be conceived as a single capacity or as a set of abilities is not the only, 
or even the most critical argument of dispute. Different fields have the propensity to 
frame the problem of animal intelligence from different perspectives, and sometimes to 
adopt a focus on distinct levels of explanation (e.g. ultimate, proximate levels; Tinbergen, 
1963). For instance, an evolutionarily-driven approach may lead towards defining 
biological intelligence in terms of fitness or other adaptive benefits, whereas 
comparative psychologists tend to characterize intelligence in terms of cognitive 
mechanisms (Kacelnik, 2006). A typical approach in the latter field is to define 
intelligence by exclusion, rather than through a positive description of the mechanisms 
underpinning it (Seed et al., 2009a). In a nutshell, behaviours that appear complex and 
flexible might be considered evidence of intelligence – or complex cognition – if it can 
be empirically demonstrated that such behaviours are not the expression of hardwire 
predispositions (e.g. genetic canalization) or simple learning processes, such as 
associative learning (Heyes, 2012; Seed, 2007)1. Thus, from the comparative cognition 
perspective, intelligence and complex cognition are often used as synonymous. This 
approach can foster a dichotomous view of cognition, with the risk of dismissing crucial 
nuances (Call, 2010; Penn and Povinelli, 2007a). In contrast, our understanding of 
animal intelligence may be substantially increased by exploring how putatively 
independent mechanisms (e.g. associative learning, ‘complex cognitive abilities’) could 
																																																								
1 Henceforth I will use ‘complex cognition’, as well as ‘enhanced cognition’, to refer to those cognitive 
underpinnings of flexible behaviours that cannot be described in terms of simple mechanisms, i.e. 
hardwired predisposition and/or associative learning. 
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together underpin a given behavioural response (Cheke et al., 2011). Further, the 
rationale for privileging simple over complex cognitive processes (e.g. behaviour-reading 
over mind-reading) in the light of parsimony has been challenged both on theoretical 
and methodological grounds (e.g. Bausman and Halina, 2018; Dacey, 2016). However, a 
key benefit of this approach is that it provides a straightforward ‘operational guidance’ 
to investigate intelligence by observing the behaviour of non-verbal species. 
 
 
1.2: HOW CAN INTELLIGENCE BE MEASURED? 
 
Intelligence is a cognitive feature and as such it cannot be measured directly. Typically, 
two kinds of proxies are used to quantify this trait. On the one hand, a number of 
neuroanatomical measures have been proposed as indicators of cognitive complexity. 
Some of the most popular indicators are those measuring relative brain size, i.e. brain 
size corrected for body size. For instance, the encephalization quotient (EQ) is the ratio 
between the brain size observed in a species and the brain size that would be expected 
given the body size of that species, with the latter being corrected by an allometric 
exponent (Jerison, 1973). Because brain size scales allometrically to body size, species 
with high EQs are thus considered as more intelligent (Jerison, 1985; Marino, 1998; 
Roth and Dicke, 2005). Another popular view suggests that cognitive complexity should 
be quantified by considering the size of the neural substrates responsible for complex 
cognition (e.g. neocortex in primates, pallium in birds), either as absolute measurement 
or in relation to the whole brain (Byrne and Corp, 2004; Sayol et al., 2016; Shultz and 
Dunbar, 2010). Both relative brain size and neocortex measurements (or equivalent for 
non-mammals) seem to correlate positively with a number of features among birds and 
primates, including tool use, innovation, and social learning (Boire et al., 2002; Lefebvre 
et al., 1997, 2004; Reader and Laland, 2002). However, it is debated whether these 
measurements represent the best indicators of the cognitive capacity of a species (for a 
recent review see Dicke and Roth, 2016; Healy and Rowe, 2007). For instance, Deaner 
et al. (2007) found that absolute brain size is more informative at explaining the 
variability of general intelligence in primates. In sharp opposition, others have 
challenged the link between intelligence and brain size (Chittka and Niven, 2009; Logan 
et al., 2018), and argued that alternative proxies, such the total number of neurons in the 
brains or in specific neural areas should be used instead (Herculano-Houzel, 2011; 
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Olkowicz et al., 2016). Thus, to date there is no consensus on which neuroanatomical 
measure can more effectively formalize the relationship between brain and intelligence. 
On the other hand, a complementary approach for quantifying intelligence is through 
behavioural proxies. Behavioural flexibility is often considered as the gold standard 
evidence for complex cognition in non-human animals (Roth, 2015). Different 
definitions have been put forward to describe behavioural flexibility (or plasticity), 
including ‘the ability to switch readily among alternative strategies in order to solve 
problems’ (Holekamp et al., 2013, page 2)2, as well as ‘the ability of an individual to 
directly respond and adjust its behaviour to environmental stimuli’ (Coppens et al., 2010, 
page 4022). The rationale behind the use of this proxy is that flexible behaviours should 
be expressions of cognitive processes, thereby the higher the level of flexibility observed 
in a given behavioural response, the more complex is its cognitive underpinnings 
(Mikhalevich et al., 2017). This assumption, and the general idea that behavioural 
flexibility per se can be taken as evidence of complex cognition, has been challenged. For 
instance behavioural flexibility does not correlate with problem solving efficiency, nor 
with learning speed in great-tailed grackles (Logan, 2016). Despite the criticisms, 
behavioural flexibility remains to be frequently used to quantify cognitive complexity 
across a wide range of species, from primates to birds and from reptiles to fishes (e.g. 
Amici et al., 2018; Leal and Powell, 2012; Lucon-Xiccato and Bisazza, 2014; Sol et al., 
2002; Wilkinson and Huber, 2012).  
In sum, neither the neuroanatomical or the behavioural proxies that are 
currently used to quantify intelligence are exempt from concerns. Yet, in my view, these 
proxies are important sources of information. Thus, rather than abandoning them, we 
should consider them jointly and critically. A single line of evidence – e.g. a study 
showing that species X has a large relative brain size, or can perform flexible 
behavioural responses to solve a task – should be taken only as an indication – rather 
than as demonstration – that the species may be endowed with complex cognition. The 
stronger and more consistent the evidence from multiple studies in a given species or 
group from both neuroanatomical and behavioural measurements, the stronger the 
confidence that can be given to the proxies as indicators of intelligence. Thus, in this 
thesis, I will attempt to convey a critical evaluation of the neuroanatomical and 
behavioural evidence of intelligence in non-human animals when discussing their 
cognitive complexity.  
																																																								
2 It is Holekamp et al. (2013)’s definition of ‘behavioural flexibility’ that I will adopt throughout the thesis. 
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1.3: WHEN DOES INTELLIGENCE EVOLVE? 
 
The question of why some species are equipped with higher cognitive sophistication 
than others can effectively be addressed by asking: which are the factors selecting for 
enhanced cognition? This issue has been traditionally investigated in primates, thus 
resulting in a number of hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence within this group. 
The most accepted hypotheses can be divided into two categories, which are often 
referred to with the umbrella terms of ‘Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis’ and ‘Social 
Intelligence Hypothesis’. These two groups of hypotheses differ in one key respect: the 
kind of evolutionary pressure that is posited to have fostered the emergence of 
intelligence. 
The Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis posits that complex cognition evolved to 
meet specific challenges associated with foraging activities (for a recent review see 
Rosati, 2017). One of these challenges may have been the need to locate ephemeral 
resources: species relying heavily on spatiotemporal dispersed foods (e.g. ripe tropical 
fruits) may face stronger pressures than those feeding on frequent and abundant foods 
(e.g. leaves), such that enhanced cognitive abilities may have evolved in the formers to 
optimize foraging activities (Milton, 1981). Specifically, sophisticated memory and 
spatial navigation may confer substantial benefits in terms of keeping track of depleted 
patches, remembering locations of fruit-bearing trees, and taking efficient routes to 
reach target areas. Further, a study in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) suggests that this kind 
of ecological problem may also have favoured the emergence of future planning abilities 
(Janmaat et al., 2014; but see Thom and Clayton, 2015). Supporting the role played by 
spatiotemporal dispersed food in the evolution of intelligence, frugivores appear to have 
larger brains than folivores among primates (Barton, 1996; Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 
1980). 
Another popular idea within the framework of the Ecological Intelligence 
Hypothesis suggests that extractive foraging may have acted as a key driver for the 
emergence of cognitive sophistication. According to Parker and Gibson (1977), the co-
occurrence of generalist diets and reliance of food not directly accessible may have 
posed severe cognitive pressures to find hidden foods and flexibly employ sophisticated 
sensorimotor coordination to process a variety of embedded foods. In line with this 
hypothesis, manipulation complexity and brain size are positively correlated in primates 
(Heldstab et al., 2016). From a slightly different perspective, Byrne (1997, 2004) 
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proposed that critical challenges may have been exerted by those forms of extractive 
foraging that involve the use of tools. In line with this possibility, the complexity of tool 
use repertoires positively correlates with the neocortex size in primates (Reader and 
Laland, 2002); with large-brained species such as chimpanzees, orang-utans and 
capuchin monkeys exhibiting particularly sophisticated behaviours: they employ a 
variety of objects as tools, use multiple tools in sequence to achieve a specific goal, and 
even manufacture composite tools (Mannu and Ottoni, 2009; Meulman and van Schaik, 
2013; Moura and Lee, 2004; Sanz and Morgan, 2007, 2009; Sugiyama, 1997; Torralvo et 
al., 2017).  
Although the capability of using tools3 does not require complex cognition per se 
(Emery, 2013; Shumaker et al., 2011; Teschke et al., 2011, 2013), most cases of tool-
mediated extractive foraging in primates are best understood as behavioural innovations 
(van Schaik et al., 2003; Whiten et al., 1999) rather than as the expression of genetic 
predispositions. Thus, it is likely that cognitive flexibility underpinning such behavioural 
inventions may have arisen to exploit embedded resources that otherwise would have 
been inaccessible. Interestingly, because embedded foods are typically highly energetic 
(e.g. seeds, honey, insects), the capability of exploiting such resources – either with or 
without using tools – may have not only posed cognitive challenges but also provided 
payoffs to meet the increased metabolic costs required to evolve enlarged brains 
(Navarrete et al., 2016). 
In sharp contrast, the Social Intelligence Hypothesis accredits the evolution of 
intelligence to the demands of group living (for recent reviews see Byrne, 2018; Whiten, 
2018; Whiten and van de Waal, 2017). Pioneeringly sketched by Jolly (1966) and 
evaluated more thoroughly by Humphrey (1976), the idea that primates’ cognitive 
sophistication emerged in response to social challenges was later on formalized as the 
Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis by Byrne and Whiten (1988) and over time 
became the most popular explanation for the origin of intelligence. In short, the 
hypothesis suggests that intelligence may have evolved as an adaptation to solve the 
problems of complex social environments, namely to compete and cooperate with 
conspecifics to maximize individual payoffs. Primate groups are intricate societies, in 
which individuals form alliances, hunt cooperatively, reconcile after aggressive episodes, 
																																																								
3 In this thesis I refer to ‘tool use’ as “the external employment of an unattached or manipulable attached 
environmental object to alter … another object … when the user holds and directly manipulates the tool 
during or prior to use …” (Shumaker et al. 2011, page 5). 
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flexibly exchange services and goods (e.g. grooming, food), and deceive competitors 
(Aureli, 1992; Aureli et al., 2002; Boesch, 1994, 2002; Cheney, 1977; Hammerstein and 
Noë, 2016; le Roux et al., 2013). Thus, it appears plausible that enhanced cognitive 
capacities perhaps in terms of individual recognition, identification of others’ associated 
(e.g. allies, relatives, partners), transitive inference of social ranks, and predicting others’ 
behaviours may have conferred substantial benefits (Cheney et al., 1986; Seyfarth and 
Cheney, 2015). Crucially such cognitive challenges are not thought to be a mandatory 
requirement of group living, rather they are postulated to result from maintaining 
intense and enduring social bonds, typically with multiple members of a group (Shultz 
and Dunbar, 2007). Early support for this hypothesis was provided by Dunbar’s work 
showing that neocortex size and average group size positively correlate in primates, a 
finding suggesting that species living in larger groups are endowed with higher cognitive 
power (Dunbar, 1992). Using less crude proxies for social complexity, further studies 
have found links between neocortex size and rate of ‘tactical deception’ (Byrne and 
Corp, 2004), frequency of coalition (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007), and size of grooming 
cliques (Kudo and Dunbar, 2001). 
More recently, the framework of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis was enriched 
by the idea that social learning may have played a key role in the evolution of 
intelligence. Cultural traditions – behavioural innovations that spread within social units 
through social learning – have been identified in several species, most notably, 
chimpanzees, orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus) 
(Moura and Lee, 2004; Schaik, 2003; Whiten et al., 1999), thus suggesting that social 
learning is a crucial aspect of primate societies. Further, frequencies of innovation and 
social learning correlate with proxies of brain complexity across primates (Reader and 
Laland, 2002). Building on this evidence, it has been argued that being exposed to 
cultural societies could shape and enhance the cognitive underpinnings of individuals on 
ontogenetic timescale and ultimately select for increased intelligence (e.g. capability to 
learning and innovation) at the level of species on a long-term evolutionary scale (van 
Schaik and Burkart, 2011; Whiten and van Schaik, 2007). 
The Social Intelligence Hypothesis and Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis have 
been classically conceived as opposing propositions, with novel evidence supporting 
one of the two being used as arguments fuelling a fierce scientific debate. Yet, these 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive per se, such that more recent approaches have 
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worked towards frameworks accounting for both ecological and social pressures (e.g. 
Dunbar and Shultz, 2017; Navarrete et al., 2016). 
A third relevant hypothesis proposes that intelligence might have arisen as a 
cognitive adaptation to cope with the challenges of predator–prey interactions 
(Zuberbühler and Byrne, 2006; Zuberbühler and Jenny, 2002). Capturing prey and 
avoiding predation have dramatic fitness consequences. Thus, it is not hard to imagine 
how complex cognition allowing flexible behaviours in these domains could be subject 
to strong positive selection. According to some authors, the cognitive challenges of 
predator–prey dynamics can be equivalent to those required to compete with group 
members as in both cases they require interactions with another individual pursuing 
personal gains (Byrne and Bates, 2007). Indeed, one of the most complex cases of 
representational communication evolved in monkeys to inform conspecifics about the 
kind of predator (e.g. eagle, leopard) threatening the group, and thus to allow predator-
specific escape strategies (Zuberbühler, 2000a, 2000b; Zuberbuhler et al., 1997). 
However, this hypothesis still needs to be properly evaluated among primates. 
A final consideration in regard to the conditions favouring the evolution of 
intelligence concerns life history. Robust evidence indicates that brain size correlates 
with life history among mammals (Gonzales-Lagos et al., 2010) and primates (Street et 
al., 2017): species with larger brains have typically slower life history trajectories (e.g. 
slow development, extended period of juvenility, long life span). Two different 
explanations have been proposed to account for this association. According to one view, 
slow life history emerges as a consequence of the development of enlarged brains, due 
to the fitness advantages conferred by increased cognitive capacities (e.g. reduced 
extrinsic mortality; Allman et al., 1993; Sol, 2009a, 2009b, but see Liedtke and Fromhage, 
2019). In contrast, the alternative explanation proposes that slow life histories are a by-
product of brain growth: enlarged brains imposed longer pre- and post-natal 
developmental periods, such that slower life histories trajectories may be an unavoidable 
by-product (Barton and Capellini, 2011).  
In sum, evidence indicates that intelligence may have evolved in primates in 





1.4: CONVERGENT COGNITIVE EVOLUTION 
 
How do similar adaptations evolve in different groups? 
Different evolutionary processes can lead to the emergence of similar traits in more than 
one lineage. Similar traits can either be inherited from a common ancestor (homologous 
adaptations) or evolve multiple times independently (analogous adaptations) in response 
to comparable evolutionary pressures. The principle of parsimony is invoked to 
distinguish between these two possibilities, such that similar traits exhibited by different 
species/groups tend to be considered as homologous if the minimum number of 
independent events required for this evolutionary process to occur is smaller than that 
necessary for the evolution of analogous traits (Richter, 2005). For instance, tunas 
(Scombridae family), dolphins (Delphinoidea family) and lamnid sharks (e.g. great white 
shark, Lamnidae family) share a variety of morphological adaptations (e.g. high 
streamlines body shape, lunate caudal fin, etc.) that allow fast swimming, thus 
supporting a lifestyle of open-water predators (Donley et al., 2004; Pabst, 2000). When 
these traits are investigated within each of the two families (e.g. in yellowfin tunas and 
bluefin tunas), such adaptations are likely to represent homologous traits that evolved 
once in the common ancestor and were subsequently inherited by extant species. This is 
because the alternate explanation is less parsimonious: e.g. yellowfin tunas and bluefin 
tunas descended from a common ancestor who lacked such adaptations, and they 
developed them twice, independently. In contrast, when the evolution of these traits in 
dolphins, tunas and lamnid sharks is considered, then the very same traits are best 
understood as analogous adaptations that evolved independently in each family to 
support a similar lifestyle (Donley et al., 2004; Pabst, 2000). It is quite unlikely that this 
specific hydrodynamic morphology evolved once in the common ancestor of fish and 
cetaceans, and subsequently disappeared repeatedly in others groups of vertebrates but 
was retained among tunas, some sharks and dolphins. 
A further distinction can be made in regard to the evolution of analogous traits. 
Such adaptations are considered as the outcomes of either parallel or convergent 
evolution, depending on whether multiple lineages evolved the trait from similar or 
different underlying mechanisms (i.e. genetic and developmental pathways) respectively 
(Arendt and Reznick, 2008; Haldane, 1932; Simpson, 1952). Most often – particularly in 
the lack of detailed knowledge of the genetic and developmental pathways underlying an 
adaptation – the taxonomic distance between the groups sharing a similar trait is used to 
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distinguish between the two processes. Specifically, it is thought that the greater the 
distance between the groups, the higher the chance that the analogous trait is the result 
of convergent (rather than parallel) evolution. However, cases in which closely related 
species develop analogous traits through different underlying mechanisms have been 
found (e.g. Hoekstra et al., 2006), such that this assumption should be treated with 
caution. Further, because phenotypes are often the expression of several interacting 
mechanisms, clear-cut distinctions between parallel and convergent evolution can be 
illusory; these processes may be better viewed as a continuum than as a dichotomy 
(Arendt and Reznick, 2008; but see Leander, 2008). For instance, the evolution of 
camera-type eyes in vertebrates and cephalopods is a recurrent textbook example of 
convergence (Serb and Eernisse, 2008). Yet, genetic similarities between the 
cephalopods and vertebrates have been found, such that according to some authors 
camera-type eyes emerged in these groups through parallel evolution (Tomarev et al., 
1997). 
Despite their differences, both parallel and convergent evolution are processes 
triggering the development of independent solutions by different species/groups to 
solve similar problems. As such, the study of these processes is central to understand 
the conditions selecting a specific adaptation. By focusing on more than one lineage 
which independently evolved an adaptation, it is possible to overcome the idiosyncrasies 
of a given group (e.g. evolutionary history, habitat), and thus to gain insight into the 
fundamental features of the process (e.g. key selective pressures; Van Horik et al., 2012). 
This research approach is not constrained to the study of genetic or morphological traits, 
rather it can be equally applied to behavioural and cognitive adaptations (e.g. MacLean 
et al., 2012), and thus to intelligence. 
 
How many times did intelligence evolve? 
Primates, and great apes in particular, have been traditionally considered as the pinnacle 
of cognitive complexity. Yet in the last few decades, indicators of complex cognition (i.e. 
large brains, behavioural flexibility) have been reported in a number of distantly related 
lineages, most notably, cetaceans, elephants, corvids and parrots (e.g. Auersperg et al., 
2011; Foerder et al., 2011; Krützen et al., 2005; Raby et al., 2007; von Bayern et al., 
2018). This evidence raises the possibility that similar levels of cognitive sophistication 
are shared among primates and other groups. If this is the case, then which evolutionary 
process may have produced this outcome? These groups differ dramatically in their 
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evolutionary histories and brain features, such that it is unlikely that they may have 
inherited intelligence from a common ancestor. In contrast, it seems far more plausible 
that intelligence represents an analogous adaptation which emerged multiple times 
independently (Roth, 2015), through the evolution of distinct neural substrates 
supporting equivalent cognitive sophistication (e.g. avian nidopallium and mammalian 
cortex; Clayton and Emery, 2015; Güntürkün and Bugnyar, 2016; Fig. 1.1). Despite 
these differences, the socioecological challenges faced by cetaceans, elephants, corvids, 
and parrots appear to be comparable to those of apes. Most species of these lineages 
have complex foraging niches (e.g. omnivorous diets, reliance on spatiotemporally 
dispersed food, extractive foraging) and engage in long-lasting social bonds involving 
intense cooperation, competition and learning from conspecifics (Byrne et al., 2009; 
Clayton and Emery, 2007; Connor, 2007; Emery, 2006; Grodzinski and Clayton, 2010). 
Furthermore, as with primates, a tight link between brain size and slow life history also 
exists in birds and other mammals (Gonzales-Lagos et al., 2010; Minias and Podlaszczuk, 
2017; Wirthlin et al., 2018). Thus, taken together this evidence led researchers to 
hypothesize that intelligence might have evolved convergently (or parallelly, Osvath et 
al., 2014) in these groups in response to similar selective pressures and through similar 
life history trajectories (Emery and Clayton, 2004; Fox et al., 2017; Marino, 2002; 
Plotnik and Clayton, 2015; Seed et al., 2009a). 
 In addition to these groups of large-brained vertebrates, there are two groups of 
invertebrates in which remarkable indications of cognitive complexity have also been 
reported, namely the coleoid cephalopods (cuttlefish, squid, and octopuses (Hanlon and 
Messenger, 2018) and the hymenoptera (e.g. bees, wasps; Chittka, 2017; Loukola et al., 
2017; Perry et al., 2017; Solvi et al., 2020). Coleoids cephalopods in particular are 
typically considered to be the most cognitively advanced group of invertebrates: these 
shell-less molluscs are endowed with a sophisticated nervous system (Fig. 1.1), which 
resembles that of vertebrates in both relative size (Packard, 1972) and complexity 
(Hochner et al., 2006; Young, 1991), and exhibit high behavioural flexibility in different 
contexts, including predatory avoidance (Norman et al., 2001; Staudinger et al., 2013a), 
foraging (Forsythe and Hanlon, 1997; Mather, 1991a) and mating (Brown et al., 2012; 
Huffard et al., 2010). Some authors have suggested that cephalopods may have, 
convergently with apes and corvids, evolved a flexible and domain-general cognitive 
tool kit (Mather and Dickel, 2017). However, these claims should be treated with great 
caution given that the cognitive underpinnings of cephalopods’ behavioural flexibility 
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are still largely unexplored and because a careful evaluation of the main hypotheses for 




Figure 1.1: Comparison among the mammalian, avian and cephalopod brain. (a) Midline sagittal section 
of a human brain showing major structures. (b) Midline sagittal section of the brain of a zebra finch, a 
songbird. Major neural structures are shown, including those with mammalian homologs. (c) Midline 
section of the brain of an octopus (O. vulgaris). Most major lobes and ganglia are shown. Vertical (VL) and 
medial superior frontal (MSF) lobes (purple hatched lines), containing circuitry critical for long-term 
memory, are shown in a magnified view in a circular inset on the right. The key (bottom of figure) shows 
color-coding of major brain regions to indicate homology or functional and/or structural analogy. Other 
regions of human and avian brains are labelled: LV, lateral ventricle; Pd, pallidum. Pallial divisions of the 
avian cerebrum are indicated as follows: HPa, hyperpallium; MPa, mesopallium; NPa, nidopallium. 
Components of the avian anterior forebrain pathway are indicated as follows: DLM, medial nucleus of the 
dorsolateral thalamus; HVC, higher vocal centre; LMAN, lateral magnocellular nucleus of the anterior 
neostriatum; nxIIts, tracheosyringeal portion of the hypoglossal nucleus; RA, robust nucleus of the 
archistriatum. Major lobes and ganglia of the octopus brain are indicated as follows: AB, anterior basal 
lobe; BrG, brachial ganglia; Es, esophagus; IF, inferior frontal lobe; MB, median basal lobe; MIF, medial 
inferior frontal lobe; PBu, posterior buccal lobe; Pe, peduncle; PeG, pedal ganglia; PB, posterior basal 
lobe; PvG, palliovisceral ganglia; SuV, subvertical lobe; SBu, superior buccal lobe; SF, superior frontal 
lobe; SuF, subfrontal lobe.  (Adapted from Edelman and Seth, 2009, and Shigeno et al., 2018).  
In addition to neuroanatomy, electrophysiological stu-
dies are critical in establishing functional homologies b -
tween avian and mammalian nervous systems. Currently,
however, common properties of mammalian thalamocor-
tical neurons, such as low-threshold calcium (Ca2+) spikes
and slow oscillations, have n t y t been found in birds [49].
Nonetheless, similarities between the waking EEG pat-
terns of birds andmammals, as well as slowwave electrical
Figure 2. Avian and mammalian brains contain homologous structures and similar functional circuitry; the complex nervous systems of coleoid cephalopods may exhibit
some functional circuitry analogous to those of higher vertebrates. (a) Midline sagittal section of a human brain showing major structures, including those involved in
generating conscious states (e.g. cortex, thalamus, and basal ganglia). (b) Midline sagittal section of the brain of a zebra finch, a songbird. Major neural structures are
shown, including those with mammalian homologs. Also shown is a greatly simplified schematic of the anterior forebrain pathway for song learning (yellow arrows)
involving components of the basal ganglia, including the striatal nucleus Area X (‘X’ in filled red circle). The circular inset to right of human brain shows zebra finch brain to
scale for comparison. (c) Midline section of the brain of an octopus (O. vulgaris). Most major lobes and ganglia are shown. Vertical (VL) and medial superior frontal (MSF)
lobes (purple hatched lines), containing circuitry critical for long-term memory, are shown in a magnified view in circular inset on right. The key (bottom of figure) shows
color-coding of major brain regions to indicate homology or functional and/or structural analogy. Other regions of human and avian brains are labeled: LV, lateral ventricle;
Pd, pallidum. Pallial divisions of the avian cerebrum are indicated as follows: HPa, hyperpallium; MPa, mesopallium; NPa, nidopallium. Components of the avian anterior
forebrain pathway are indicated as follows: DLM, medial nucleus of the dorsolateral thalamus; HVC, higher vocal center; LMAN, lateral magnocellular nucleus of the
anterior neostriatum; nxIIts, tracheosyringeal portion of hypoglossal nucleus; RA, robust nucleus of the archistriatum. Major lobes and ganglia of the octopus brain are
indicated as follows: AB, anterior basal lobe; BrG, brachial ganglia; Es, esophagus; IF, inferior frontal lobe; MB, median basal lobe; MIF, medial inferior frontal lobe; PBu,
posterior buccal lobe; Pe, peduncle; PeG, pedal ganglia; PB, posterior basal lobe; PvG, palliovisceral ganglia; SuV, subvertical lobe; SBu, superior buccal lobe; SF, superior
frontal lobe; SuF, subfrontal lobe. Scale bars are shown at the bottom of each brain section.
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FIGURE 1 | The adult Octopus vulgaris brain. (A) Schematic outline of octopus body and the relative relationships to the main components of its nervous system.
(B) A longitudinal section of the supra- and sub-esophageal mass of O. vulgaris (parasagittal plane). (C) A cross section of the vertical lobe (supra-esophageal
mass), showing the five distinct gyri. The esophagus lies at the center between the supraesophageal and subesophageal mass. Sections of stained with the Cajal
silver method. abL, anterior basal lobe; ASM, anterior subesophageal mass; dbL, dorsal basal lobe; eso, esophagus; ifL, inferior frontal lobe; MSM, middle
subesophageal mass; PSM, posterior subesophageal mass; sbL, superior buccal lobe; sfL, superior frontal lobe; spL, subpedunculate lobe; svtL, subvertical lobe;
vtL, vertical lobe. Sc le bars: 500 µm.
2005) in tructures such as the cephalopod brachial and buccal
crown, funnel, and stellate ganglia are not predicted by Hox
collinearit . Th ir expres ion along the axis does not appear
to d monstrate th canonical nested dom ins aracteristic of
these ranscription factor (see Lee et al., 2003). Furthermore,
as d fined by mbryological orientation along the body axis (see
for example: Shi e o et al., 2008, 2010; Buresi et al., 2016), the
brain areas con o ling arms and brachial centers are considered
ventral, while those controlling the mantle and visceral organs
app ar dorsal: a remarkable shift.
Despite some initial interest, the phylogenetic origins of
cephalopod neural centers remain largely unexplored (Young,
1977a; Nixon and Young, 2003; see also discussion in Grasso and
Basil, 2009). The recent genomic sequencing of O. bimaculoides
(Albertin et al., 2015) and the possible availability of other
cephalopod genomes in the near future opens a new era. The
analysis of O. bima uloides genome rev aled that the basic
neuronal gene repertoire of cephalopods is shared with that of
many other invertebrates. However, the octopus genome appears
to e characterized by extensive expansion f tr nsposons and
other gene families, including an unusual (for invertebrates)
expansion in the protocadherins and the C2H2 superfamily of
zinc-finger transcription factors (Albertin et al., 2015). These
genome level novelties are rendered more complex by the already
well established extensive RNA editing, particularly in nervous
system cells, which allows diversification of the proteins that the
cells can produce (Garrett and Rosenthal, 2012a,b; Liscovitch-
Brauer et al., 2017).
A short list of cephalopod novelties, excluding a discussion
on the Bauplan, may include: (i) an extraordinarily large
cadherin gene encoding over 70 extracellular cadherin domains
found to be highly expressed in octopus suckers; (ii) gene
families expansions (e.g., protocadherins, zinc finger proteins,
interleukin-17 like genes, G-protein coupled receptors, chitinases
and sialines); (iii) novel octopus-specific genes expressed in
specialized structures such as skin and brain; (iv) Vascular
Endothelial Growth Factor (VEGF) pathway, a possible
prerequisite for the development of a closed vascular system; (v)
octopressin/cephalotocin co-occurrence, never before reported
in invertebrates; (vi) horizontal gene transfer as a possible origin
of reflectin gene, allowing dynamic iridescence and structural
color change in the skin, in cephalopod clades (Albertin et al.,
2015; Guan et al., 2017; Wang and Ragsdale, 2017). These may
originate by increase in genome complexity in the clade linked
to polyploidy, di erential arrangements of key genes (e.g., Hox
appearing not clustered), exceptional RNA editing capacities,
expansion of transposable elements (e.g., Packard and Albergoni,
1970; De Marianis et al., 1979; Lee et al., 2003; Albertin et al.,
2015; Liscovitch-Brauer et al., 2017).
THE VERTEBRATE-LIKE NEURAL
SYSTEMS IN CEPHALOPODS
It is without doubt that the most classic examples of vertebrate/
mammalian-like comparison of cephalopod brain-functioning is
provided by the work of Young (1961, 1964, 1965b, 1976a, 1991,
1995) and Hobbs and Young (1973).
The parallelism is seen in di erent structures and functional
analogies; these di erences encouraged later authors to consider
cephalopod brains as unfamiliar structures, when compared to
bird and mammalian brains, and as examples of analogous
functions worth exploring as examples of phyletic boundaries of
consciousness (Edelman and Seth, 2009).
Evolutionarily Conserved Axes as
Defined by the Developmental
Framework
Developmental approaches have been used to probe how the
complex brain centers and body parts developed during the
evolutionary history of cephalopods (Figure 2). Embryological
studies suggest that all molluscan nervous systems share an
early developmental stage in which three neurogenic domains
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The caveat of convergence: the level of analysis 
For explanatory purposes, I have so far disregarded a key requirement in the study of 
convergence evolution, namely the identification of the level of analysis. Convergent 
adaptations are similar, yet not identical traits, such that the analysis of analogous 
adaptations in different groups will inevitably highlight differences, as well as similarities. 
For instance, the independent emergence of wings in birds and baths is a textbook 
example of convergent evolution. At a superficial level of analysis, wings in the two 
groups are functionally and structurally similar, i.e. these structures derived from 
modified ancestral forelimbs to allow flight through flapping movements. Yet at a 
deeper level of analysis, the structure of wings differs between the groups: birds 
developed wings through the elongation of forelimb bones, whereas bats acquired wings 
through the extension of digits bones (Seed et al., 2009a). Hence, when a process of 
convergent evolution is proposed it is crucial to specify the level of analysis at which 
two independently evolved traits may have become similar (Doolittle, 1994; Marr, 1982). 
Addressing this issue is not a straightforward task when the trait being investigated is 
intelligence, a cognitive adaption which lacks of a universally accepted definition and 
that can only be measured indirectly. With this in mind, when it is said that two lineages 
share comparable cognitive sophistication (or intelligence) as result of a process of 
convergent cognitive evolution, what it is actually meant to be similar? According to 
Seed (2007), three levels of analysis can be applied to the investigation of convergent 
cognitive evolution4. At a first and more superficial level, two distantly related groups 
may converge behaviourally, namely they can exhibit behaviours that appear comparably 
complex and flexible. At a second level of analysis, a deeper kind of convergence may 
occur when such flexible behaviours result from the evolution of complex cognitive 
underpinnings (i.e. behaviours that are not the expression of hardwired predisposition 
or simple learning processes) in both groups. Finally, at the third and finer-grained level, 
convergent cognitive evolution involves the independent emergence of similar cognitive 
mechanisms underlying complex behaviours in different groups. By allowing an explicit 
identification of the level of analysis and by providing a stepwise framework for 
																																																								
4 Note that alternative frameworks have been proposed to investigate convergent evolution. For instance, 
building on Marr (1982)’s work, Seed et al. (2009a) suggest that the study of cognitive convergence should 
be based on the following levels of analysis: computation, representation and algorithm, and 
implementation. In the present thesis, I adopt Seed (2007)’ framework because it conveys, in my view, the 
most straightforward classification of the levels of analysis for investigating cognitive convergence. 
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studying analogous cognitive adaptations, this approach represents a useful tool to 
investigate convergent cognitive evolution. 
 
Corvids and cephalopods as model groups for studying the evolution of 
intelligence 
Among the groups of animals in which indicators of intelligence have been reported, 
corvids and coleoid cephalopods (henceforth cephalopods) are perhaps the most 
intriguing cases. These groups exhibit the most dramatic difference in brain features and 
evolutionary history with primates (Figs. 1.1, 1.2). The Corvidae are a family of oscine 
passerine birds that contains more than 100 species, including crows, jays, and magpies 
(Goodwin, 1986). The avian brain has a nuclear structure, whereas the mammalian brain 
is laminar (Clayton and Emery, 2015; Jarvis et al., 2005). These two alternative neural 
organizations resulted from approximately 300 MYA of independent evolution (Osvath 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, coleoid cephalopods are a successful group of shell-less 
molluscs encompassing more than 800 species among octopuses, cuttlefish and squid 
(Jerep et al., 2014). These molluscs diverged from vertebrates approximately 550 MYA 
ago. Cephalopods’ brain is formed by the aggregation of several enlarged ganglia that 
show the typical neuronal arrangement of invertebrates, with cell bodies surrounding 





Figure 1.2: Phylogenetic tree depicting the evolutionary relationship between corvids, cephalopods and 




Corvids and cephalopods are particularly interesting models also from another 
perspective. While most other groups of large-brained animals encompass a small 
number of species (e.g. apes, elephants) and/or inhabit only specific geographic ranges, 
such as the tropics (e.g. parrots), corvids and cephalopods are both highly specious 
lineages, characterized by an enormous variability in terms of habitats and social systems 
(Goodwin, 1986; Hanlon and Messenger, 2018). Corvids are found on all continents 
(except Antarctica) and in habitats as different as hot deserts and glaciers, with some 
species inhabiting astonishing diverse regions. For instance, the common raven (Corvus 
corax) can be found from Siberia to North Africa, and from Central America to Alaska. 
Social systems in corvids span from territorial pairs as in the Eurasian jays (Garrulus 
glandarius), and small family groups with non-breeding helpers as in Florida scrub-jays 
(Aphelocoma coerulescens), to large colonies as in rooks (Clayton and Emery, 2007). Further, 
individuals show great flexibility such that social systems may vary among different 
populations (Baglione et al., 2002), as well as during the ontogeny (Boucherie et al., 
2019). In a similar vein, cephalopods can be found in all marine habitats, from shallow 
waters to ocean depths and from tropical to polar region. Some species have remarkably 
large geographic distribution such as the common octopus (Octopus vulgaris), which is 
found in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Caribbean, and Japan seas. Further, social systems 
in cephalopods span from tendentially strict solitary life styles in octopuses, to breeding 
aggregation in some cuttlefish and up to gregarious schooling in squids (Schnell and 
Clayton, 2019). As result of the great speciousness and socioecological variability, the 
study of corvids and cephalopods can allow wide correlation analyses between proxies 
of intelligence and socioecological features, and thus a powerful testing of the main 
hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence. 
In the remaining part of this chapter I will review the current state of art in 
regard to the evolution of intelligence in corvids and cephalopods. By adopting Seed 
(2007)’s framework, I will subsequently discuss at what level of analysis corvids’ and 
apes’ cognition may have evolved convergently on the basis of the evidence available. In 
parallel I shall use the same approach to compare cephalopods with large-brained 
vertebrates. Finally, I will highlight key research gaps in each group, and outline how, by 
addressing these issues, this thesis will attempt at fostering a deeper level of understating 




1.5: CORVIDS’ COGNITIVE EVOLUTION 
 
How complex is corvid cognition? 
Indications that corvids may be endowed with complex cognition comes both from 
neuroanatomical and behavioural proxies. In regard to the former, corvids’ 
encephalization quotient is comparable to that of great apes and higher than that of any 
other group of birds (except from parrots; Emery, 2006; Jerison, 1973). In addition, as 
in apes, brain regions that are thought to be involved in complex cognition (i.e. 
nidopallium and mesopallium) are particularly enlarged in corvids (Rehkämper et al., 
1991; Sayol et al., 2016). In regard to the latter, a number of experiments have reported 
high levels of behavioural flexibility and provided evidence that cognition in corvids – as 
in apes – may involve mechanisms more complex than hardwired predispositions and 
associative learning. Due to the large amount of literature, I will not attempt to provide 
a comprehensive review of the topic. Rather, in what follows I wish to highlight what 
are in my view the most remarkable examples of behavioural evidence of complex 
cognition in corvids and apes. The reader may refer to the work of other authors for 
recent reviews (Clayton and Emery, 2015; Krupenye and Call, 2019; Taylor, 2014). 
One cognitive domain in which at least some corvids appear to be on par with 
apes is physical problem solving. Empirical evidence indicates that, similarly to apes 
(Bania et al., 2009; Martin-Ordas et al., 2012; Mulcahy et al., 2005), New Caledonian 
crows (Corvus moneduloides) and rooks (Corvus frugilegus) spontaneously choose and 
manufacture appropriate tools for a specific task, use tools to gain access to other 
objects that can in turn be used to acquire food (sequential tool use), and flexibly use 
multiple tools and/or strategies to solve similar tasks (Auersperg et al., 2011; Bird and 
Emery, 2009; Chappell and Kacelnik, 2002; Taylor et al., 2007). Further, these two 
species of corvids appear to rival great apes in solving trap-tube problems. In the classic 
version of the task, animals have to insert a stick in a clear horizontal tube and to push a 
bait outside the apparatus by avoiding a trap (a hole sealed on the bottom side and 
located in the middle part of the tube; Visalberghi and Limongelli, 1994). The 
performance of apes and corvids in a variety of modified version of this task suggests 
that both groups are capable of solving such problems through some level of causal 
understanding (Mulcahy and Call, 2006b; Seed et al., 2006, 2009b; Taylor et al., 2009).  
Chapter	1	
	 17	
A number of studies have also suggested that corvids and apes may share the ability to 
plan for the future5, namely that they may recall specific features of a past episode and 
act in the present to meet future motivational states. This capability is thought to be 
based on the same cognitive machinery involved in episodic-like memory (Clayton et al., 
2003; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), i.e. a process allowing to remember the what-
where-when feature of a past episode, which has been demonstrated in both corvids 
(Clayton and Dickinson, 1998) and apes (Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). The most 
compelling evidence that corvids may be able to plan for the future comes from caching 
experiments in jays (California scrub-jays: Correia et al., 2007; Raby et al., 2007; 
Eurasian jays: Cheke and Clayton, 2012). In the most recent study, Cheke & Clayton 
(2012) tested jays’ capability to plan for the future with a paradigm that relied on specific 
satiety, a phenomenon in which individuals experience a reduction of desire toward a 
specific kind of food as a result of having been fed that food to satiety (Balleine and 
Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). The experiment encompassed three 
trials, with each trial being formed by three stages. In trial 1 (stage 1), jays were 
presented with maintenance food and then allowed to cache food A and food B in two 
possible locations (location 1 and 2). A few hours later (stage 2), jays could eat one food 
to satiety (e.g. food A) and then retrieve the items that were cached in stage 1, but only 
from location 1. Finally, on the following day, jays could feed on the alternate food (e.g. 
food B) before having the possibility to retrieve items from the other location (e.g. 
location 2). Trials 2 and 3 were identical with the exception that food A or food B were 
provided in stage 1 rather than maintenance food. The authors found that on the first 
trial, jays cached the two kinds of food in similar proportions across the two locations. 
In later trials however, birds adjusted their caching pattern: jays tended to accumulate a 
given food in a specific location (e.g. food B in location 1) such that in stage 2 and 3 
they could retrieve the most desired food, i.e. the food they were not sated on at the 
time of recovery. Thus, results of this experiment are consistent with the possibility that 
Eurasian jays can perform an action in the present to meet a future motivational state 
(e.g. desire for a specific food) that is conflicting with the current motivational state. On 
the other hand, future planning in apes has been mainly tested in the context of tool use. 
For instance, Osvath and Osvath (2008) showed that chimpanzees and orang-utans 
select a tool over an immediate reward to gain access to more valuable reward in the 
future. Additional evidence also suggests that apes may save tools for the future to solve 
																																																								
5 Note that in the thesis I use ‘prospection abilities’ and ‘future planning abilities’ as synonymous.  
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experimental tasks (Mulcahy and Call, 2006a; but see Emery and Clayton, 2009), as well 
as spontaneously even without training (Osvath, 2009a).  
Another domain in which remarkable performance of both apes and corvids 
were reported is social cognition. Current evidence is consistent with the possibility that 
these animals may respond to the mental states of a conspecific, such as perspectives, 
desires, knowledge and beliefs (Theory of Mind). In regard to perspectives, multiple 
studies indicate that apes may take into account what others can see and hear to 
maximize individual benefits (Bräuer et al., 2007; Karg et al., 2015a; Melis et al., 2006). 
For instance, Melis et al. (2006) found that chimpanzees tend to reach for a reward 
through an opaque or a silent tunnel in the presence of a human competitor but show 
no preference between clear-opaque and silent-noisy tunnels when alone. In a similar 
vein, California scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica) and Eurasian jays appear to take into 
account the visual and acoustic perspective of others to minimize the risk of pilfering: 
they tend to cache in less visible locations (e.g. in the shadow, behind barriers, at 
distance) when observed by a conspecific, or in a non-noisy substrate when a 
conspecific cannot see but can hear them (Dally et al., 2005; Legg et al., 2016; Legg and 
Clayton, 2014; Shaw and Clayton, 2013; Stulp et al., 2009; for evidence in ravens see also 
Bugnyar et al., 2016). Interestingly enough, both scrub-jays and chimpanzees may also 
use self-experience to outperform competitors (Emery and Clayton, 2001; Karg et al., 
2015b). 
In regard to knowledge states, Kaminski et al. (2008) showed that chimpanzees 
distinguish between ignorant and informed conspecifics in a competitive task. 
Comparable evidence was reported in ravens (Bugnyar and Heinrich, 2005) and scrub-
jays (Dally et al., 2006). In particular, Dally et al. (2006) found that if allowed to cache in 
the presence of a conspecific and subsequently allowed to recover their caches whilst 
the same individual is present, scrub-jays tend to re-cache selectively those items that 
were hidden in the sight of that individual, compared to the items that were previously 
cached in the view of a different conspecific.  
Flexible social cognition in both groups however is not restricted to competitive 
scenarios. When sharing food with their mate, male Eurasian jays select the food 
according to the specific satiety of the females, thus suggesting they may be able to 
attribute desires to conspecifics (Ostojić et al., 2013, 2014, 2016). On the other hand, 
Buttelmann et al. (2017) presented apes with an active helping paradigm, providing 
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some indication that apes’ sensitivity to beliefs may not be only implicit (Krupenye et al., 
2016), but it can also translate into actions.  
 
Evolutionary pressures 
According to the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis, three factors may have played a 
key role in the evolution of intelligence: generalist diets, extractive foraging (particularly 
with tools) and spatio-temporal dispersed resources (Byrne, 1997; Milton, 1981; Parker 
and Gibson, 1977). Were these factors relevant in the evolution of corvids? Most 
corvids are highly omnivorous, feeding on fruits, berries, insects, eggs, and even 
vertebrates (e.g. reptiles, small birds and mammals; Goodwin, 1986). Further, these 
birds employ various extractive foraging techniques, often requiring the concerted 
actions of feet and beak (Goodwin, 1951). For instance, rooks dig in the soil for roots 
and invertebrates (Lockie, 1956), while Eurasian jays and carrion crows crack open nuts 
and mussels, respectively (Goodwin, 1951; Whiteley et al., 1990). New Caledonian 
crows and Hawaiian crows (Corvus hawaiiensis) routinely use tools during foraging (Rutz 
et al., 2010, 2016). The former, which have been studied in more detail, manufacture 
different kinds of tools: hook-like tools are fashioned from twigs/leaves to extract 
insects from cervices, whereas stepped-cut tools are obtained from Pandanus leaves and 
used to probe for prey under leafy detritus (Hunt, 1996; Hunt and Gray, 2004a, 2004b). 
However, despite sporadic reports existing for other species (Boire et al., 2002), tool-
mediated foraging is not widespread within corvids. Given that multiple species of 
corvids can develop tool use behaviour in captivity despite not habitually using tools in 
the wild (e.g. rooks, Bird and Emery, 2009; Eurasian jays, Cheke et al., 2011; California 
scrub-jays, Logan et al., 2016), these data are unlikely to be explained by the lack of 
cognitive capacity for using tools. Rather, the rarity of tool-mediated foraging in corvids 
may stem from the constraints and opportunities set by their morphology. By lacking 
grasping hands and ape-like physical strength, corvids may have limited opportunity to 
use tools when compared to apes (Seed et al., 2009a). In parallel, corvids’ beak may act 
as an in-built tool for certain tasks (e.g. to dig in the soil), such that tool-use may more 
rarely confer benefits to corvids than to apes (Seed et al., 2009a). If this is the case then 
tool-mediated foraging may not have been as crucial as a factor in the evolution of 
corvids as it has been proposed in the case of primates.  
Finally, corvids rely substantially on spatio-temporally dispersed resources. With 
a few exceptions, these birds are food hoarders, hiding food for later consumption (de 
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Kort and Clayton, 2006). Specialized cachers (e.g. most jays) hide large amount of staple 
food (up to 33000 items/year in Clark’s nutcrackers; Kamil and Balda, 1985) in periods 
of seasonal abundance and retrieve them during the harsher time of the year. On the 
other hand, moderate cachers (e.g. crows, ravens) hoard a variety of food types 
(including perishable items, e.g. insects) throughout the year but never depend on cache 
retrieval for surviving. Caching may pose important cognitive challenges particularly in 
the case of moderate cachers who hide foods that degrade at different rates. The need 
to integrate information about what food was cached when and in which location may 
have selected for episodic-like memory and perhaps future planning abilities 
(Grodzinski and Clayton, 2010). Since the ancestor of corvids was likely to be a 
moderate cacher (de Kort and Clayton, 2006), such cognitive adaptations may have 
evolved in the corvids’ ancestor, such that they may be widespread among extant 
species. Therefore, the ecological challenges of caching may be comparable to those 
experienced by primates feeding on tropical ripe fruits (Seed et al., 2009a). 
In contrast, the Social Intelligence Hypothesis posits that cognitive 
sophistication evolves for competing, cooperating and acquiring information from 
others. Thus, cognition is considered as an adaptation for navigating complex social 
environments (Byrne, 2018; Whiten and van de Waal, 2017). Were these selective 
pressures relevant in the evolution of corvids?  
When group size is used as a proxy for social complexity, birds violate the 
prediction of the Social Intelligence Hypothesis: brain size does not correlate with group 
size; rather long-term monogamous species have the larger brains (Beauchamp and 
Fernández-Juricic, 1999; Emery et al., 2007; Shultz and Dunbar, 2007). However, it has 
been argued that these data do not reflect the lack of relevance of social pressure in 
birds’ cognitive evolution. The fact that brain size positively correlates with long-term 
monogamy in birds – rather than with group size as in primates – may result from key 
differences in reproductive biology and, consequently, social system between birds and 
mammals. Parental investment is remarkably more skewed toward females in mammals 
than in birds, particularly for avian species raising altricial offspring, which typically 
requires bi-parental cares (Orians, 1969; Sibly et al., 2012). According to Emery et al. 
(2007) this biological difference between groups has important implications in term of 
cognitive challenges faced by birds and mammals within bonds with pair mates. 
Specifically, long-term monogamous birds need to maintain enduring and cooperative 
relationships that may pose challenges comparable to those experienced by primates in 
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their bonds with multiple members of the group. Evidence from corvids supports this 
idea. For instance, rook pair-mates – who pair for life and raise altricial chicks – exhibit 
high levels of cooperation (e.g. nest building, offspring feeding, predator defence), 
synchronization, affiliative behaviour (e.g. food sharing, allopreening), and third-party 
affiliations (Emery et al., 2007; Seed et al., 2007). Others however have argued that the 
complexity of monogamous relationships in corvids does not cover the whole story. It 
is common for juvenile corvids to join mixed-sexes, temporary flocks during a number 
of years before forming breeding pairs (Goodwin, 1986). Evidence in ravens indicates 
that these ‘juvenile societies’ resemble primates’ fission-fusion groups, requiring the 
birds to keep track of individual ranks, build alliances, acquire information form others 
(e.g. food location) and maintain ‘friendships’ (Boucherie et al., 2019; Braun and 
Bugnyar, 2012; Loretto et al., 2012). Thus, during a limited ontogenetic stage, corvids 
and primates may share quite similar social challenges.  
An additional factor that is thought to have played a key role in corvids’ 
cognitive evolution is caching. Due to the evidence of seemingly complex cognition 
expressed by corvids in the caching context (e.g. Cheke and Clayton, 2012; Dally et al., 
2006), and because of the ecological relevance of food hoarding in this group, it appears 
plausible that a cognitive arms race between cachers and pilferers may have elicited 
complex sophistication to maximized the benefits of both players (Bugnyar and 
Kotrschal, 2002; Dally et al., 2005; Grodzinski and Clayton, 2010).  
 Finally, with regard to social learning, a number of studies indicate that corvids 
rely on the vicarious acquisition of information in the wild. For instance, jackdaws are 
more likely to consume novel foods after witnessing a conspecific feeding on that food 
(Greggor et al., 2016), while American crows learn to recognize novel threats from peers 
(horizontal transmission) and from parents (vertical transmission; Cornell et al., 2012). 
Further, social learning is involved in the development of tool manufacture in New 
Caledonian crows (Kenward et al., 2006), a set of behaviours that appear to vary across 
populations as a result of cultural processes (Hunt and Gray, 2003). However, the 
number of behavioural traditions reported in corvids is not comparable to those 
observed among primates, such that it is not clear whether social learning played a 
crucial role in corvids’ evolution as it has been proposed for primates.  
In sum, corvids face a number of socioecological challenges that, although not 




Level of convergence 
Based on these pieces of evidence, to what extent can we consider corvids to be akin to 
‘feathered apes’ (Emery, 2004)? More specifically, at what level of analysis can corvids’ 
and apes’ cognition be said to have converged? Current evidence may provide sufficient 
grounds to support the idea that corvids and apes may have converged at the second 
level of analysis. Specifically, these groups may not just perform comparably complex 
and flexible behaviours (first level); they may also share cognitive underpinnings that are 
to some extent more complex than hardwired predispositions and associative learning 
(second level)6. What about the third and deeper level of convergence? In an influential 
paper, Emery and Clayton (2004) hypothesized that corvids and apes may have 
independently evolved a similar cognitive-tool kit encompassing four mental pillars: 
causal reasoning, flexibility, imagination and prospection. In my view, there are two 
main issues that currently impair a satisfactory evaluation of this idea. The first concerns 
a systemic problem in the field of comparative cognition. As mentioned earlier – due to 
the lack of a solid description and formalization of intelligence – complex cognitive 
processes tend to be invoked through a process of exclusion of simpler mechanisms. As 
a result, it is currently challenging to test whether different lineages, such as corvids and 
apes, may also have converged at the third level of analysis, namely that similar cognitive 
processes may underlie their flexible behaviour. The second problem is more specifically 
related to corvids, and it more likely reflects the fact that this group encompasses a 
substantially larger number of species and it is a far more recent model for the study of 
cognition than apes. As noted by Seed (2007), despite evidence of complex cognition 
being available for both apes and corvids, in the case of the former such evidence 
results from a systematic investigation of different cognitive domains in the same 
species, with chimpanzees being the most notable example. In contrast, evidence of 
complex cognition in corvids is more spread within the family, with some cognitive 
abilities being investigated predominantly/exclusively in a small subset of species. For 
instance, the idea that corvids are excellent physical problem solvers hinges 
predominantly on the study of the Corvus genus (e.g. New Caledonian crows, rooks), 
																																																								
6 Note however that a number of alternative explanations have proposed to interpret the experimental 
evidence of apparently complex cognition for both corvids and apes (e.g., Problem solving: Ghirlanda and 
Lind, 2017; Hennefield et al., 2018; Penn and Povinelli, 2007a; social cognition: Heyes, 2015, 2017; Penn 
and Povinelli, 2007b; future planning: Lind, 2018; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). As result, it is still a 
matter of dispute whether corvids and apes are capable of cognitive processes that are more complex than 
associative learning and hardwired predisposition. 
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whereas the notion that corvids are capable of planning for the future mainly relies on 
the study of California scrub-jays and Eurasian jays. This is not to say that the 
species/genus of corvids mentioned above have never been tested in other cognitive 
domains, or that physical cognition and prospection abilities have never been sampled 
in other corvid species. Yet, such studies are rarer and sometimes failed to provide 
convincing support for complex cognition. For example, California scrub-jays 
performed poorly in a series of tool use experiments (Logan et al., 2016) and string 
pulling tasks (Hofmann et al., 2016). Further, the recent evidence that ravens (another 
member of the Corvus genus) can plan in the context of tool use and bartering (Kabadayi 
and Osvath 2017) has been challenged (Lind, 2018; Redshaw et al., 2017), such that 
solid conclusion on prospection abilities in the Corvus genus, or in corvid species other 
than California scrub-jays and Eurasian jays, cannot be drawn. Therefore, while claims 
about a cognitive tool-kit in apes can be abstracted from (relatively) complete 
investigations of the different abilities in question within each species, current claims of 
a cognitive tool-kit in corvids are based on partial investigations where different 
cognitive abilities are assessed in different species/genera. As such, it is currently not 
clear whether the remarkable cognitive complexity observed at the level of the corvid 
family results from complementary cognitive specializations in different subgroups, or 
from a domain general cognitive tool-kit shared by individual species of the corvid 
family as hypothesized by Emery & Clayton (2004; cf. Seed 2007). 
A useful approach to clarify this issue is to conduct a systematic investigation of 
different cognitive domains in a single species of corvids. This multifaceted testing of 
cognitive complexity in one species will foster insights into whether corvids are indeed 
endowed with a domain general cognitive-tool kit, thus ultimately facilitating the study 
of convergent cognitive evolution between corvids and apes, at a deeper level of analysis. 
The first objective of this thesis will be to adopt such an approach to the study of the 
Eurasian jay, a corvid species for which some indication of complex complexity has 
been reported. To this end, I will attempt to fill the gap in our current knowledge by 
probing into problem solving, future planning and social cognition abilities of these jays.  
Chapter	1	
	24	
1.6: THE EURASIAN JAY 
 
Socioecology 
The Eurasian jay (Garrulus glandarius; Fig. 1.3) is a species of corvids inhabiting 
woodlands and copses across vast geographic regions, from Scandinavia to North 
Africa, and from Russia to Eastern Asia. Like most corvids, these jays have an 
omnivorous diet, which includes insects, berries, fruits, eggs, young birds, and other 
small vertebrates (e.g. mice, lizards; Goodwin, 1986). However, acorns are usually a 
staple food. The Eurasian jay is a specialized cacher who hoards nuts in large quantities 
during autumn and then retrieves hidden food during the harsh winter season (Bossema, 
1979; de Kort and Clayton, 2006). Cached items are protected from pilferers (both 
conspecifics and heterospecifics) through aggressive displays, or by displacing the items 
to novel locations (Bossema, 1979; Goodwin, 1951). Eurasian jays form cooperative 
monogamous pairs, with both parents engaging in nest building and feeding of chicks, 
and with males feeding the females before and during incubation (Clayton and Emery, 
2007; Goodwin, 1986). During breeding season, pairs typically occupy non-overlapping 
territories which are actively defended, whereas individuals appear more tolerant to the 
presence of conspecifics (e.g. neighbours) at other times of the year (Grahn, 1990). In 
contrast to other species of corvids (e.g. raven), Eurasian jays do not form large flocks, 








Cognition: what we do and do not know  
To date, different aspects of Eurasian jay cognition have been investigated (Tab. 1.1). 
Yet a number of issues remain unexplored and/or appear in need of further clarification 
(Tab. 1.1). In what follows I shall summarize the available literature and unanswered key 
questions. 
With regard to physical cognition, these jays have been used as a model in 
developmental studies of object permanence (Zucca et al., 2007) and causal 
relationships between objects (e.g. support intuition; Davidson et al., 2017). To the best 
of my knowledge, only two studies have been published on physical problem solving in 
Eurasian jays (Cheke et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2016). Interestingly, both studies showed 
that – although these jays are not known for using tools in the wild – they can develop 
(learn) tool use behaviours in captivity. Cheke et al. (2011) first trained jays to solve an 
object-dropping task: birds had to learn to insert a tool (e.g. a stone) into a vertical tube, 
an action that provided access to a food reward placed inside the apparatus. 
Subsequently, jays were presented with a variety of tasks requiring them to select a 
functional tool or apparatus. For instance, in one experiment jays were presented with a 
liquid-filled apparatus in which a floating reward was placed. Birds had to choose 
between inserting sinking objects or floating objects, with the former being the 
functional tool, i.e. only sinking objects would cause the level of liquid into the tube to 
rise, thus making the floating reward reachable. The performance of Eurasian jays in 
this test indicated that jays could learn a preference toward functional sinking tools. 
More in general, across all the experiments, performance suggested that tool use 
behaviour in this species relied on the interplay between instrumental learning and 
causal understanding. More recently, Miller et al. (2016) investigated if these jays could 
learn to solve an object-dropping task by observing a conspecific. The study failed to 
find evidence that Eurasian jays can socially learn to use tools; however, it corroborated 
the result that tool use behaviour can emerge through training. Building on this evidence, 
a number of experimental questions that have already been addressed in other species of 
corvids can be investigated in Eurasian jays. Can these jays select functional tools 
according to other physical properties, such as size and shape? Are these jays capable of 
flexibly using different kinds of tools and/or different strategies to solve a similar task? 
Can these jays use sticks as tools? 
With regard to future planning abilities, a single study has been conducted in 
Eurasian jays. Cheke and Clayton (2012)’s experiment, which I have described 
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previously, is often acknowledged as one of the most convincing piece of evidence that 
corvids, or perhaps non-human animals, may be able to plan for the future 
(Shettleworth, 2010). However, alternative explanations that do not involve planning 
have been proposed to interpret corvids’ performances in future planning experiments 
(e.g. Dickinson, 2011). For instance, one hypothesis – which I will refer to as the 
‘Compensatory Caching Hypothesis’ – suggests that jays may be endowed with a natural 
propensity to distribute resources uniformly, thereby hoarding items in areas where 
food was not available in past, or caching a given type of food in locations in which that 
specific food was not previously experienced (Premack, 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 
2008). This valuable lower level explanation for apparent future planning abilities of 
corvids in the caching context, still need to be tested empirically. The Eurasian jay is an 
ideal model species to investigate the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis, albeit this 
alternative interpretation was not formulated to address specifically the results obtained 
by Cheke and Clayton (2012). 
 
 
 Table 1.1: Summary of the main findings and open questions (yellow cells) with regard to the physical 





Finally, social cognition is the area of cognition on which Eurasian jays’ research has 
been focusing more intensively. As mentioned earlier, caching experiments indicate that 
these jays may be sensitive to the visual and acoustic perspective of conspecifics (Legg 
and Clayton, 2014; Shaw and Clayton, 2013), while food sharing experiments suggest 
that they may take into account another agent’s desire (Ostojić et al., 2013, 2014, 2016). 
Recently however, Ostojić et al. (2017) showed that Eurasian jays may also take into 
Tab Chp1 Domain Reported Effects & Open Questions References
Physical    Learn to use tools (object dropping tasks) through training Cheke et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2016
Problem    Learn to select functional tool based on density Cheke et al. 2011
Solving    Can Ej select functional tools according to the size and shape of objects?
   Can Ej use sticks as tools?
Future    Distribute caches to maximize future benefit, in line with planning abilities Checke and Clayton 2012
Planning    Is future-oriented caching in Ej underpinned by predispositions or prospection abilities?
   Protect caches by responding to the visual perspective  of a conspecific Legg and Clayton 2014
Social    Protect caches by responding to the acoustic perspective of a conspecific Shaw and Clayton 2013
Cognition    Protect caches by responding to the current desire of a conspecific Ostojic et al. 2017
   Adjust food sharing by responding to the current desire of the pair mate Ostojic et al. 2013, 2014, 2016
   Can Ej integrate cues about others’ desires and perspectives to protect their caches?
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account another bird’s desire to protect their caches, although this may have been 
achieved by responding to the conspecific’ behaviour, without the need to consider 
others’ mental states. Building on this, it would be particularly interesting to ask whether 
jays – like humans – are capable of taking into account different mental states (or 
behavioural cues correlating with mental states) simultaneously. For instance, can jay 
integrate others’ desire and perspective?  These questions will be empirically investigated 
in this thesis in order to gain further insight into the cognitive complexity of problem 
solving, future planning and social cognition in the Eurasian jay. 
 
 
1.7: CEPHALOPODS’ COGNITIVE EVOLUTION 
 
How complex is cephalopods’ cognition? 
Coleoid cephalopods are endowed with a remarkably complex brain that resembles that 
of some vertebrates in size (corrected for body size; Packard, 1972) and in density of 
interneuron connections (Young, 1991, 1995). Among the various ganglia that 
constitute the cephalopod brain, the vertical lobe – which plays a pivotal role in learning 
and memory (Fiorito and Chichery, 1995; Shomrat et al., 2015) – has been compared to 
regions of the mammalian cortex and avian nidopallium (Edelman and Seth, 2009; 
Young, 1995). Cephalopods also exhibit rich and flexible behavioural repertoires. For 
instance, octopuses use a variety of solid objects (e.g. stones, shells) and even water, as 
tools for different purposes (Finn et al., 2009; Mather, 2016), whereas many species, 
particularly among cuttlefish and squid, appear to employ flexible mating tactics (Brown 
et al., 2012; Moynihan and Rodaniche, 1982; Schnell and Clayton, 2019) and anti-
predatory strategies (Langridge et al., 2007; Staudinger et al., 2011, 2013b). To date, 
however, the cognitive mechanisms underpinning cephalopods’ behaviour are still 
largely unexplored. Hence, it is not clear whether the behavioural flexibility exhibited by 
this groups is actually the expression of complex cognitive abilities. Nevertheless, some 
intriguing evidence supporting the idea that cephalopods may be endowed with a 
vertebrate-like cognitive complexity is available. A study by Jozet-Alves et al. (2013) 
indicated that cuttlefish – like corvids – may possess episodic-like memory. Given that 
this form of memory is thought to be based on the same cognitive machinery required 
to plan for the future (Clayton et al., 2003; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), results of 
this study raise the possibility that cephalopods may also have prospective cognition (see 
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also Billard et al., 2020). More recently, Yang and Chiao (2016) found that number 
discrimination skills in cuttlefish are comparable to those of primates, and may involve 
an analogous mechanism of numerical representation. Further, this study also showed 
that quality discrimination in cuttlefish is influenced by the hunger state, akin to 
economic decision making in humans (Yang and Chiao, 2016). Another interesting line 
of evidence concerns problem solving in octopus. Richter et al. (2016) presented 
octopuses with a series of tasks requiring the animals to retrieve a baited L-shaped food 
container. Octopuses appeared not to rely on simple learning mechanisms to solve the 




The evolution of cephalopods has been attracting the interest of scientists for decades. 
This topic however has been traditionally investigated with a focus on sophisticated 
biological and physiological traits such as the camera eye, suckered arms, dynamic 
colour skins, and buoyancy mechanisms (Messenger, 2001; Packard, 1972; Voight et al., 
1995). These adaptations, as well as complex behaviours, are thought to have evolved as 
a result of the competition and predation exerted by marine vertebrates (Hanlon and 
Messenger, 2018; Packard, 1972). The study of cognitive evolution in cephalopods has 
received far less attention. In a popular science book, Godfrey-Smith (2016) recently 
suggested that ecological challenges (e.g. extractive foraging, generalist diets) may have 
played a role in the evolution of cephalopods’ cognition. Nevertheless, the relevance of 
the main hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence has not yet been properly 
evaluated in this group. As a result, it is currently unclear whether similar evolutionary 
pressures may have elicited the emergence of large brains and behavioural flexibility in 
cephalopods and in the main groups of intelligent vertebrates.  
 
Level of convergence 
Mather and Dickel (2017) provocatively suggested that cephalopods may share with 
corvids and apes a cognitive tool-kit hinging on causal reasoning, flexibility, imagination 
and prospection. Thus, according to the authors, cephalopods may have converged with 
large brained vertebrates at the deepest level of analysis, i.e. behavioural flexibility in 
these groups may be underpinned by similar cognitive processes. In my view, this is idea 
is currently highly speculative. This is because current indications of cognitive 
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complexity in cephalopods are still quite preliminary. Further, given the key differences 
in sociality and life history between cephalopods and intelligent vertebrates, it is not 
clear whether the same evolutionary pressures may have shaped the evolution of these 
groups. Specifically, cephalopods have fast life histories (e.g. life spans shorter than two 
years, no parental care, a single reproductive event; Rocha et al., 2001), and do not 
appear to engage in complex social bonds, even in the case of the highly social squids 
(Boal, 1996; Schnell and Clayton, 2019).  
It will be the second objective of this thesis to lay the groundwork for studying 
convergent cognitive evolution between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates. By 
reviewing current indications of behavioural flexibility in cephalopods I will first 
evaluate whether the available evidence is sufficient to support a case of behavioural 
convergence (first level of analysis) among these groups. Subsequently I will attempt at 
devising an evolutionary hypothesis for the emergence of large brains and behavioural 
flexibility in cephalopods. Finally, I will propose novel behavioural paradigms that may 
allow to explore the cognitive underpinning cephalopods’ complex behaviours.  
 
 
1.8: THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
In summary, a number of distantly related lineages may have evolved intelligence 
independently from primates. Among these groups, the corvids and the cephalopods 
represent two particularly interesting cases. With regard to the corvids, current evidence 
supports the idea that cognitive abilities more complex than hardwired predispositions 
and associative processes may have evolved convergently in corvids and apes, in 
response to comparable socioecological pressures. However, further research is needed 
to evaluate whether convergent cognitive evolution between these two groups may have 
occurred at a deeper level of analysis (e.g. Seed 2009a; Seed et al., 2007), namely if a 
similar cognitive tool-kit underpins behavioural flexibility in both corvids and apes 
(Emery and Clayton, 2004). A key factor constraining the evaluation of this hypothesis 
is that evidence of cognitive sophistication in different domains is not currently available 
within the same species of corvids. Hence it is not possible to distinguish whether the 
apparent domain general cognitive complexity of corvids is the expression of similar 
cognitive abilities shared by individual members of the corvid family, or rather whether 
it is the result of complementary cognitive specializations among different subgroups. 
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As for the cephalopods, preliminary evidence is consistent with the possibility that these 
molluscs may have independently evolved large brains and behavioural flexibility that 
are to some extent comparable to those of vertebrates. Yet, because the study of the 
cognitive evolution in cephalopods is very young, it is not yet clear how complex their 
cognition is, nor which pressures may have been responsible for their cognitive 
evolution. As a result, very little can be said about the level at which they may have 
converged with intelligent vertebrates. 
The general aim of this thesis is to gain further insights into the process of 
convergent cognitive evolution. My first objective is to take one step further in 
understanding how deep the cognitive convergence between corvids and apes may be. 
To this end I will report four empirical studies exploring cognitive complexity among 
different domains in a single species of corvids, the Eurasian jay. My second objective is 
to investigate the potentials of cephalopods as a novel model group for the study of 
convergent cognitive evolution. I will attempt at laying both theoretical and 
methodological groundwork for testing these fascinating molluscs. This dissertation is 
therefore divided into two parts: in Chapters 2-5 I will focus on corvids, whereas in 
Chapter 6 I will turn my attention to the cephalopods. 
To begin addressing the first objective, Chapter 2 focuses on tool use abilities in 
Eurasian jays. Previous research has suggested that these jays may learn a preference 
toward functional sinking tools (over floating tools) to solve water-displacement tasks 
(Cheke et al., 2011). Through two tool selectivity tests, this chapter explores whether 
Eurasian jays can select appropriate tools according to other physical properties, namely 
size and shape. Additionally, jays’ capability of using novel tools (sticks) to solve a task 
with a familiar apparatus is also evaluated. In contrast to fellow corvids (e.g. rooks; Bird 
and Emery, 2009), jays could not spontaneously adjust their selection according to the 
functionality of the tools, thus suggesting that they may be endowed with more limited 
tool selectivity abilities. Yet, supporting previous findings in this species, jays’ 
performance indicates they are able to modify their tool use behaviour through learning. 
When presented with sticks, jays could use these novel objects to acquire food rewards 
from a familiar apparatus, a finding which represents the first evidence that Eurasian 
jays are capable of using sticks as tools. 
Chapter 3 further investigates complex cognition in Eurasian jays by focusing 
on future planning abilities. Caching experiments in jays are often regarded one of the 
most convincing piece of evidence that non-human animals may be able to plan for the 
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future. However, alternative explanations accounting for jays’ performances in these 
studies have been proposed, although these have to date never been empirically tested. 
For instance, the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis suggests that jays’ apparent future 
planning behaviour is instead the expression of a natural propensity to distribute 
resources uniformly. In this chapter, I report a novel paradigm that was designed to test 
the hypothesis that jays are capable of future planning against the Compensatory 
Caching Hypothesis. Interestingly, jays’ performance did not provide support for either 
of the two contrasting hypotheses, thus challenging both alternative accounts. 
Social cognition is the domain that has been more intensively investigated in the 
Eurasian jay. Previous research found that these jays employ flexible anti-pilfering 
strategies, thereby minimizing the risk of cache loss by responding to the visual 
perspective (Legg and Clayton, 2014) or the desire toward specific food of a conspecific 
(Ostojić et al., 2017). Building on this work, Chapter 4 investigates whether Eurasian 
jays are capable of integrating information about another bird’s visual perspective and 
desire to most effectively protect their caches. Across two experiments, jays’ caching 
pattern consistently provided no evidence that they can integrate multiple social 
information. However, these results could not support previously reported effects 
either: jays’ performance did not show that these birds can adjust their caching 
behaviour by responding to a single social cue (either to the visual perspective or the 
desire of another bird). This finding is surprising considering that the procedures 
employed in these experiments closely matched those previously used by Legg and 
Clayton (2014) and by Ostojić et al. (2017) to show, respectively, that Eurasian jays 
respond to others’ visual perspective and desire in the caching context.  
To further explore this unexpected outcome, Chapter 5 investigates the 
reliability of the two original effects, independently. In one experiment I conduct a 
replication of Legg and Clayton (2014)’s study and find that jays did not tend to cache 
behind an opaque barrier in the presence of a conspecific. This result is in line with the 
outcomes of the previous chapter, which shows that jays could not adjust their caching 
behaviour according to the visual perspective of a conspecific. In a second experiment, I 
test whether a minor difference in set-up between the experiments conducted in 
Chapter 3 and in Ostojić et al. (2017)’s study – i.e. the presence/absence of a clear 
barrier – could have influenced jays’ capability to respond to the desire of conspecifics 
across the studies. Consistently between the two slightly different set-ups, jays exhibit a 
caching pattern that does not support their ability to respond to another bird’s desire, 
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thus further corroborating the results of the previous chapter. Taken together, these two 
experiments appear to put into question the reliability and robustness of the effects 
reported in the original studies. 
In Chapter 6 I turn my attention to the cephalopods. I first review the most 
relevant cases of behavioural flexibility in this group. I suggest that current evidence 
appears solid enough to hypothesize that cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates 
may have converged at the behavioural level (i.e. first level of analysis). Subsequently, I 
outline a hypothesis for the evolution of cognition in this group, in relation to the main 
hypotheses discussed for vertebrates. Additionally, I present a number of novel 
experimental paradigms to test cephalopods’ cognitive underpinnings in different 
domains.  
Finally, in Chapter 7 I summarize the main outcomes of my empirical studies in 
the Eurasian jay, and my theoretical and methodological study in cephalopods. Relating 
back to the two objectives of this thesis, I discuss the implications of my findings. 
Specifically, I consider whether the hypothesis that corvids are endowed with a domain-
general cognitive tool-kit is supported in the Eurasian jay, and evaluate the potentials of 
cephalopods as a novel model group for the study of convergent cognitive evolution. I 
conclude by outlining future research avenues that may deepen our current 










Eurasian jays have not been reported to use tools in the wild, yet they can be trained to 
solve object-dropping tasks, i.e. to insert a tool into an apparatus to release a food 
reward. Previous research suggests the these jays can learn a preference toward 
functional tools – objects allowing to obtain a food reward placed inside an apparatus – 
according to their density (Cheke et al., 2011). However, it is not yet known whether 
they can also select functional tools (tool selectivity) according to other physical 
properties such as size and shape, and use different kinds of tools to solve a similar task. 
In this chapter I conducted three object-dropping experiments aimed at exploring these 
abilities in Eurasian jays. In Experiment 2.1, jays tended to select large stones as tools 
irrespective of the diameter of the apparatus. However, jays progressively developed a 
preference for the small tool, which was functional with both the wide and the narrow 
apparatuses. In Experiment 2.2, only vertically-oriented long stones could fit into the 
narrow apparatus, whereas both long and round stones were functional with the wide 
apparatus. Jays showed a preference for the long stone and, with the narrow apparatus, 
tended to achieve the correct manipulation after one or more unsuccessful attempts. In 
Experiment 2.3, jays were able to use sticks and adopt a novel technique on the same 
object-dropping apparatus, thus providing the first evidence that Eurasian jays can use 
sticks as tools. Taken together, these results indicate that Eurasian jays may have limited 
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In Chapter 1, I introduced corvids – a family of large brained birds thought to possess 
remarkable cognitive abilities (Emery and Clayton, 2004) – as an important model for 
studying the evolution of cognition in general, and convergent evolution in particular. 
The first objective of this thesis is to investigate to what extent different cognitive 
abilities reported across different corvid species can also be found within one species, 
the Eurasian jay. To begin addressing this objective, in this chapter I focus on one 
iconic expression of corvids’ sophisticated cognition, namely their skill in solving 
physical problems by using tools.  
The most prominent example of corvid tool use comes from the New 
Caledonian crow, a species considered to be among the most proficient tool users in the 
animal kingdom. These birds are, together with Hawaiian crows, the only corvid species 
currently known to develop tool use behaviours in the absence of training (Kenward et 
al., 2005; Klump et al., 2018; Rutz et al., 2016). Individual practice and social inputs, 
however, appear to be essential for juvenile New Caledonian crows to acquire some of 
the more complex tool behaviours habitually performed in the wild, such as the 
manufacture of hooked stick tools or stepped pandanus tools (Holzhaider et al., 2010; 
Kenward et al., 2006). Growing evidence indicates that, although relying on an inborn 
predisposition for manipulating objects (for a review see Amodio et al., 2018), tool use 
behaviours in New Caledonian crows may entail complex physical cognition. For 
instance, tool manufacture in these crows varies across populations and represents an 
example of behavioural tradition (Hunt & Gray, 2003) that, according to a recent study, 
may be sustained through a mechanism of mental template matching (Jelbert et al., 
2018). Furthermore, studies in captivity indicate that New Caledonian crows may be 
capable of flexibly selecting functional tools by encoding relevant features of objects: 
these crows have been reported to select or manufacture tools of appropriate length to 
acquire out-of-reach baits (Chappell and Kacelnik, 2002; Knaebe et al., 2017), choose 
the most suitable raw materials (e.g. plant species) to shape hook tools (Klump et al., 
2019), and distinguish between light and heavy objects by observing the movement of 
objects in the breeze (Jelbert et al., 2019). New Caledonian crows have also been found 
to build composite tools (von Bayern et al., 2018), solve sequential tool use tasks (Taylor 
et al., 2007; Wimpenny et al., 2009), and – when presented with a multi-access apparatus 
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– acquire food rewards by using up to four alternative strategies involving two different 
tools (i.e. sticks and balls; Auersperg et al., 2011).  
Corvid species not known to habitually use tools in the wild also exhibit 
impressive skills in solving problems by using tools. Possibly the most famous case are 
rooks. Bird and Emery (2009) conducted a series of object-dropping experiments 
demonstrating that these birds are capable of tool selectivity: they can select functional 
tools based on their physical properties (e.g. size, shape). Rooks were presented with a 
set of tools differing in one feature (e.g. size) and with an object dropping apparatus, a 
transparent box with a baited, collapsible platform in the inside and a vertical tube on 
the top. To solve the task, birds had to select a functional tool (i.e. an object that could 
fit into the tube) and to drop it into the vertical tube of the apparatus, an action that 
would collapse the internal platform and thus release the food reward. In the size 
selectivity test, rooks could choose between three stones of different sizes. They were 
tested in two conditions: in the first half of the trials stones of all sizes were functional 
(Wide tube condition), whereas in the second half of trials only the small stones could fit 
into the apparatus (Narrow tube condition). Rooks were reported to have immediately 
switched their preference for large stones in the Wide tube condition to small stones in 
the Narrow tube condition. In the shape selectivity test, rooks were provided with two 
stones of different shapes and were again tested in the Wide and Narrow tube conditions. 
Rooks preferentially selected and correctly oriented long stones (over non-functional 
round stones) in the Narrow tube condition, in which only vertically-oriented long stones 
were functional (Bird and Emery, 2009). The authors found no evidence that rooks’ 
preference toward tools of appropriate size and shape emerged through learning, such 
that birds may have spontaneously adjusted their selection on the basis of the feature 
determining whether or not tools were functional. In a follow-up test, Bird and Emery 
(2009) showed that rooks can acquire food rewards from the same apparatus by using 
sticks, i.e. tools that differed from the ones they have been trained with, and that 
required a different technique. Rooks dropped heavy sticks in the same way they had 
previously dropped the stones, but they adopted a distinct technique to solve the task 
with light sticks: they held the tool with their beak and pushed it downward to collapse 
the baited platform. Through a further set of experiments, Bird and Emery (2009) 
found that rooks are also capable of solving a sequential tool use task, as well as 
fashioning functional tools by removing side branches from twigs or shaping hook-like 
tools from straight wire.  
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Common ravens are another example of corvids that can use tools in captivity (e.g. 
Gallot and Gruber, 2019), although they do not habitually exhibit such behaviours in 
the wild. Kabadayi and Osvath (2017) recently reported that one raven successfully 
solved an object-dropping task on the first training trial, and subsequently employed an 
alternative tactic when stones were unavailable: the bird filled the apparatus with parts 
of the aviary floor, and thereafter pecked at the substrate when it came within reach 
(Kabadayi and Osvath, 2017). Although anecdotal, this observation suggests that ravens, 
like New Caledonian crows and rooks, may be capable of using different kinds of tools 
and devising alternative strategies to acquire food from the same apparatus.  
The flexibility in tool-use behaviours reported in these studies appears to 
indicate that complex physical cognition may be widespread within the Corvus genus, a 
subgroup of corvids to which rooks, common ravens, New Caledonian crows and 
Hawaiian crows belong. Why tool use in the wild is only exhibited by New Caledonian 
crows and Hawaiian crows may be explained by a number of factors, including stronger 
inborn predispositions for manipulating tools (Amodio et al., 2018; Kenward et al., 2005, 
2006), as well as idiosyncratic features of their habitats (e.g. reduced risk of predation, 
lack of extractive foraging competitors; Rutz and St Clair, 2012). As discussed in 
Chapter 1 however, it is not clear whether the sophisticated physical cognition reported 
in the Corvus genus is shared with more distantly related species of corvids. It has been 
shown that Eurasian jays and California scrub-jays can be trained to solve object-
dropping tasks (Cheke et al., 2011; Logan et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016). In the case of 
Eurasian jays, a member of the Garrulus genus, empirical evidence also suggests that 
these birds may take into account causal clues to solve tool use tasks. Cheke et al. (2011) 
presented Eurasian jays with a series of water displacement tasks that required the 
insertion of tools into an apparatus (i.e. a vertical tube filled with liquid) to acquire a 
reward, which could be reached only after the liquid has been progressively raised as a 
result of the insertion of the tools. In the study, the availability of causal cues was 
manipulated, such that in some tasks jays could choose between an apparatus or a tool 
that was functional according to physical principles and one that was not, whereas in 
other tasks jays had to select a functional apparatus according to arbitrary features such 
as colour, in the absence of available causal cues or when the available causal cues were 
counter-intuitive. Cheke et al. (2011) found that when causal cues were available, jays 
could learn to choose a functional liquid-filled apparatus over a non-liquid-filled 
apparatus containing only air or filled with a solid substrate, and learn to choose 
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functional sinking tools over ones that float and therefore fail to raise the water level. 
When the functional apparatus could be identified on the basis of arbitrary features 
rather than on the basis of causal cues, jays could also learn to select the functional 
apparatus, but only in tasks in which the insertion of tools was ‘artificially’ (i.e. caused by 
the action of a hidden experimenter) associated with a progressive movement of the 
food reward. In contrast, jays failed to learn a preference toward the functional 
apparatus in a counter-intuitive task. When presented with a modified apparatus formed 
by one baited narrow tube and two non-baited wide tubes with different colour marks, 
jays could not learn to drop tools into the functional non-baited tube, an action that 
would raise the level of the liquid not only in the functional non-baited tube, but also in 
the adjacent baited tube because these tubes were invisibly connected. Thus, the overall 
performance of Eurasian jays in this study suggests that these corvids may have 
acquired tool use behaviours through an interplay between instrumental learning and 
causal understanding, with the latter fostering/constraining the learning process 
according to whether tasks fit or do not fit with physical principles (Cheke et al., 2011). 
Note, however, that recent meta-analyses of water displacement experiments in corvids 
have challenged the explanation that Eurasian jays’ and other species’ performance in 
these tasks may also have involved causal understanding to some degree, arguing instead 
that it may have been based only on simple learning and/or initial predispositions 
(Ghirlanda and Lind, 2017; Hennefield et al., 2018). 
It is important to note that in the Cheke at al. (2011) study there are two 
confounding variables which may have affected jays’ performance in the task requiring 
jays to select functional sinking objects over non-functional floating objects. First, the 
two kinds of objects differed not only in density, the physical property that determined 
its functionality, but also in the material (rubber or foam) and colour (i.e. sinkable 
rubber pieces were either yellow or green, whereas floating foam pieces were either red, 
blue, yellow or green). Second, both individual birds that were tested had previous 
experience in dropping rubber tools, but not foam tools, in order to solve water 
displacement tasks. Specifically, both birds had taken part in a previous water 
displacement experiment in which rubbers and stones were provided as tools. Note 
however that the amount of their experience differed: one bird, Hoy, had used rubber 
on 35 occasions, whereas the other bird, Romero, had used rubber only once, and yet 
Hoy’s performance was no better than Romero’s. Nonetheless, it cannot be excluded 
that these jays developed a preference toward the functional rubber tool on the basis of 
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trivial features (e.g. material) or due to a higher familiarity with these objects. Thus, it 
remains an open question whether Eurasian jays are capable – as rooks and New 
Caledonian crows – of selecting tools on the basis of an understanding of functionality. 
To overcome these potential confounds and limitations, I conducted two tool 
selectivity tests in which functional and non-functional tools differed only in one feature 
(i.e. size in Experiment 2.1, and shape in Experiment 2.2), and were not familiar to the 
birds in the context of object dropping tasks. I presented the birds with two object 
dropping tasks that were designed after Bird and Emery’s (2009) size and shape 
selectivity tests, and which involved an apparatus closely resembling that used in rooks. 
Finally, in a third experiment (Experiment 2.3) I explored jays’ capability of using 
different tools – sticks – to acquire food for the same apparatus. 
 
 
2.2: GENERAL METHODS 
 
Subjects 
Five hand-raised Eurasian jays of both sexes (three females and two males) were tested: 
Chinook, Homer, Jaylo, Poe, Stuka. At the time of testing (October-December 2016), all 
birds were juveniles (1.5 years). Birds were housed as a group (Colony 3, Appendix A) in 
a large outdoor aviary (20x10x3m) at the Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, 
University of Cambridge. The birds received a maintenance diet of vegetables, eggs, 
seeds and fruits and water ad libitum. All birds took part in Experiment 2.1a. Chinook 
stopped interacting with the apparatus and the tools after completing this experiment, 
therefore she was excluded from subsequent experiments. All birds except Chinook 
were tested in the subsequent Experiments 2.1b, 2.2 and 2.3. All procedures were 
approved by the University of Cambridge Ethics Review Committee. 
 
Apparatus 
All tests were conducted using an object dropping apparatus originally designed by Bird 
& Emery (2009) and modified for Eurasian jays by Cheke et al. (2011) and Miller et al. 
(2016). It consisted of a transparent Perspex box (12x11x11 cm) with a baited but out-
of-reach, collapsible platform with a vertical tube (11.5 cm) on top (Fig. 2.1). Depending 
on the experimental condition, either a wide tube (Ø 4.2 cm) or a narrow tube (Ø 1.6 
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cm) was used. To release the food, birds could drop a tool (e.g. a stone) into the tube, 




Figure 2.1: Design and Apparatus used in Experiment 1. Left: Scheme showing the tools (stones or novel 
objects) and conditions (Wide tube, W; Narrow tube, N) used in each block (20 consecutive trials) in 
Experiment 1a, and 1b; Right: Picture of the Wide tube apparatus (back) and Narrow tube (front). 
 
General Procedure 
Birds were tested in visual isolation from other individuals inside an indoor 
compartment (2x1x3 m). The experimenter placed the apparatus and the tools into the 
bird’s compartment through an opening in the mesh wall. In all three experiments, the 
tools were placed on one side of the apparatus, approximately 10 cm away from it. The 
initial position of the bird was not standardized, so that the bird could be in any location 
within the compartment at the onset of each trial, i.e. when the stimuli were presented. 
In experiments involving multiple tools (Experiments 2.1 and 2.2), the tools were 
equidistant from the bird when the bird was facing the front side of the apparatus (i.e. 
the side of the apparatus from which the food is released). In Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, 
the position of the tools in regards to the apparatus (i.e. close, middle, far position) was 
pseudo-randomized across trials. Live larvae of the mealworms beetle (Tenebrio molitor) 
were used as food rewards. The baiting of the apparatus occurred out of view.  
In all experiments the maximum duration of a trial was set to 2 minutes. 
However, in Experiment 2.3, one additional minute was allowed if the bird was 
interacting with the tool by the cut-off time (up to 4 minutes in total, i.e. up to two 
additional minutes were allowed). This procedural detail was set during the very first 
trial, when it was noticed that the jay being tested required substantially more efforts to 
achieve the correct manipulation of stick tools.  
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Typically, birds were given 10 trials per day. However, if a bird did not interact with the 
tool(s) at all during a trial, testing was interrupted and continued on the next day, with 
the no-interaction trial being repeated. For example, if a bird completed trials 1-8 and 
subsequently it stopped interacting with the stimuli on trial 9, then on the day the bird 
received trial 9 again, and potentially 10 additional trials (i.e. trials 9-18). 
Subjects did not have access to their maintenance diet for 1h prior to testing to 
ensure that they were motivated to eat multiple food rewards during testing. Water was 
accessible ad libitum during testing. All experiments were recorded using a GoPro® Hero 
4 video-camera and subsequently analysed.  
 
Refresher Training 
All birds had previously been trained to drop hollow metal balls (Ø 2 cm, 4 g) inside the 
apparatus as part of a previous study (Miller et al., 2016). All birds had also been further 
exposed to the wide tube apparatus and metal balls in a non-systematic manner. This 
occurred during January-April 2016, as part of my training in working with the jays. 
Critically, however, the birds had no prior experience of dropping any of the specific 
tools used in this study (stones and sticks). 
I conducted a short refresher training to ensure that the birds were still familiar 
with the task and would insert stones into the apparatus. During training, the birds were 
presented with the wide tube apparatus and a single tool placed approximately 10 cm 
away from it. In the first 5 trials, they were provided with the metal ball (i.e. the tool 
with which they had previously been trained) and in the following 5 trials with a 




Inter-observer reliability was calculated by comparing the behavioural scoring I have 
recorded with that of a naïve coder (Benjamin Farrar, BF) for the 20% of videos in each 
experiment. All data were analysed with R.3.5. using the RStudio 1.1.447 wrapper 
(RStudio Team, 2018). All datasets and R scripts used to conduct the statistical analyses 






2.3: EXPERIMENT 2.1: Size Selectivity Test 
In the first experiment I explored whether Eurasian jays were capable of tool selectivity 





The design of this experiment closely followed the ‘Stone Size Test’ conducted by Bird 
and Emery (2009) on rooks. I used both the wide and the narrow tube apparatuses in 
the test. In Experiment 2.1a, stones of three sizes – large (7.8 ± 0.2 g), medium (4.2 ± 
0.5 g), small (2.2 ± 0.1 g) – were provided as tools. With the wide tube, stones of all 
sizes were functional (i.e. all stones could fit inside the tube), whereas with the narrow 
tube, only the small stone was functional because the two larger stones did not fit inside 
the tube. The experiment was composed of four blocks (Fig. 2.1). In Block 1 (trials 1-
20), jays were presented only with the wide tube apparatus to evaluate their potential 
preference for a specific tool, namely the small versus the large stone. In Block 2 (trials 
21-40), the narrow tube (10 trials in total) and the wide tube (10 trials in total) were 
presented in a pseudo-randomized order to investigate whether the jays would 
spontaneously select the small stone when this was the only functional tool (Narrow tube 
condition), and whether they would express the same preference when all stones were 
functional (Wide tube condition). In Block 3 (trials 41-60) only the narrow tube apparatus 
was used. This block was designed to facilitate jays’ learning about the functional 
features of the small stone. Finally, in Block 4 (trials 61-80) birds received a further test 
with the narrow and wide tubes that followed the procedure of Block 2. This 
experiment differed from the ‘Stone Selectivity Test’ conducted by Bird and Emery 
(2009) in two respects. Rooks tested in the latter study received a smaller number of 
trials (i.e. 60 trials), and they experienced only the wide tube apparatus in the first 30 
trials and only the narrow tube apparatus in the remaining 30 trials. 
After noting that the jays appeared to have switched to using the small stone 
more often in Block 4 than in Block 2, in Experiment 2.1b I investigated whether jays 
may have learned to select the small stone based on its functional property, namely its 
size. To that end, Experiment 2.1b was a transfer task with novel objects, which differed 
from the stones in irrelevant perceptual properties namely colour, shape and material. In 
the same way that the stones previously differed in their functional property of size, the 
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novel objects were large (15 g), medium (10.5 g) and small (5 g) bolts upholstered with 
red tape. Like previously, the novel objects of all sizes were functional with the wide 
tube but only the small one could fit in the narrow tube. Given that jays had had two 
blocks of the two apparatuses in a counterbalanced order in Experiment 2.1a, they also 
received two blocks in Experiment 2.1b (Fig. 2.1): Block 5 (trials 81-100), Block 6 (trials 
101-120). In each block, there were 10 trials with the narrow tube in total and 10 trials 
with the wide tube, the order of which was pseudo-randomized such that the jays did 
not receive more than three consecutive trials with the wide tube nor narrow tube. 
 
Data Analysis 
I scored the size of the tool (small, medium or large) selected on each trial. Ordinal-logit 
models (package ordinal, Haubo and Christensen, 2018) were used to test whether jays 
adjusted their preference of selection i) according to the condition (Wide or Narrow tube), 
and ii) across blocks (e.g. due to learning). In all models, the size of the tool (small, 
medium or large) selected in each trial was treated as ordinal data and fitted as response 
variable. Alpha was set to 0.5. 
 
2.3.2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Inter-observer reliability between BF and me was excellent: for the size of selected tools 
Cohen’s kappa was k=0.986. In Block 1, one bird (Stuka) received 15 instead of 20 trials 
due to an experimental error.  
Overall jays selected a similar proportion of the three stones between conditions 
(Model 1, Tab. 2.1). Hence jays did not adjust the selection of tools according to the 
diameter of the tube. I further tested whether the proportion of selection of the three 
stones varied across blocks by comparing jays’ performance in Block 1 with each of the 
three subsequent blocks. The performance in Block 1 represents the spontaneous 
preference exhibited by the jays when all tools were functional, therefore this block was 
considered as a meaningful reference to analyse changes of preference through dyadic 
comparisons among blocks. Model 1 (Tab. 2.1) showed that the proportions of 
selection of the three stones in Block 1 were comparable to those observed in the two 
subsequent blocks, but significantly different from the proportions of selection in Block 
4. This result is likely to be explained by the variation in preference for the large and the 
small stones throughout blocks (Figs 2.2 and 2.3). A stronger preference towards the 
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large stone appeared in Block 1 and was retained across Blocks 2 and 3, but it became 
less pronounced together with an increase in preference for the small stone in Block 4 
(Fig. 2.2).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Box and Whisker plot showing the proportions of selection of the small, medium and large 
tool in Experiment 1a (Block 1-4) and Experiment 1b (Block 5,6). In Blocks 2, 4, 5, and 6, the two 
conditions (Narrow and Wide tube) are grouped as jays’ performance was comparable across conditions 
(Model 1, Tab. 1). 
 
When presented with novel objects of different sizes for the first time, the jays did not 
prefer the large tool, rather they chose the three tools in similar proportions (Block 5, 
Fig. 2.2), thereby seemingly showing a random pattern of selection. To investigate 
whether this pattern of selection differed from that previously observed toward the 
stones, I compared the jays’ performance in the last block when tools were stones 
(Experiment 2.1a; Block 4) with the first block when tools were novel objects 
(Experiment 2.1b: Block 5). One subject (Chinook) was excluded from this analysis 
because she did not participate in Experiment 2.1b. Model 2 (Tab. 2.1) indicated that 
the proportions of selection of the three stones (Block 4) and novel objects (Block 5) 
were not significantly different (Tab. 2.1; Fig. 2.2), thus suggesting that jays showed a 
similar pattern of behaviours with the stones and the novel objects. In line with 





























































































































Figure 2.3: Trial by trial description of the behaviour in Experiment 1a 
(Block 1-4) and 1b (Block 5, 6). Yellow dots indicate trials with wide tube,  
blue dots trials with narrow tube.  
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Together, these results are consistent with the possibility that jays transferred their 
pattern of preference between tools of different appearances. However, I did not test 
the jays’ preference for the three novel objects in a naïve group of birds. Therefore, it 
cannot be ruled out that jays’ performance in Block 5 was not influenced by their 
experience in Experiment 1a, but rather that it simply resulted from a difference in their 
spontaneous preference for the novel objects over stones. Specifically, the jays may have 
had no preference for a novel object of specific size (e.g. large novel object) although 
they did have an initial preference for the large tool when firstly presented with stones. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Results from ordinal-logit models examining whether the proportions of selection of the three 
tools differed: i) according to the condition (Wide or Narrow tube), and; ii) across blocks of trials. Model 1 
focused on Experiment 1a. Model 2 focused on the last block of Experiment 1a and the first block of 





Finally, I compared jays’ preference of selection of the three novel objects between the 
two blocks of Experiment 2.1b. Model 3 (Tab. 2.1) revealed that the proportions of 
selection of the three tools in Block 5 and Block 6 were not significantly different, thus 
indicating that jays’ preferences of selection were stable across blocks. However, the 
model showed a trend (p< 0.06), which could be explained by the concurrent stronger 
preference for the small tool and decreased preference for the large tool in Block 6 (Fig. 
2.2). This pattern first appeared in Block 4, and then it increased – although not 
significantly – in Block 6 (Fig. 2.2). Supporting previous findings, Model 3 also indicated 
that jays’ performance was again consistent between conditions. 
Diagnostic plots were produced for each of the three models. Visual inspection 
of the plots indicates that all models have a satisfactory fit. 
  
Model Variable Estimate SE z p
Narrow Tube - Wide Tube -0.13 0.26 -0.50 0.61
Block 1 - Block 2 0.24 0.30 0.79 0.43
Block 1 - Block 3 -0.03 0.38 -0.09 0.92
Block 1 - Block 4 -0.69 0.30 -2.30 0.02 *
Narrow Tube - Wide Tube -0.23 0.29 -0.78 0.44
Block 4 (Exp. 1a) - Block 5 (Exp. 1b) 0.18 0.29 -0.60 0.55
Narrow Tube - Wide Tube -0.43 0.30 -1.45 0.15






2.4: EXPERIMENT 2.2: Shape Selectivity Test 
In this experiment I presented Eurasian jays with a task in which shape – rather than 





The design of this experiment closely followed the ‘Stone Orientation Test’ used by 
Bird and Emery (2009) for rooks. In Experiment 2.2, jays were provided with two 
shapes of stone tools: long stones (approximately 2.4x1.0 cm) and round stones 
(approximately 1.8x1.9 cm). Birds received a total of 20 trials, 10 of which were with the 
narrow tube and 10 of which were with the wide tube. The order in which birds were 
presented with the narrow and wide tubes was pseudo-randomized such that the jays 
did not receive more than three consecutive trials with the same tube. To successfully 
solve the task in the Narrow tube condition, birds had to select the long stone and orient 
it vertically to insert it into the tube. In the Wide tube condition, both stones were 
functional and no specific rotation of the tool was required. This experiment and the 
equivalent test previously conducted on rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009) differed in the 
number of trials (40 trials in rooks) and in the fact that in the rook study the two 
apparatuses were not counterbalanced within sessions of trials: rooks first received 20 




I scored the tool (long or round stone) selected and what kind of manipulation of the 
long stone was performed on each trial. Specifically, three kinds of manipulation could 
be achieved. The long stone could: i) be oriented vertically prior of the first insertion 
attempt (Immediate Rotation); ii) be oriented vertically after one or more failed insertion 
attempts (Eventual Rotation), or; iii) not be oriented vertically (No Rotation). The scoring 
of these behaviours had been planned before the experiment was conducted, based on 




Binomial General Linear Models (package stats, R Core Team and contributors 
worldwide, 2018) were fitted to test whether the kind of tool selected and the 
manipulation performed varied i) according to the condition and, ii) across blocks (e.g. 
due to learning). Alpha was set to 0.5. 
 
2.4.2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Inter-observer reliability between BF and me was excellent for the shape of selected 
tools (Cohen’s kappa, k=1) and the kind of rotation of the tool (Cohen’s kappa, k=1). 
When presented with a choice of two stones of different shapes, jays showed a 
pronounced preference for the long stone in both conditions (Narrow tube: 77.5 ±7.5% 
trials; Wide tube: 77.5 ±4.8% trials; Mean ± SE; Fig. 2.4). The GLM analysis indicated 




Table 2.2: Results from GLMs examining data of Experiment 2. Model 4 tested whether the proportions 
of selection of the tools (long and round stones) differed: i) according to the condition (Wide or Narrow 
tube), and; ii) across blocks of trials. Model 5 tested whether the proportions in which the long stone was 
oriented vertically (i.e. Immediate Rotation, Eventual Rotation) or it was not oriented vertically (No Rotation) 





In line with previous findings in rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009), the jays performed three 
kinds of manipulation when the Long stone was selected. The tool was oriented 
vertically (Fig. 2.5) either prior to the first insertion attempt (Immediate Rotation) or after 
one or more unsuccessful attempts (Eventual Rotation). Alternatively, the tool was 
oriented horizontally with respect to the tube (No Rotation, Fig. 2.5). 
  
Table 2
Model Variable Estimate SE z p
Intercept -1.38 0.47 -2.94 0.003 **
Narrow Tube - Wide Tube -0.01 0.54 -0.03 0.98
Block 1 - Block 2 0.29 0.54 0.53 0.60
Intercept 1.50 0.53 2.81 0.005 **
Narrow Tube - Wide Tube -2.16 0.59 -3.63 0.0003 ***







Figure 2.4: Trial by trial description of the behaviour in Experiment 2. Yellow dots indicate trials with 
the wide tube, blue dots indicate trials with the narrow tube. Note that two individuals performed only 
two of the three possible kinds of manipulation of the long stone: Homer never performed Eventual 
Rotation, whereas Poe never performed Immediate Rotation. 
 
To investigate whether the manipulation of the long stone differed between conditions I 
fitted a GLM with a binary outcome variable (No Rotation-Rotation). The manipulation 
of the long stone differed between the conditions (Model 5, Tab. 2.2) with higher 
frequencies of rotation performed with the narrow tube (79.1 ±10.1% trials; Mean ± 
SE). However, the correct orientation of the long stone in the Narrow tube condition was 
often achieved after one or more incorrect attempts of insertion (Eventual Rotation: 55.3 ± 
21.1% of trials with the narrow tube in which the long stone was rotated; Fig. 2.4). 
Therefore, this finding cannot be taken as evidence that jays had a solid understanding 
of the affordance of the task, because in this case they would have correctly oriented the 
stone before the first insertion attempt (Immediate Rotation). Model 5 (Tab. 2.2) also 



















































































































Figure 2.5. Eurasian jay being tested in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. A-B) Different kinds of 
manipulation of the Long stone: No Rotation (A), Rotation (B); C-F) Sequence of actions describing the 
Push technique: the stick is picked up near one end (C), steered inside the tube (D) and pushed downward 




2.5: EXPERIMENT 2.3: Stick Tool Test 
 
In the third experiment I explored whether Eurasian jays can use sticks as tool to solve 





The design of this experiment closely matched the ‘Stick Use Test’ conducted by Bird 
and Emery (2009). In Experiment 2.3, jays were provided with one of two types of 
sticks as a tool: a twig (11 cm long, 3.0 g) or a barbecue stick (11 cm long, 0.4 g). When 
provided with the twig, jays could solve the task by dropping it, just like they previously 
did with stones (No Push technique). Due to its lighter weight, the barbecue stick 
required jays to hold it in their beak and push it downwards to collapse the baited 
platform (Push technique).  
A total of 10 trials with the wide tube were conducted. On each trial, jays were 
only provided with one type of tool (the barbecue stick or the twig), the order of which 
was pseudo-randomized such that jays did not receive the same tool on more than two 
consecutive trials. 
In contrast to this experiment, rooks tested by Bird and Emery (2009) received 
more trials (20 trials) and they were presented consistently with the heavy stick in the 
first 10 trials, and then the light sticks in the final 10 trials. 
 
Data Analysis 
I scored: i) whether a trial was successful, ii) the technique utilized to solve the task with 
stick tools (i.e. Push technique, No Push technique), and iii) the number of insertion 
attempts until successfully inserting the tool into the apparatus. The scoring of 
successful trials and the tool use technique had been planned before the experiment was 
conducted, based on the results previously reported in rooks on this test (Bird and 
Emery, 2009). I decided to score the number of insertion attempts during the testing 
phase as it became clear that this variable was very informative of inter-individual 




2.5.1: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Inter-observer reliability was again excellent: BF and I achieved 100% of agreement in 
scoring successful trials and insertion techniques. 
All subjects solved the task by using a stick as a tool (Tab. 2.3). However, the 
insertion rate was extremely variable: Homer 9/10 trials, Jaylo 8/10 trials, Poe 2/10 
trials, Stuka 1/10 trials. Similarly, the number of insertion attempts was also quite 
variable among subjects (Tab. 2.3). The success rate matched the insertion rate for all 
subjects except for Jaylo, who did not collapse the platform in the three trials in which 
the tool was inserted into the apparatus.  
 
 
Table 2.3: Trial by trial description of the behaviour in Experiment 3. In successful trials (blue cells), the 




Trial Stick Kind Inserted N°Attempts Technique Stick Kind Inserted N°Attempts Technique
1 BBQ Stick Y 2 Push BBQ Stick N 14
2 Twig N 5 Twig Y 12 Push
3 BBQ Stick Y 2 Push BBQ Stick N 12
4 BBQ Stick Y 2 Push BBQ Stick Y 7
5 Twig Y 2 No Push Twig Y 7 Push
6 Twig Y 13 Push Twig Y 3 Push
7 BBQ Stick Y 1 Push BBQ Stick Y 9
8 Twig Y 3 Push Twig Y 5 Push
9 Twig Y 1 No Push BBQ Stick Y 8
10 BBQ Stick Y 3 Push Twig Y 1 Push
Trial Stick Kind Inserted N°Attempts Technique Stick Kind Inserted N°Attempts Technique
1 BBQ Stick N 16 Twig N 1
2 Twig Y 11 No Push Twig Y 5 Push
3 BBQ Stick N 16 BBQ Stick N 4
4 BBQ Stick Y 9 Push Twig N 4
5 Twig N 15 Twig N 2
6 Twig N 0 BBQ Stick N 0
7 BBQ Stick N 2 BBQ Stick N 0
8 Twig N 0 Twig N 0
9 BBQ Stick N 0 BBQ Stick N 0





In most of the successful trials (77%), jays collapsed the platform of the apparatus by 
actively pushing downward on the stick (Push technique). The technique was adopted 
not only with light barbecue sticks but also with twigs. In 23% of successful trials, the 
insertion of the twig into the apparatus was sufficient to collapse the platform in the 
absence of active pushing (No Push Technique). The reason for the active pushing with 
the heavy stick can likely be explained by the insertion technique used by the birds. 
Instead of dropping the stick as they did with stones, birds typically held the stick near 
one end and appeared to carefully steer it inside the tube (Fig. 2.5). As a result of these 
seemingly gentle movements, the heavy stick likely did not always hit the platform with 
enough force to collapse it. All birds used the Push technique at least once. Two subjects 
(Homer and Poe) solved the task by using both techniques. 
 
 
2.6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter I investigated the tool use abilities of Eurasian jays by exploring whether 
this corvid species can select functional tools on the basis of their physical properties, 
namely size and shape, and solve a familiar task by using novel tools, in this case sticks. 
Jays showed only limited tool selectivity, i.e. they did not spontaneously adjust their 
choice according to the functionality of the tools, but were capable of using sticks as 
tools.  
In the size selectivity test (Experiment 2.1), jays initially exhibited a spontaneous 
preference for the large stone regardless of whether this tool was functional. Thus, jays 
seem to have failed to encode the relevant feature of objects and to adjust their selection 
of tool according to the features of the apparatus. However, jays’ performance also 
suggests that they may be capable of altering their selection of tools through learning: 
across trials jays reduced their initial preference in favour of the only tool that was 
functional in both conditions, namely the small stone. Subsequently, when presented 
with novel objects (Experiment 2.1b), jays expressed a pattern of selection that was 
comparable to those observed toward stones in the final block of the previous test 
(Experiment 2.1a). This result is consistent with the possibility that jays transferred their 
preference of which tool to use based on size despite other perceptual differences 




In the shape selectivity test (Experiment 2.2) jays exhibited a pronounced preference for 
the functional tool (long stone) in both conditions, but they tended to perform the 
correct manipulation of the tool only when needed (Narrow tube condition). However, 
jays often achieved the correct manipulation of the tool after one or more failed 
attempts of insertion (Eventual Rotation) rather than before the first insertion attempt 
(Immediate Rotation). Therefore, it is likely that jays correctly oriented the tools through 
trial-and-error, in the lack of a full understanding of the objects’ properties and 
functionality.  
In the stick tool test (Experiment 2.3), all birds were capable of using a novel 
tool and of acquiring food rewards from a familiar apparatus through a novel strategy 
(i.e. Push technique). These results also represent the first demonstration that Eurasian 
jays can use sticks as tools. 
The overall pattern of our results supports previous reports of learning forming 
the basis of Eurasian jay tool use (Cheke et al. 2011). The relatively fast learning of a 
preference for the functional tools in the latter study may have been facilitates by the 
fact that birds had already experienced the functional sinking objects as tools, before the 
experiment (Cheke et al. 2011) and that the functional and non-functional tools differed 
not only in the relevant characteristic (density) but also in others features (material and 
colour). Furthermore, in line with Cheke et al. (2011), I found important individual 
differences in tool use skills in Eurasian jays. One bird, Homer, rapidly developed a 
clear preference for the functional small tool in Experiment 1 (Fig. 2.3) compared with 
the other jays that were tested; Homer more frequently oriented the tool correctly before 
the first insertion attempt (Immediate Rotation) in Experiment 2 (Fig. 2.4) and solved 
more trials (9/10) and by using both techniques in Experiment 3 (Tab. 2.3). A possible 
explanation for the performance of this individual may be linked to his experimental 
history. Homer was used as the demonstrator in a previous tool use study (Miller et al., 
2016) and thus has received a more extensive exposure to the object-dropping apparatus 
than the other individuals we tested. 
Given that neither Eurasian jays nor rooks habitually use tools in the wild, it is 
interesting to compare the performance of the jays in this study with that of the rooks 
tested by Bird and Emery (2009). Importantly, however, one must exhibit caution in 
doing so given that these were two separate experiments, but tentative comparisons 
might yield fruit for further work in which the two groups of birds could be directly 
compared. When tested in a similar size selectivity test, rooks immediately switched their 
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preference from the large stone to the small stone when the latter was the only 
functional tool (Bird and Emery, 2009). In the shape selectivity test, rooks, like jays in 
this study, expressed a pronounced preference for the long stone regardless of the 
condition, and higher frequencies of rotation in presence of the narrow tube (Bird and 
Emery, 2009). Crucially however, rooks often performed Immediate Rotation rather than 
Eventual Rotation in the Narrow tube condition. Taken together, the performances of these 
species may indicate that Eurasian jays may have more limited tool selectivity abilities 
than rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009). However, this possibility should be considered with 
caution given the methodological and ontogenetic differences between our experiments 
and those conducted by Bird and Emery (2009). Specifically, in Bird and Emery’s (2009) 
selectivity tests, rooks were systematically presented with the wide tube apparatus in the 
first half of trials, and subsequently with the narrow tube apparatus in the remaining 
trials. In contrast, the jays tested in this study did not experience such a clear sequence 
of exposure to the two apparatuses, as the presentation of the two apparatuses most 
often co-occurred within the same block of trials. Although apparently minor, it cannot 
be excluded that this methodological difference may have influenced the performances 
of the two species. Another potentially relevant difference between the studies is that 
jays tested in this study were juveniles (1.5 years old at test date) whereas the rooks 
tested by Bird and Emery (2009) were adults at the time of testing. 
In regard to the stick tool test jays’ performance appears to be similar to that 
reported in rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009). Both species appear to exhibit good levels of 
flexibility in using novel tools to solve a familiar task. Supporting previous findings in 
rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009), jays’ use of sticks as tools also indicate that New 
Caledonian crow-like adaptations in beak morphology and vision (Martinho et al., 2014; 
Matsui et al., 2016; Troscianko et al., 2012) are not essential to achieve basic 
manipulations of stick tools. 
Ultimately, to directly assess the question of whether the sophisticated physical 
cognition reported in the Corvus genus is shared with more distantly related species of 
corvids, future work will have to encompass large-scale comparative studies, where 
different species can be directly compared using the same or equivalent methodology.  
In summary, after being trained to use stones as tools, the Eurasian jays were 
able to generalise to using sticks and to adopt a novel technique on the same apparatus, 
i.e. collapsing the internal platform by actively pushing a tool against it. What appears to 
be in contrast to the previously reported results for rooks is that the Eurasian jays failed 
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to immediately adjust their selection of tools according to their functionality. However, 
the jays’ performance indicates that these birds were capable of learning to optimise 
their behaviour, as they progressively developed a preference for the smaller size tool, 
which was the only tool that was functional in both conditions, and performed the 
required manipulation of the functional long-shaped tool. 
As introduced in Chapter 1, physical problem solving is considered to be one of 
the cornerstones of cognitive sophistication. In Chapter 3, I therefore continue my 
investigation into the cognition of the Eurasian jay by focusing on a second cognitive 









Testing two competing hypotheses for Eurasian 






On par with physical problem solving – which I investigated in Chapter 2 – prospection 
ability is thought to be a key cognitive pillar. Previous research reported that jays could 
provision for future events: they cached more food in a location where no food was 
going to be available at a later point and cached more of a specific food in a location 
where this food was not going to be available. In this chapter, I consider two competing 
hypotheses that could explain this caching behaviour. The birds either learn to cache 
more in places where food was less frequently available in the past (Compensatory 
Caching Hypothesis) or they recall what-when-where features of past events to predict 
future availability of food (Future Planning Hypothesis). I tested Eurasian jays in two 
experiments using a protocol that aims at disambiguating the two hypotheses: the 
expected caching pattern under the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis differs from the 
one under the Future Planning Hypothesis. Consistently across the two experiments, 
data did not support either hypothesis. Future research is needed to gain more insights 






As discussed in Chapter 1, corvids are also one of the prominent animal models for the 
study of prospection (Clayton and Emery, 2015; Emery, 2004; Emery and Clayton, 
2004; Seed et al., 2009a). Over the last two decades, an increasing number of studies in 
corvids and other animals, primarily apes, have challenged the view that future planning 
abilities evolved only once, in humans (primates: Mulcahy and Call, 2006; Naqshbandi 
and Roberts, 2006; Osvath, 2009; Osvath and Karvonen, 2012; Osvath and Osvath, 
2008; corvids: Cheke and Clayton, 2012; Correia et al., 2007; Kabadayi and Osvath, 
2017; Raby et al., 2007; rodents: Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). In particular, California 
scrub-jays and Eurasian jays were found to adapt their caching behaviour according to 
future needs. Experiments showed that these jays tend to cache more in locations where 
food will be absent in following trials, or cache preferentially a specific type of food 
(relatively to another type of food) in locations where that food will not be available in 
following trials (Cheke and Clayton, 2012; Correia et al., 2007; de Kort et al., 2007; Raby 
et al., 2007).  
The jays’ performance in these studies is in line with the Future Planning 
Hypothesis: namely that at the time of caching, jays may have recalled the ‘what-when-
where’ features of past events (e.g. the availability of a specific food in a given location 
at a given time) and cached food that will maximize the future outcome. Remarkably, 
jays’ may be able to do so even when their motivational state at the time of caching 
differs from their motivational state at recovery, thus suggesting that their caching 
decision is not based on their current motivation. One manner in which an individual’s 
current motivation can be manipulated is through sating an individual on a specific food. 
This procedure subsequently reduces the individual’s motivation for eating that specific 
food (but not different kinds of food), a phenomenon known as specific satiety 
(Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). Building on this 
phenomenon, Cheke and Clayton (2012) and Correia et al. (2007) found that jays cached 
preferentially a type of food that will not be available in the future even when they had a 
low desire toward that food at the time of caching, because they have been sated on that 
food before being allowed to cache. Additional support for the Future Planning 
Hypothesis comes from experiments demonstrating that jays are capable of episodic-like 
memory (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998), i.e. they can retrieve information about what 
happened in a specific event, where it took place, and when it occurred (Clayton et al., 
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2001). This is because: i) the Future Planning Hypothesis hinges on the ability of 
recalling ‘what-where-when’ features of past events; ii) episodic-like memory and future 
planning are thought to be based on the same cognitive machinery (Clayton et al., 2003; 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007) and show the same developmental trajectory in young 
children (Clayton, 2015). 
However, it has been argued that jays’ performance in these caching experiments 
cannot be taken as evidence of future planning abilities because the experimental 
designs do not exclude alternative interpretations of the results. Two predominant 
alternative explanations that have been raised are the Mnemonic Association Hypothesis 
and the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis (see below). Importantly, each of these 
hypotheses cannot provide an alternative interpretation for all published caching 
experiments, but only to a specific subset of the studies. Yet the Mnemonic Association 
Hypothesis and the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive – rather they may describe two parallel cognitive processes – so that they can, 
together, explain the currently available results.  
The Mnemonic Association Hypothesis (Dickinson, 2011; see also Cheke and 
Clayton, 2012;) suggests that jays’ strategic caching behaviour may be the result of long-
delay learning (Lett, 1975): at the time of the outcome (e.g. recovery), jays may have 
recalled their previous actions, and thus created a positive association with the specific 
action that had resulted in a more beneficial outcome (e.g. the action of caching a 
specific type of food). This mechanism hinges on episodic-like memory because the 
retrieval of the ‘what-when-where’ features of a past episode is essential to develop a 
positive association between an outcome experienced in the present and the action that 
was performed in the past and that led to that outcome. Thus, although both the 
Mnemonic Association Hypothesis and the Future Planning Hypothesis postulate 
‘what-where-when’ memory, the former explains the jays’ strategic caching as the result 
of a learning process. In the studies conducted by Correia et al., (2007), de Kort et al., 
(2007), and Cheke and Clayton (2012), jays may have – during the second and third 
caching session – reiterated the actions which led to the more beneficial outcome in the 
first recovery session, thereby solving the tasks without pre-experiencing future 
scenarios.  
Crucially however, while the Future Planning Hypothesis can explain the data 
from all experiments, the Mnemonic Association Hypothesis cannot provide an 
explanation for the results of Raby et al. (2007). Here, on six consecutive days, 
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Californian scrub-jays had access to either compartment A or B, with the availability of 
food during the first two hours being dependent on the compartment (Fig. 3.1). When 
in the evening of the sixth day the jays were allowed to cache for the first time, they 
cached more food in the compartment where no food was available on the previous 
mornings (Raby et al., 2007). In a follow-up experiment, each of the two compartments 
was associated with a specific type of food (e.g. food X available in compartment A, 
food Y available in compartment B). Here, in the test trial, jays cached proportionately 
more items of each food in the compartment in which they had experienced the 
alternate food being available (Raby et al., 2007). These results are consistent with the 
Future Planning Hypothesis: jays may have adjusted their caching strategy according to 
their expectations of the specific future event, thereby ensuring that on the hypothetical 
following day, i) food will be available in the compartment where they experienced 
hunger on the previous days (in Experiment 1), and; ii) both types of foods will be 
present in the two compartments (in Experiment 2). In contrast, these results cannot be 
explained by the Mnemonic Association Hypothesis. Because jays were given a single 
caching trial (i.e. at test), their caching pattern could not have resulted from long-delay 
learning, i.e. jays could not have adjusted their caching behaviour according to the 
outcome of a previous caching event. (Dickinson, 2011). Nevertheless, it has been 
argued that jays’ performance in this study may not entail any kind of prospection 
ability: jay may ‘have a propensity to cache a particular food type in a given location that 
differs from the foods that have been previously associated with that location, a strategy 
that would provide more uniform distribution of resources’ (Shettleworth personal 
communication, as cited in Dickinson, 2011, page 90; see also Premack, 2007; 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2008). Support to this idea is, to some extent, provided by 
field observations: wild American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos) foraging at walnut trees 
were never observed caching nuts in proximity of the fruiting trees but carried the items 
up to 2km away before caching them (Cristol, 2001). This argument, henceforth 
referred to as the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis, appears to bear high ecological 
relevance also in the case in which two different types of food are available. As pointed 
out by Shettleworth (2010) ‘For an animal that caches different types of items (and […] 
can remember what it cached where), a strategy of distributing items of each type as 
widely as possible would help to defeat predators that might raid just one of those types’ 
(page 393). Since caching behaviour is considered to have played a key role in the 
evolution of corvid cognition (de Kort and Clayton, 2006; Grodzinski and Clayton, 
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2010), it appears plausible that, to protect their caches, these birds may have developed 
predispositions such as those assumed by the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis. 
To reach firmer conclusions on whether caching behaviour in corvids entails 
prospection abilities, it is essential to test the Future Planning Hypothesis against each 
of the two predominant alternative interpretations. As the Mnemonic Association 
Hypothesis and the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis may describe two 
complementary processes, these hypotheses should first be investigated independently. 
In this chapter I focus on the Complementary Caching Hypothesis. Firstly, I describe a 
cognitive mechanism that may underpin jays’ propensity to distribute caches such that 
across different locations, resources are uniformly distributed. Secondly, I report a 
paradigm that allows to test the Complementary Caching Hypothesis against the Future 
Planning Hypothesis in jays. 
Following Brea and Gerstner (2019), jays may evaluate the suitability of a given 
location as caching site for a specific type of food by attributing location-specific 
‘weights’ according to the perceived availability of that food in that location. For 
instance, if a jay is given the possibility to access three potential caching locations (A, B, 
C), in which no food was experienced, then the bird may attribute equal weights to each 
location (wA, wB, wC), and therefore, if allowed to cache, distribute caches in 
comparable quantities across the locations. However, if the jay subsequently experiences 
a given food as being available in a given location (e.g. at location A), then the location-
specific weights may be updated accordingly, i.e. wA is reduced in comparison to wB 
and wC. As a result, when allowed to cache, the jay may concentrate its caches in the 
two locations associated with higher weights for this food (e.g. locations B and C), thus 
achieving a more uniform distribution of the resources. This idea is similar to that 
proposed by Hampton and Sherry (1994) as a possible mechanism employed by black-
capped chickadees for re-using caching locations according to the probability of 
recovering previously hidden items.  
Building on Raby et al. (2007)’s study, a paradigm was developed to differentiate 
between the Compensatory Caching and the Future Planning Hypotheses (Fig 3.1). 
Eurasian jays first received an experience phase over nine consecutive days. On each 
day, jays had access to one of three compartments, in which a specific food (either food 
X or Y) was available. Crucially, the location and the type of food available on each day 
changed respectively on a 3-days cycle and on a 2-day cycle (Fig. 3.1). Thus, jays 
experienced the three compartments as being differentially associated with each specific 
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food. Subsequently a single test trial was conducted in which jays could freely cache 






Figure 3.1: Experimental protocols. On training days, the birds could access one of the compartments (A, 
B or C) under condition X or Y, where X could mean that no food is provided or only food of a certain 
type, and Y could mean that food is provided or only food of another type. In the protocol of Raby et al. 
(2007), each compartment is always experienced under the same condition. In the experiment reported 
here, each compartment is experienced under both conditions. 
 
 
This design ensures that the two competing hypotheses have opposite predictions. 
According to the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis, birds are expected to cache a 
similar number of items in the three test compartments, but they should allocate the two 
types of food with different proportions across the three compartments: specifically, 
they should exhibit a preference for caching in each compartment the food that was – 
during the experience phase – less frequently experienced in that specific compartment. 
In contrast, the Future Planning Hypothesis predicts that birds should exhibit a 
preference for caching according to which location they would have access to on the 
future days (i.e. hypothetical additional trials equivalent to the past experience trials) and 
according to what food would be available there. Two possible, complementary, 
predictions would support the Future Planning Hypothesis: jays could plan only for the 
nearest future event (hypothetical trial 10) or they could take into account all future 
events that they can currently provision for (hypothetical trials 10, 11, and 12). 
According to the former (Prediction 1), jays should cache more items of the food that 
they expect will not be available, and only in the compartment that they expect will be 
Test 
Days 1 2 3 4 5 6 (evening Day 6)
Compartment A B A B A B
Condition X Y X Y X Y
Experience Phase
Raby et al. (2007)
Test Test 
(evening Day 6) Days 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (evening Day 9)
Compartment A B C A B C A B C





accessible on the hypothetical trial 10. According to the latter (Prediction 2), jays should 
distribute their caches across all three compartments but cache more food in the 
specific compartment where they expect that particular food will not to be provided the 
next time that they would have access to that particular compartment (hypothetical trials 
10, 11, and 12). Importantly, the two predictions differ only in whether caching is 
expected in the two compartments that correspond to the hypothetical days 11 and 12. 
 
 




Nine Eurasian jays of both sexes (four males, five females; all born in 2007) participated 
in the study: Caracas, Lima, Lisbon, Dublin, Rome, Jerusalem, Wellington, Washington 
and Quito. Birds were housed as a group (Colony 1, Appendix A) in a large outdoor 
aviary (20x10x3 m) at the Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, University of 
Cambridge, Madingley. The sample size included all birds that were available when the 
study was conducted. Two other colonies (i.e. Colony 2 and 3) that are housed at the 
same site were not tested because these birds were being used in other studies at that 
time; thereby it was not possible to install the set-up required for the experiments 
reported here in their indoor testing compartments. Outside of testing the birds had ad 
libitum access to their maintenance diet, which consisted of vegetables, eggs, seed and 
fruits. Water was available at all times. All procedures were approved by the University 




The experimental set-up comprised three indoor test compartments (labelled as A, B, C) 
that were accessible from an equidistant middle compartment (Fig. 3.2). All four 
compartments (1x1x2 m) were delimited by mesh walls and contained a suspended 
wooden platform (1x1 m). Birds could access the set-up from a trap-window connecting 
the outside aviary with the middle compartment, and from there they could reach each 
test compartment through an opening in the mesh wall. The openings of the three test 
compartments could be opened and closed. Whilst standing outside the compartments, 
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the experiment could lower and raise transparent Perspex windows in the openings by 




Figure 3.2: Top view of the experimental set-up of Experiment 3.1. Birds could access the three test 
compartments (A, B, C) from a middle compartment. On each experience trial (Left), the bird had access 
only to one test compartment (e.g. A in Trial n; B in Trial n+1), and one type of food in powdered form 
(e.g. Peanuts (P) in Trial n; Macadamia nuts (M) in Trial n+1). The compartment that was accessible and 
food available rotated respectively on a 3-days cycle and on a 2-days cycle. On the test trial (Right), a bowl 
containing items of both types of food was placed in the middle compartment and caching trays were 




The test procedure required that jays in principle eat powdered food in sufficient 
quantity to develop specific satiety. Note that it was essential to use food in powdered 
form so that jays could not cache inside the experimental set-up during the experience 
phase. To ensure that jays would meet these requirements, a Pre-test was conducted.  
Each bird received two pre-test trials in total. The birds’ maintenance diet was 
removed from the aviary approximately 1.5 h prior to the start of each trial. Birds were 
tested in visual isolation from the rest of the group, namely in an indoor compartment 
that was not part of the experimental set-up. Trials were conducted on different days 
and involved a pre-feeding phase followed by a test phase. On each trial, birds were first 





















nuts) and given the opportunity to eat for 15 minutes. Following this pre-feeding phase, 
the powdered food bowl was removed and birds received two bowls, one containing 50 
whole peanuts, and one containing 50 Macadamia nut halves. Birds could freely eat and 
manipulate (and thus also cache in the compartment) both types of food during the test 
phase (15 minutes). At the end of each trial, I recorded: i) the amount of powdered food 
taken out of the bowl during the pre-feeding phase, and; ii) the number of items of both 
food that were taken from the bowls in the testing phase. Across the two trials, all birds 
experienced both types of food in powdered form in the pre-feeding phase. The order 
in which the two types of foods were presented was counterbalanced across birds. To 
pass the pre-test, birds were required to i) take at least one peanut and one Macadamia 
nut from the respective bowls across the two trials, and ii) exhibit an eating pattern that 
was numerically in line with specific satiety, i.e. to show a relative preference for the 
non-pre-fed food when both trials were considered. For instance, a jay should have 
taken a smaller number of peanuts after being pre-fed peanuts than after being pre-fed 
Macadamia nuts. If a bird did not meet the criteria on the first pair of trials, it was re-
tested a second time. 
 
Familiarization  
After the Pre-test, the birds were familiarized with the experimental set-up in one trial. 
Birds were individually given access to the middle compartment and allowed to explore 
all three testing compartments. At this stage all compartments’ windows were kept open. 
Three items of a high value food not used as a test food in the test (wax moth larvae, 
Galleria mellonella) were placed in each test compartment to favour the exploration of the 
areas. The bird inside the set-up was monitored remotely through a cctv camera system. 
The duration of the familiarisation was not the same for all birds: a bird was released 
back into the aviary through the trap-window in the middle compartment after it has 
eaten in all compartments. However, if a bird showed no motivation for the food or 
otherwise looked as if they were not comfortable in the set-up (e.g. flying frantically 
across compartments), the trial was concluded and the bird released into the outdoor 
aviary. No standardised duration was set for the trials. The decision regarding how long 
a bird was inside the set-up was made by the experimenter on a case-by-case basis. To 
successfully complete the Familiarization, birds were required to eat at least one food 
item in each test compartment. In case a bird did not reach this criterion, the 
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Familiarization trial was repeated up to two times (i.e. birds could receive three 
Familiarization trials in total). 
 
Test 
The experiment consisted of an experience phase (nine trials), followed by one test trial. 
In the experience phase birds received one trial per day on nine consecutive days. The 
trials were conducted in the morning after the birds’ maintenance diet had been 
removed from the aviary for approximately 1.5 h. On each trial birds were individually 
allowed to access the experimental set-up through the trap-window in the middle 
compartment and given access only to one of the three test compartments. A bowl 
containing powdered food (either 50.0 g of peanuts or 50.0 g of Macadamia nuts) was 
placed on the suspended platform in the accessible test compartment. Food in 
powdered form was used to prevent the bird from caching in the test compartments 
during the experience phase. The bird could freely eat and move between the middle 
compartment and the accessible test compartment during 15 minutes. At the end of a 
trial the bird was released into the outside aviary through the trap-window in the middle 
compartment. Birds were tested in the same order on all trials. The location and the 
type of food experienced by the birds on each trial changed according to two different 
patterns (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2). The test compartment that was accessible rotated on a 3-day 
basis, so that the birds that had access to compartment A on trial 1 experienced the test 
compartments in the following order across the nine trials: A-B-C-A-B-C-A-B-C. The 
kind of food available rotated on a 2-day basis, i.e. the same food was provided every 
other trial. As a result, all test compartments were experienced three times, and differed 
in the frequency in which they were associated with a specific type of food. In particular, 
two compartments were associated twice with one type of food and once with the 
alternative food, whereas the third compartment was characterized by the opposite 
pattern. The compartment that was accessible and the type of food available on trial 1 
were counterbalanced across birds. 
The test phase was conducted on the last day of the experience phase, 
approximately 3h after the ninth trial of the experience phase. Birds were again 
individually given access to the experimental set-up. All test compartments were 
accessible at this stage, and each contained one caching tray (5 x 3 pots filled with sand). 
A bowl containing 25 peanuts and 25 Macadamia nut halves, was placed in the middle 
compartment. Food items were arranged inside the bowl so that both types of food 
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were equidistantly positioned from each opening that connected the middle 
compartment to the test compartments (Fig. 3.2). Birds could eat and cache both types 
of food in all test compartments for 15 minutes. At the end of the trial birds were 
released to the outdoor aviary through the middle compartment. Birds were not given 
the opportunity to recover their caches. 
 
Analysis 
I scored the number of items of each food type cached in the three test compartments. 
These data were collected at the end of each test trial by manually checking the caching 
trays. Data were analysed descriptively: I compared the caching patterns observed – 
both at the group level and at the individual level – with those predicted according to 
the Future Planning and Complementary Caching Hypotheses by inspecting the data 
plots.  
Because the specific type of food and location experienced on the first 
experience trial were counterbalanced among the birds, the predictions about what to 
cache and where according to the two hypotheses were not identical for all individuals. 
To overcome this issue, and thus to facilitate the comparison between observed and 
expected caching patterns, raw data were sorted semantically. The three locations were 
relabelled such that: i) C1 corresponded to the compartment available on experience 
days 1, 4, 7, and to the hypothetical test on day 10; ii) C2 corresponded to the 
compartment available on experience days 2, 5, 8, and to the hypothetical trial on day 
11; iii) C3 corresponded to the compartment available on experience days 3, 6, 9, and to 
the hypothetical trial on day 12. Similarly, the two types of food were relabelled such 
that: i) f1 corresponded to the food received on experience days 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and on the 
hypothetical trial on day 11, and ii) f2 corresponded to the food received on experience 
days 2, 4, 6, 8 and on the hypothetical trial on days 10 and 12. 
 In addition to this descriptive analysis, data were also analysed statistically using 
a Bayesian approach (Appendix C). The Bayesian analysis was conducted in 






3.2.2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Rome and Lima did not meet the criteria of the Pre-test in the first pair of trials nor 
when they were re-tested the second time. Thus, Rome did not proceed to the 
Familiarization. Due to a mistake, Lima did receive the Familiarization. Neither of these 
two birds proceeded to the test. In addition, Dublin showed very agitated behaviours 
during the Pre-test, consequently I stopped the testing of this bird on welfare grounds. 
Therefore, six birds in total passed the criteria of the Pre-test and proceeded to the 
Familiarization. All of these six birds passed the Familiarization and proceeded to the 
test (Tab. 3.1). 
At the group level, the observed caching pattern appeared not to support the 
predictions of either hypotheses. The jays cached both types of food in all 
compartments, and allocated a seemingly comparable amount of each type of food 
across the three compartments (Fig. 3.3). Note that the evident disproportion between 
the total number of items cached for the two foods largely resulted from one bird 
(Caracas), who cached f1 exclusively, and in similar high quantities across the 
compartments (C1: 8 items; C2: 11 items; C3: 9 items). Thus, the apparent preference of 
the group toward f1 – the food that would have been absent, and so more desired on 
day 10 – is most likely an artefact of the data rather than a meaningful effect. 
When caching patterns were analysed at the individual level, only the 
performance of one individual, Lisbon, was consistent with the Future Planning 
Hypothesis. In line with the Prediction 2, Lisbon cached f1 only in C1 and C3, while he 
cached f2 exclusively in C2 (Fig. 3.3). Therefore, this bird may have distributed the two 
types of food such that on the hypothetical following days both foods would have been 
available in all three compartments. The performance of all other birds however, 
seemed largely inconsistent with both hypotheses. Three birds (Caracas, Washington, 
Jerusalem) showed a caching pattern that was partially consistent with the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis: they cached the most items of f1 in compartment 
C2 and less in C1 and C3 (Fig. 3.3). Yet, these birds did not distributed f2 as predicted, 
such that their overall performance cannot be taken as evidence supporting the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis. Finally, the performance of the remaining two birds 
could not be interpreted according to any prediction. Wellington only cached f2 in C3, 




Table 3.1: Number of items cached in Experiment 3.1. Raw data and semantically sorted data (C1 = 
compartment available on trials 1, 4, 7; C2 = compartment available on trials 2, 5, 8; C3 = compartment 
available on trials 3, 6, 9; f1 = food received on trials 1, 3, 5, 7, 9; f2 = food received on trials 2, 4, 6, 8). 
The entries in the Sequence column indicate the temporal order of compartments and food type during 
the familiarization, e.g. BCA-MP means that the bird was in compartment B on trials 1, 4 and 7 and 





Interestingly, all birds except Washington (and Quito, who cached no item) showed a 
pronounced preference for caching one of the two types of food: Caracas, 28/28 items 
f1; Lisbon 6/7 items f1; Jerusalem 9/10 items f1; Wellington, 1/1 f2 (Tab. 3.1). 
In sum, the overall pattern of results did not provide support for either the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis or the Future Planning Hypothesis (see also 
Appendix C). One possible explanation for this inconclusive outcome is that the task 
imposed a too high cognitive load on the jays. To test between the two hypotheses in a 
scenario with a decreased cognitive load, I conducted a second experiment: here, the 
experience phase did not involve having access to one of the two foods on alternating 
days but either having access to one particular food or having access to no food.  
 
 
Bird Sequence P M P M P M f1 f2 f1 f2 f1 f2
Washington BCA-MP 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 4
Wellington ABC-MP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Caracas ABC-PM 8 0 11 0 9 0 8 0 11 0 9 0
Lisbon CAB-MP 1 0 0 1 0 5 5 0 0 1 1 0
Jerusalem BCA-PM 2 0 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 1 2 0
Quito CAB-PM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Raw Data Sorted Data
A B C C1 C2 C3
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Compensatory Caching Future Planning (Pr 1) Future Planning (Pr 2)
C1             C2            C3 C1             C2            C3 C1             C2            C3
Caracas Group
CC Pl1 Pl2













































































































































Figure 3.3: Caching patterns predicted (Top) and observed at the individual level (Bottom left) 
and group level (Bottom right) in Experiment 3.1. If a bird caches according to the Prediction 1 of 
the Future Planning Hypothesis, it will provision only for the next day when it expects to be in 
compartment C1 with food of type f2 being available; thus it would cache food f1 in C1. If it also 
takes into account subsequent days (Prediction 2 of the Future Planning Hypothesis), it will 
distribute the caches to complement the food type it expects to find in the respective 
compartments. If the bird caches according to the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis, it should 
allocate its caches such that each type of food is concentrated in those compartments in which 
that specific food was less frequently available during the Experience Phase. Therefore, the bird 
should cache more f1 in C1 and C3, but it should cache more f2 in C2. 
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3.3: EXPERIMENT 3.2 
 
Experiment 3.2 employed the same protocol used in Experiment 3.1, but with one key 
difference: to decrease the cognitive load associated with the task, only one type of food 
(either peanuts or Macadamia nuts, depending on the individual bird) was used. Birds 
either received food (Food condition, F) or had access to no food (No Food condition, N) 
on alternating days during the experience phase. Like in Experiment 3.1, the test 
compartment that was accessible rotated on a 3-day basis. Food availability was rotated 
on a 2-day basis, i.e. food was available on every other trial.  
This experiment was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/3y5tm/). The pre-registration was conducted after the pre-tests were 





Eight birds (Colony 1, Appendix A) were tested in this experiment in October 2018. I 
tested all birds that had participated in Experiment 3.1 except Jerusalem: this bird was 
euthanized due to sickness unrelated to the behavioural tests, prior to the start of 




The same set-up as in Experiment 3.1 was used. 
 
Pre-test 1 
Pre-test 1 was conducted to ascertain individual preferences for caching two different 
types of food. This information was used to decide which food would be provided to 
each individual bird in the test to minimise the probability that a bird would not cache 
during the test and thus minimise a decrease of the sample size. Approximately 1.5h 
after their maintenance diet had been removed from the aviary, birds were tested in 
visual isolation from the rest of the group, in an indoor compartment that was not part 
of the experimental set-up. Birds were provided with one caching tray and with two 
food bowls, one containing 50 peanuts, and one containing 50 Macadamia nut halves. 
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Birds were allowed to eat and manipulate (including caching in the compartment) the 
food for 15 minutes. At the end of the trial, birds were released back into the outdoor 
aviary. I manually checked the caching tray and recorded the number of items of each 
type of food cached. Approximately 3h after each trial, birds were again given access to 
the same compartment and were given the opportunity to retrieve their caches for 10 
minutes. Retrieval sessions were conducted only to minimise the probability that birds 
would stop caching because this behaviour yielded no benefit to them. Each bird 
received three trials in total. Individual preferences were established by considering the 
type of food that was cached on average more often across the trials. To proceed to 
Pre-test 2, birds were required to have cached at least one food item in at least two of 
the three trials.  
 
Pre-test 2 
Eurasian jays tend to require repeated exposure to a food (even if they had previously 
received the same food) to start eating it. Given that the jays had not had the 
opportunity to consume powdered food following the completion of Experiment 3.1 
(i.e. January-October 2018), it was necessary to ensure that the birds were still motivated 
to eat powdered food as this food was subsequently used in the test. To this end, Pre-
test 2 was conducted to ascertain that birds would eat peanuts and Macadamia nuts in 
powdered form.  
This Pre-test comprised two stages. In stage 1, birds were given the opportunity 
to eat both types of powdered food in the aviary as a group. Powdered peanuts and 
Macadamia nuts were presented in separate bowls, after the birds’ maintenance diet had 
been removed from the aviary for approximately 1.5 h. Birds were observed by the 
experimenter from an observation hut adjacent to the aviary. If higher-ranking 
individuals monopolised the food bowls, they were separated from the group, such that 
lower ranking individuals could access the food. I scored the number of times each bird 
inserted their beak into each food bowl. To proceed to stage 2, birds were required to 
insert their beak at least twice into their preferred food (as determined in Pre-test 1). If 
this criterion was not reached by all birds on the first trial, the trial was repeated up to 
two times (i.e. a maximum of three trials in total).  
In stage 2, birds were tested individually in an indoor compartment that was not 
part of the experimenter set-up and were provided only with their preferred food. Like 
in stage 1, birds were tested after their maintenance diet had been removed from the 
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aviary for approximately 1.5h. The bird was allowed to eat freely from a bowl containing 
50.0 g of their preferred food in powdered form for 15 minutes. Birds were required to 
eat at least 0.1 g of food to proceed to the Familiarization. If a bird did not pass this 
criterion, the trial was repeated up to two times (i.e. a bird received a maximum of three 
trials in total). 
 
Familiarization 
The Familiarization followed the same procedure as described in Experiment 3.1.  
 
Test 
The test followed the same procedure as in Experiment 3.1. However, instead of two 
foods, birds received only one food, i.e. their preferred food. This procedure was 
chosen to maximise the probability that each bird would eat the food during the test. 
Again, the experiment consisted of an experience phase (nine trials) followed by one test 
trial (Fig. 3.4). In the experience phase birds received one trial per day on nine 
consecutive days. The trials were conducted in the morning after the birds’ maintenance 
diet had been removed from the aviary for approximately 1.5 h. On each trial birds were 
individually allowed to access the experimental set-up through the trap-window in the 
middle compartment and they were given access only to one of the three test 
compartments. On the platform was either a bowl containing 50.0 g of their preferred 
food in powdered form (Food condition, F) or an empty bowl (No Food condition, N). In 
the Food condition, food was available in powdered form to prevent the bird from 
caching in the test compartments during the experience phase. In the No Food condition, 
an empty bowl – rather than no bowl at all – was placed in the accessible compartment, 
both to ensure that it was only the availability of food that differed between the two 
conditions and to maximise the probability that the bird would enter the testing 
compartment when no food was available. 
The bird could freely move between the middle compartment and the accessible 
test compartment and – in the Food condition – eat the food for 15 minutes. At the end 
of a trial, the bird was released into the outside aviary through the trap-window in the 
middle compartment. Birds were tested in the same order on all trials. Like in 
Experiment 3.1, the location and availability of food experienced by the birds on each 
trial changed according to two different patterns. The test compartment that was 
accessible rotated on a 3-day basis, so that the birds that had access to compartment A 
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on trial 1 experienced the test compartments in the following order across the nine 
trials: A-B-C-A-B-C-A-B-C. The availability of food rotated on a 2-day basis, i.e. food 
was available every other trial. As a result, all test compartments were experienced three 
times, and differed in the frequency in which they were associated with the food. 
Specifically, two compartments were associated twice with the presence of food and 
once with the absence of food, whereas the third compartment was characterized by the 
opposite pattern. The compartment that was accessible on trial 1 and food availability 
were counterbalanced across birds. This meant that – as far as food availability is 
concerned – there were two group of birds: one group that experienced food on trial 1 
(henceforth Food-No Food group, FN) and the other group that experienced no food on 




Figure 3.4: Top view of the experimental set-up of Experiment 3.2. Birds could access the three test 
compartments (A, B, C) from a middle compartment. On each experience trial (Left), the birds had access 
only to one test compartment (e.g. A in Trial n; B in Trial n+1), and they were presented either with a 
bowl containing powdered food (F, Trial n, Trial n+2) or with an empty bowl containing no food (NF, 
Trial n+1, Trial n+3). The compartment that was accessible and food availability rotated on a 3-days cycle 
and on a 2-days cycle, respectively. On the test trial (Right), a bowl containing food items (i.e. not food in 
powdered form) was placed in the middle compartment and caching trays were placed in all test 



















The test phase was conducted on the last day of the experience phase, approximately 3h 
after the ninth trial. Birds were again individually given access to the experimental set-up. 
All test compartments were accessible at this stage and each contained one caching tray 
(5 x 3 pots filled with sand). A bowl containing 50 items of the bird’s preferred food 
(whole peanuts or Macadamia nut halves) was placed in the middle compartment. The 
bird could eat and cache the food in all test compartments for 15 minutes. At the end of 
the trial, the bird was released in the outdoor aviary through the middle compartment. 
Birds were not given the opportunity to recover their caches. 
According to the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis birds should cache higher 
proportions of items in the compartment(s) where – during the experience phase – the 
food had been available only once than in the compartment(s) where the food had been 
available twice. Importantly, birds in the FN group experienced two compartments as 
being more frequently associated with food, whereas birds in the NF group experienced 
only one compartment as being more frequently associated with food. As result, the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis predicts that birds in FN group should cache more 
in one compartment, but birds in the NF groups should concentrate their caches equally 
across two compartments (Fig. 3.5).  
In contrast, according to the Future Planning Hypothesis birds should cache 
more in the compartment(s) in which they expect to receive no food, either on the next 
day (hypothetical experience trial 10, Prediction 1) or on the following three days 
(hypothetical experience trials 10 to 12, Prediction 2). Both predictions are applicable to 
the FN group (Fig. 3.5). However, only Prediction 2 is relevant to the NF group. 
During the nine experience trials, these birds were given food every other day in the 
following sequence: N-F-N-F-N-F-N-F-N, thereby they would receive food in the 
hypothetical trial 10 and 12 but not in trial 11. As a result, if jays can cache according to 
future need, then it makes little sense for birds in the NF group to cache in the 
compartments where they expect to be on day 10 (Prediction 1) because food would be 
available anyway. Rather they should concentrate their caches only in the compartment 
in which they expect to be given access to on day 11 because this compartment would 
be the only one in which no food would be available among the three hypothetical trials 






I scored the number of items of food cached in the three test compartments. These data 
were obtained by manually checking the caching trays after the end of each trial. As in 
Experiment 3.1, data were analysed descriptively through the comparison between the 
caching patterns observed and those predicted according to the two contrasting 
hypotheses. Again, to facilitate the analysis, raw data were semantically sorted by using 
C1-C3 as variables in the plots. A distinction between f1 and f2 (as was done in 
Experiment 3.1) was not necessary because in this experiment each bird was provided 
with one type of food only. 
 In addition to this descriptive analysis, data were also analysed statistically using 
a Bayesian approach (Appendix C). The Bayesian analysis was conducted in 
collaboration with Johanni Brea. The descriptive and statistical analyses yielded the same 
conclusions 
 
3.3.2: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
All birds passed the Pre-tests and the Familiarization, except Dublin who did not pass 
the criterion in the Familiarization. Therefore, seven birds took part in the test. On the 
ninth and last experience trial, Lima went through a small empty space in between the 
suspended platform in the compartment and the mesh wall and therefore experienced 
not only the accessible compartment but also another one. Because this unforeseen 
circumstance may have influenced Lima’s performance in the test trial, I decided to 
exclude him from further testing. Thus, six birds were tested in the test trial (Tab. 3.2).  
The caching pattern recorded for the FN group violated the predictions of both 
hypotheses. According to the Future Planning hypothesis, birds should have 
concentrated their caches in C1 (Prediction 1), or in both C1 and C3 (Prediction 2), 
whereas following the Compensatory Caching hypothesis, they should have preferred 
C2 over C1 and C3 (Fig. 3.5). However, despite a slight preference toward C1, the FN 
group spread food items quite homogenously across the three compartments (Fig. 3.5). 
The same pattern also emerged for each bird in the FN group (Caracas, Washington, 





Table 3.2: Number of items cached in Experiment 3.2. Raw data and semantically sorted data (C1 = 
compartment available on trials 1, 4, 7; C2 = compartment available on trials 2, 5, 8; C3 = compartment 
available on trials 3, 6, 9). The entries in the Sequence column indicate the temporal order of 
compartments and conditions during the familiarization, e.g. BCA-NF means that the bird was in 
compartment B on trials 1, 4 and 7 and received no powdered food (N) on odd days and powdered food 
(F) on even days. 
 
 
On the other hand, the performance of the birds in the NF group could not support the 
Future Planning Hypothesis, but it appeared – to some extent – compatible with the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis. In the line with the latter hypothesis, the analysis at 
the group level showed that birds cached more in C1 and C3 over C2 (Fig. 3.5). 
However, while similar number of items were expected to be cached in C1 and C3 
under the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis, the group cached two times more items 
in C3 (15 items) than in C1 (7 items). The individual level analysis indicated that this 
pronounced preference toward C3 resulted from one bird, Lisbon, who cached 7 out of 
8 items in C3. In contrast, the other two individuals of the NF group (Wellington and 
Rome) appeared to have fully met the prediction of the Compensatory Caching 
Hypothesis: they spread their caches uniformly across C1 and C3, and cached no items 
(Wellington) or a small fraction of items (Rome: 3/16 items) in C2 (Fig. 3.5). 
Therefore, as in Experiment 3.1, the overall pattern of the results could not 
support either the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis or the Future Planning 
Hypothesis (see also Appendix C). 
EXP 2
Bird Sequence A B C C1 C2 C3
Caracas BCA-FN 7 8 7 8 7 7
Washinghton CAB-FN 2 2 3 3 2 2
Quito ABC-FN 9 8 8 9 8 8
Wellington CAB-NF 0 1 1 1 0 1
Rome ABC-NF 6 3 7 6 3 7
Lisbon BCA-NF 7 0 1 0 1 7




Figure 3.5: Caching patterns predicted (Top) and observed at the individual level and group level (Bottom) in Experiment 3.2. A bird in the FN group should expect to not receive 
powdered food on test day 10. If it caches according to Prediction 1 of the Future Planning Hypothesis, it will provision only for the next day, when it expects to be in compartment 
C1 with no food available; thus it would cache exclusively in C1. If it takes into account the next three days (Prediction 2 of the Future Planning Hypothesis), it will distribute the 
caches in compartments C1 and C3. If the bird caches according to the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis the bird should cache more in compartment C2, where it has only once 
encountered the powdered food. In contrast, a bird in the NF group should expect to receive food on the hypothetical trial 10 (and 12), but not on trial 11. Therefore, according to 
Prediction 2 of the Future Planning Hypothesis, it should cache in C2, whereas following the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis, it should preferentially cache in C1 and C3. Note 
that Prediction 1 of the Future Planning Hypothesis is not applicable to the NF because the birds in this group should expect to receive food on trial 10. 
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3.4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter the objective was to evaluate two alternative hypotheses about future 
planning, focussing on the cognitive mechanism underpinning corvids’ ability to cache 
for the future. To this end, I tested Eurasian jays in two experiments in which the 
Compensatory Caching and the Future Planning hypotheses would have opposite 
predictions. Across both experiments, the data did not support either hypothesis.  
In Experiment 3.1, the performance of a single bird (Lisbon) was compatible 
with one of the two hypotheses: Lisbon’s caching patterns was in line with the 
Prediction 2 of the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis. Thus, this bird might have 
distributed his caches such that in the hypothetical following trials, both types of food 
would have been available in each compartment. On the other hand, in Experiment 3.2, 
two birds (Wellington and Rome) cached as predicted by the Compensatory Caching 
Hypothesis. Specifically, they cached comparably more items in the two compartments 
in which the food was less frequently available during the experience phase.  
Inter-individual differences are not rare in comparative cognition, particularly in 
studies focussing on complex abilities (e.g. Seed et al., 2006, 2009b; see also Chapter 2). 
Hence, the fact that only a few individuals cached as predicted does not per se disprove 
that Eurasian jays are endowed with the cognitive mechanisms described by the two 
hypotheses. For instance, the individuals tested in this study might differ in their ability 
to plan for the future, with Lisbon being endowed with higher cognitive sophistication 
than the others. However, inter-individual difference can also be caused by chance or 
other factors that are not related to cognitive variability (e.g. motivation). Because 
individual jays were given a single test trial in both Experiment 3.1 and 3.2, it is hard to 
tear apart which factor may have produced the observed variability within each 
experiment. Yet, when the overall pattern of results is taken into account, it appears 
more likely that three individuals met one of the predictions in a single trial, due to 
chance. First, because the performances of Lisbon, Rome and Wellington were not 
compatible with the same hypothesis, results would suggest that caching in Eurasian jays 
should be underpinned by both the ability to plan for the future and a predisposition to 
distribute caches according to location-specific weights. This possibility cannot be 
excluded a priori, yet, hinging on two different mechanisms, it is less parsimonious than 
the Compensatory Caching or the Future Planning hypotheses alone. Second, if the 
caching performance of Lisbon, Rome and Wellington was actually the expression of 
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the cognitive mechanisms described by one of the two hypotheses, then these 
individuals should have consistently met the predictions of one hypothesis in both 
experiments. In contrast, Lisbon failed to cache according to the Future Planning 
Hypothesis in Experiment 3.2, while Wellington did not cache as predicted by the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis in Experiment 3.1. Because Rome only took part in 
Experiment 3.2, no consideration can be made for this individual. Therefore, the overall 
pattern of results cannot be taken as evidence that corvids’ caching behaviour is 
underpinned by either of the two cognitive mechanisms that were investigated. Note 
that the Bayesian analysis of the data (Appendix C) support the same conclusion. 
Interestingly, birds most frequently spread their caches among all compartments 
in both experiments. Considering all individual trials in which at least one item was 
cached (i.e. 5/6 trials in Experiment 3.1; 6/6 trials in Experiment 3.2), birds distributed 
their caches across the three compartments in 8 out of 11 eleven trials. This is 
particularly evident in the performance of Caracas and Washington, both of whom 
consistently cached similar quantities of items in the three locations (Fig. 3.3 and 3.5). 
Thus, location-specific experience before the test might not have played a key role in 
guiding birds’ decisions about where to cache. A similar argument may be raised in regard 
to the decision about what to cache. Indeed, in Experiment 3.1 (when two foods were 
available) most birds showed a pronounced preference to cache only one type of food, 
regardless of whether that food would have been unavailable in the next days or had less 
frequently been associated in the past with the compartments where it was eventually 
cached. 
Taken together, the results reported in this chapter seem to be in contrast with 
previous studies in corvids. In particular, Raby et al. (2007) found that, when California 
scrub-jays were allowed to cache in two different locations – one in which food has 
been consistently available and one in which it had not – they tended to concentrate 
their caches in the location where food has been absent in the past. Raby et al. (2007) 
further reported that, when allowed to cache two types of food, scrub-jays distributed 
their caches heterogeneously such that each food was cached preferentially in the 
location in which the alternative food had been experienced. Regardless of whether 
these performances were achieved through an ability to plan for the future or by 
attributing location-specific weights, Raby et al. (2007)’s study suggests that scrub-jays 
decide where and what to cache on the basis of their previous experience about food 
availability in multiple locations. In this study I could not find equivalent evidence. 
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Given that the experiments reported here and those conducted by Raby et al. (2007) 
employed different paradigms, it is not possible to draw conclusive inferences about 
what factors may have caused inconsistent results in the two studies. To this end, a 
crucial first step for future research is to replicate the findings reported in this chapter in 
Eurasian jays, and those obtained by Raby et al. (2007) in California scrub-jays. 
Subsequently, in case the results of both studies will be corroborated, future work 
should investigate the factors (e.g. experimental paradigms, model species) that may 
have caused inconsistent outcomes between these two studies. 
One factor that future research may focus on is whether methodological 
differences may have influenced the ecological validity of the tasks, and consequently 
affected jays’ capability to cache according to future needs. A key difference between 
the studies is that the association between food and locations was stable across 
experience trials in Raby et al. (2007)’s experiments but it changed systematically in the 
experiments reported here. It is possible that the two kinds of manipulations may have 
affected the ecological relevance of the task. For a wild corvid, it may be more plausible 
to encounter locations in which food is consistently available during a given period than 
to experience locations in which a specific food is abundant every few days in a cyclic 
fashion. For instance, Eurasian jays are specialized cachers that primarily rely on trees’ 
fruits (i.e. acorns) as food for caching (de Kort and Clayton, 2006; Goodwin, 1951). It 
may be more likely for a wild jay to experience a scenario resembling the paradigms of 
Raby et al. (2007) than those employed here. An oak tree does not bear abundant fruits 
every few days but no fruits in between; rather it consistently bears acorns over weeks, 
in one season. Therefore, future work on the cognitive mechanisms underpinning 
caching behaviour in corvids may want to evaluate the interplay between experimental 
designs and ecological validity of the task. To this end, it would be also beneficial to take 
into account species-specific differences in caching given that these features may 
influence the ecological relevance of the tasks for different species. 
The methodological difference between studies that was noted above further 
highlights that the paradigms I have employed likely imposed a higher cognitive load on 
the jays, relatively to Raby et al. (2007)’s paradigms. However, in their current form, 
neither the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis nor the Future Planning Hypothesis 
involve any auxiliary claims regarding the extent of information that the underlying 
mechanism is able to process. The Future Planning Hypothesis specifies that individuals 
should be able to keep track of ‘what-where-when’ representations to select actions that 
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are most appropriate at a given point. Thus, the cognitive load involved in this study – 
namely the need to integrate information about food availability at three different 
locations based on time intervals – seems compatible with the hypothesis. Similarly, the 
Compensatory Caching Hypothesis specifies that the suitability of a given caching 
location for a specific food is based on food-specific ‘weights’ associated with each 
location, which are updated when the bird finds itself at that location. Thus, in its 
current form the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis also seems compatible with the 
cognitive load required in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2. Future theoretical work may, 
however, expand the hypothesis regarding the manner in which the ‘weights’ are 
updated, and thus should motivate further empirical work.  
In summary, the data from this study provide no support for either of the two 
tested cognitive abilities being the base of future-oriented caching behaviour in Eurasian 
jays (see also Appendix C). In the first part of this chapter, I introduced a third 
explanation that has been proposed in the literature, namely the Mnemonic Association 
Hypothesis. To evaluate whether this third hypothesis could provide a better 
explanation for the Eurasian jays’ caching behaviour future studies could utilise 
equivalent procedures that can simultaneously test between different competing 
hypotheses. In addition, future studies replicating the experiments reported here both in 
Eurasian jays and other corvid species are needed to strengthen the claims that can be 
made based on the current findings.  
In parallel to future planning and problem solving, there is a third cognitive 
domain in which corvids appear to excel, namely social cognition. As summarized in 
Chapter 1, a number of studies have suggested that corvids, and Eurasian jays in 
particular, may respond to different types of mental states, such as perspectives and 
desires of others. In Chapter 4, I shall attempt at gaining further insight into the 





Can Eurasian jays integrate cues about others’ 




In Chapter 2 and 3, I explored the cognitive sophistication of Eurasian jays by focusing 
on their abilities to solve physical problems and plan for the future, respectively. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, a third cognitive domain in which corvids have been reported to 
show remarkable complexity is social cognition. Corvids appear to be capable of 
adjusting their behaviour according to another’s perspective, knowledge and desire. For 
example, Eurasian jays seem to employ a variety of cache protection strategies to 
minimise cache loss by either responding to the visual or auditory perspective or the 
desire of an observing conspecific. Yet, it is an open question whether these jays (or any 
other corvid) can integrate cues about different kinds of mental states and perform the 
optimal response accordingly. In this chapter I investigate whether Eurasian jays can 
limit the risk of cache loss by accounting simultaneously for cues about the desire and 
perspective of a potential conspecific pilferer. Hinging on established paradigms, I 
conducted two experiments in which both the visual perspective and the desire of an 
observer jay were manipulated. Opaque and transparent barriers were used to 
manipulate the observer’s visual access to cache locations, whereas the observer’s desire 
towards different types of food was manipulated through specific satiety. In Experiment 
4.1, the jays could hide only one type of food – either the same food the observer was 
sated on or a different food – but could choose to distribute their caches across 
locations that were in-view and out-of-view for the observer. In Experiment 4.2, jays 
could only cache in one location (either in-view or out-view for the observer) but could 
choose between two types of cacheable foods: one that was currently desired and one 
that was not currently desired by the observer. Consistently, across both experiments 
the jays’ caching pattern provided no evidence that they could integrate information 
about the observer’s desire and perspective. Thus, the integration of these mental states 
may be too cognitively demanding for Eurasian jay, or alternatively such ability may 






In the first two experimental chapters of this thesis I explored the cognitive 
sophistication of the Eurasian jay by focusing on physical problem solving (Chapter 2) 
and future planning abilities (Chapter 3). In this chapter I turn my attention to social 
cognition and report a study investigating whether Eurasian jays can simultaneously 
respond to cues about different mental states of another agent, namely the agent’s 
perspective and desire. 
Theory of Mind – a set of abilities allowing individuals to attribute internal, 
mental states to others – is what enables humans to explain, predict, and even 
manipulate, the behaviour of other individuals. The reason why this set of abilities is 
referred to as a Theory of Mind is that it provides a causal framework within which 
different observable entities can be used to infer otherwise imperceptible mental states. 
Theory of Mind (ToM) appears to develop as a step-wise process: children around the 
age of two, seem to first develop the ability to acknowledge others’ perspective (Moll 
and Tomasello, 2006), while subsequently, between three to five years of age, they 
appear to progressively acquire the abilities to explicitly reason about others’ desires, and 
then knowledge and beliefs (Wellman and Liu, 2004). Evidence suggests that this 
developmental trajectory is stable across cultures (although minor differences exist, 
Selcuk et al., 2018; Wellman et al., 2006) and transcends sensory modalities, e.g. both 
visual and auditory cues can be used to reason about others’ mental states (Hasni et al., 
2017). Despite this stepwise development, different ToM abilities are subsumed into a 
flexible cognitive framework that allows us not only to process a single type of social 
information but also to integrate different types of information at a given time. Adult 
humans routinely make inferences about the behaviour of another agent by 
simultaneously taking into account different types of mental states such as others’ 
perspective, desires and beliefs (e.g. Baker et al., 2017).  
Interestingly, humans’ capability to integrate multiple pieces of social 
information emerges during infancy, prior to the full development of ToM. For instance, 
infants younger than two years old can integrate an adult’ emotional expressions and 
referential cues (e.g. gaze direction, body orientation), and use it to adjust their 
behaviour toward a target (Moses et al., 2001; Repacholi et al., 2014). Crucially, such 
sophisticated cognitive processing may not entail the representation of mental states: 
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infants may implicitly register social cues and exhibit adaptive responses accordingly 
without an explicit understanding of another person’s behaviour (Apperly and Butterfill, 
2009; Butterfil and Apperly, 2013).  
According to some authors, the evolution of ToM is tightly linked to the 
emergence of some of the most iconic human traits, such as language and a pervasive 
culture (Heyes and Frith, 2014; Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003). Yet a growing body of 
research raises the possibility that non-human animals may take into account the 
perspectives, desires, knowledge and beliefs of conspecifics and adjust their behaviours 
accordingly (e.g., primates: Buttelmann et al., 2017; Drayton and Santos, 2014; 
Flombaum and Santos, 2005; Kano et al., 2019; Krupenye and Call, 2019 dogs: 
Horowitz, 2011; Maginnity and Grace, 2014; corvids: Bugnyar et al., 2016; Dally et al., 
2006; Ostojić et al., 2013; Shaw and Clayton, 2012). Note however that it is debated 
whether the mechanisms underpinnings these flexible behaviours in non-human animals 
really hinge on the attribution of mental states to conspecifics or whether they entirely 
rely on observable behavioural cues (Heyes, 2015, 2017; Penn and Povinelli, 2007b; 
Whiten, 2013). Studies of ToM in non-human animals most frequently employed 
paradigms in which individuals had to solve a task by responding to a single type of 
mental state (e.g. desires) of another agent. In contrast, testing the ability to 
simultaneously process different types of mental states has been largely overlooked in 
animals. As a result, very little is known about whether – like humans – other species 
can integrate multiple social cues that correlate with others’ mental states and exhibit 
appropriate responses accordingly. Corvids, and Eurasian jays in particular, are an ideal 
candidate for this line of research because they appear to be capable of responding – 
independently – to social cues correlating with different types of mental states.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, several studies have reported that jays flexibly employ 
a variety of anti-pilfering strategies to limit the risk of cache loss. In the presence of a 
conspecific, California scrub-jays and Eurasian jays tend to cache in less visible locations 
(e.g. behind barriers, in shadow areas), or in non-noisy substrates, thus suggesting they 
respond to the visual or to the acoustic perspective of a potential pilferer (Dally et al., 
2005; Legg and Clayton, 2014; Shaw and Clayton, 2013; Stulp et al., 2009). In parallel, 
research investigating food sharing behaviour indicated that jays may be able also to 
attribute desires to conspecifics. Male Eurasian jays choose which kind of food to cater 
to their mates, on the basis of females’ desires (Ostojić et al., 2013, 2014). According to 
a recent study, jays’ ability to respond to others’ desires may not be limited to food 
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sharing behaviour, rather it may extend also to caching. Ostojić et al., (2017) tested 
whether jays will adjust the amount of caching of two distinct foods according to what 
an observer, a potential pilferer, was pre-fed on. The authors found that the jays tend to 
cache more of the food the observer was pre-fed on, i.e. the food that was less desired 
by the observers, and thus less likely to be pilfered. However, cachers exhibited the 
same caching pattern regardless of whether or not they had witnessed the pre-feeding of 
the observer, thus suggesting that the observer’s behaviour during caching played an 
important role in the cacher’s decision making process and may be sufficient to explain 
the food-sharing behaviour of the males (Ostojić et al., 2017). Building on this evidence, 
a critical question is whether jays, like humans, can integrate multiple cues that correlate 
with different types of mental states to flexibly solve social problems.  
In this chapter I investigate whether Eurasian jays can integrate information 
about a conspecific’s perspective and current desire to selectively protect those caches 
that are at most risk of being pilfered. Hinging on previously established paradigms 
(Legg and Clayton, 2014; Ostojić et al., 2017), I conducted two experiments in which I 
manipulated the observers’: i) visual perspective of caching locations by allowing cachers 
to hide food either behind an opaque or a transparent barrier, and; ii) desire toward 
different types of food through specific satiety. In Experiment 4.1, jays were provided 
with only one type of food – either the same food the observer was previously sated on, 
or a different food – and two caching trays, one that the observer could see and one 
that the observer could not see. Jays could choose whether to cache in-view or out-view 
of the conspecific. In contrast, in Experiment 4.2, jays were provided with a single 
caching tray – which could either be seen by the observer or could not be seen by the 
observer – and two types of food, one of which had previously been pre-fed to the 
observer. Jays could decide whether to cache the same type of food on which the 
observer had been sated or the different food. Thus, the designs of the two experiments 
were complementary, such that jays could most effectively protect their caches by 




4.2 EXPERIMENT 4.1: Do jays protect their caches by choosing 





Nine Eurasian jays (four males and five females) were tested: Caracas, Lima, Lisbon, 
Dublin, Rome, Jerusalem, Wellington, Washington and Quito. These were all the birds 
available at the time of testing. Birds were housed as a group (Colony 1, Appendix A) in 
a large outdoor aviary (20x10x3 m) at the Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, 
University of Cambridge, Madingley. Outside of testing the birds had ad libitum access to 
their maintenance diet of vegetables, eggs, seed and fruits. Water was available at all 
times. All procedures were approved by the University of Cambridge Animal Ethics 
Committee. The experiment was conducted in October-November 2017. 
 
Experimental set-up 
Birds were tested in indoor testing compartments (2x1x3 m) that were accessible from 
the aviary through flap windows. During the Familiarisation, each bird was tested in 
isolation, i.e. with no other birds present in the test room. Compartments used during 
the Familiarisation were not used in the test phase. During the test, a cacher bird and an 
observer bird were located in adjacent compartments. These compartments were 
separated by opaque sheeting except for a mesh window (30x55 cm) through which the 
birds had visual access to the adjacent compartment.  
Each compartment contained a suspended platform (1x1 m) approximately 1 m 
from the ground, onto which food bowls, caching trays and Perspex barriers could be 
placed. The bowls contained i) a handful of maintenance diet (MD); ii) 50 Macadamia 
nut halves (M), or; iii) 50 whole peanuts with skin (P). Each type of food was presented 
in a bowl of a specific colour, and these colours were kept consistent for all birds. 
Rectangular seedling trays (5 x 3 pots filled with sand) were used as caching trays. Trays 
were painted different colours and were trial-specific to minimise the probability that 
birds’ caching behaviour in one trial would be influenced by its memory from previous 
trials. A Perspex barrier – which was placed next to the caching trays in the cacher’s 
compartment – was used to manipulate the observer’s visual access to the caching trays. 
To give cachers the option to cache in or out of view of the observer, I used a ‘T-
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shaped’ barrier – henceforth T-barrier – consisting of three plastic sheets (25x40 cm) 
forming two arms and one stem. This was the same barrier that was used by Legg and 
Clayton (2014). One arm of the ‘T’ was constructed out of transparent Perspex, while 
the other arm and the stem were constructed out of white opaque Perspex. This T-
barrier was placed around two caching trays (Fig. 4.1) such that the observer could see 
the tray behind the transparent arm (in-view tray) but could not see the tray behind the 
opaque arm (out-of-view tray). Due to the height of the barrier, the observer could always 
see the cacher when the latter was standing upright in proximity of the trays. However, 
the observer could not see the location where the cacher hid the food when it was 
caching in the out-of-view tray.  
 
General Procedure 
To ensure that the birds were mildly hungry and thus likely to interact with food 
provided during testing, their maintenance diet was removed from the aviary 
approximately 1.5h prior to testing. Test trials involved a pre-feeding phase followed by 
a caching phase. Before the start of the trial, two birds (one cacher and one observer) 
were given access to two adjacent compartments. Subsequently, I placed a bowl 
containing pre-feeding food (Macadamia nuts or peanuts) on the suspended platform in 
the observer’s compartment and a bowl containing a handful of maintenance diet on the 
platform in the cacher’s compartment. Both bowls were placed in front of the mesh 
window (Fig. 4.1) to ensure that the birds could see each other whilst eating and to 
maximise the chances that the cacher could see on which food the observer was pre-fed. 
I then left the test room and the birds could eat the pre-feeding food for 15 minutes. 
Next, I entered the test room again and removed the bowls as well as any food remains 
on the platforms. In the subsequent caching phase, I positioned the caching trays, as 
well as the barrier and the food bowl, in front of the mesh window in the cacher’s 
compartment (Fig. 4.1). I then left the test room and the birds were given 15 minutes, 
during which the cacher could eat and cache the food in the trays. At the end of the trial, 
I opened the flap windows to allow the birds to re-join the rest of the group in the 
aviary and recorded the amount of food eaten and the number and location of caches in 
the trays. Approximately three hours after each trial, the cacher was allowed to re-enter 
the caching compartment. At this stage, the flap window was kept open so that the bird 
had access not only to the indoor compartment but also to the adjacent outside run. 
Note that the door connecting the outside run to the aviary was kept closed, thus no 
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other bird could enter the cacher’s run or compartment. During 10 minutes, the cacher 
could retrieve the hidden items and re-cache them in the compartment and in the 
adjacent small outdoor run. Observers were not present during recovery. This retrieval 
phase was conducted only to reduce the probability that birds would stop caching in the 
trays so that these data were not analysed. Birds received a single test trial per day. 
 
Familiarization 
Birds received two Familiarization trials on two separate days to ensure that they were 
comfortable caching in trays when these were placed in proximity of each of the two 
arms of the T-barrier. I presented the birds with the T-barrier, a single caching tray and 
a food bowl. On each trial, birds were given the opportunity to eat and cache for 15 
minutes. On each trial, the tray was placed either behind the opaque or the transparent 
arm of the T-barrier. The order in which birds experienced the tray in the two locations 
was counterbalanced across birds. The orientation of the barrier within the 
compartment was different from that later used during testing, and kept consistent for 
each bird across the two Familiarization trials (Fig. 4.1). The type of food (Macadamia 
nuts or peanuts) was randomly assigned to birds but each bird was provided with the 
same type of food in both trials. To proceed to testing, birds had to cache at least one 
item on each trial.  
 
Test 
During the pre-feeding phase, cachers could see a conspecific eating a specific type of 
food: either the same type of food they were going to receive in the subsequent caching 
phase or a different one. In the subsequent caching phase cachers were provided with 
the same food used in the Familiarization and with two caching trays, each one placed 
behind one of the two arms of the T-barrier (Fig. 4.1).  
All birds were tested in two conditions (one trial per condition) that differed in 
whether or not the type of food provided to the observer in the pre-feeding phase 
matched the type food provided to the cacher in the caching phase (Fig. 4.1). In the 
High Desire Condition, the type of food provided to the cacher and to the observer 
differed (e.g. M for the observer, and P for the cacher). In the Low Desire Condition, the 
same type of food was used (e.g. P for both the observer and cacher). The order in 
which the cachers experienced the High Desire and Low Desire conditions was 





Figure 4.1: Top-view schematic representation of the set-up and procedure used in Experiment 4.1. In 
the Familiarization (left panels), the cacher bird received two trials, one in which the caching tray was 
placed near the opaque arm of the barrier (top panel), and one in which the tray was placed near the clear 
arm of the barrier (bottom panel). In the test, trials were composed by a pre-feeding phase (middle 
panels) and a caching phase (right panels). The cacher bird received two trials that differed in the type of 
food that was provided to the observer bird in the pre-feeding phase. In one trial (High Desire Condition, 
top panels), the food provided to the observer in the pre-feeding phase differed from the food the cacher 
bird could subsequently cache. In the other trial (Low Desire Condition, bottom panels), the food provided 
to the observer in the pre-feeding phase was the same as the food the cacher bird could subsequently 
cache. In the pre-feeding phase of both trials, the cacher bird was provided with a handful of maintenance 
diet (md). Note that, for explanatory purposes, the scheme shows the cacher as being provided with 
peanuts (P) in the Familiarization and in the caching phase of the two test trials. However, in the 
experiment, cacher birds were randomly assigned to one type of food (either peanuts, or Macadamia nuts), 




In each individual test trial, I recorded the number of food items cached in each tray. I 
then calculated the difference in the number of items cached in the out-of-view tray minus 
the number of items cached in the in-view tray. This difference score [Cachesout-of-view – 
Cachesin-view] represents an indication for a preference to cache in the out-view tray over 
the in-view tray. I compared this difference between the two conditions using a Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. In addition, in the High Desire condition, I used a one-sample Wilcoxon 





Cacher	 Observer	 T-Barrier	 Caching	Tray	 Food	Bowl	
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tray minus the number of items cached in the in-view tray against chance. I also recorded 
i) the number of items taken from the bowl by observers (during pre-feeding) and by 
cachers, and ii) the number of items recovered by cachers during recovery sessions. 
These data were not relevant to the experimental question, such that they were not 
analysed. Statistical analyses were performed in R (R.3.5) using the RStudio 1.1.447 
wrapper (RStudio Team, 2018). Alpha was set to 0.5. 
If the jays can integrate information about the observer’s perspective and desire, 
their caching pattern should meet two predictions. First, the difference in the number of 
items cached in the out-of-view tray minus the number of items cached in the in-view tray 
should be higher in the High Desire condition than in the Low Desire condition. This is 
because it is in the High Desire condition that the observer has a stronger desire toward 
the cacher’s food, so that the cacher would have to protect their caches more carefully. 
Second, in the High Desire condition, the cacher should exhibit a clear preference for 
caching in the out-of-view tray, therefore in this condition the difference score should be 
higher than expected by chance.  
 
4.2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
All birds except two (Lisbon and Dublin) reached the criterion in the Familiarization 
and therefore seven birds proceeded to the test. The differences between the items 
cached out-of-view and in-view did not differ between the High Desire Condition and 
the Low Desire Condition (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: N=7, W=9, p=0.40; Fig. 4.2). 
Therefore, in contrast to the first prediction, the jays did not preferentially cache items 
in the out-of-view tray when the observers had a higher motivation to pilfer that specific 
food. Further, in the High Desire condition the difference in the number of items cached 
in the out-of-view tray minus the number of items cached in the in-view tray did not differ 
from chance (One-sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: N=7, W=-7, p=0.61). Thus, 
contradicting the second prediction, the jays did not prefer to cache in the out-of-view 






Figure 4.2: Box and whisker plot of data in Experiment 4.1. The plot shows the difference in the number 
of items cached in the out-of-view tray minus the number of items cached in the in-view tray in the two 
experimental conditions. In the High Desire condition (orange), the food cached by the cacher bird 
differed to the food on which the observer was sated. In the Low Desire condition (blue), the food cached 
by the cacher bird was the same as the food on which the observer was sated on. 
 
Taken together, the results of this experiment are not consistent with the possibility that 
jays can integrate cues about the perspective and desire of a conspecific to most 
effectively protect their caches. Surprisingly however, these results also appear 
incompatible with previous studies reporting that Eurasian jays flexibly adjust their 
caching behaviour on the basis of an observer’s perspective (Legg and Clayton, 2014). 
In particular, Legg and Clayton (2014) reported that jays tended to cache more in the 
out-of-view tray when a conspecific was present than when they cached in private. 
Although Experiment 4.1 employed the same procedure (including the same T-barrier) 
as the observed condition in Legg and Clayton (2014) – the only difference being in the 
food provided to cachers8 – I found no indication that jays preferentially cached in the 
location that was not visible from the observer’s perspective.  
																																																								
8 In Legg and Clayton (2014)’s experiment, the jays were provided with 30 peanut halves. In contrast, in 
























































4.3: EXPERIMENT 4.2: Do jays protect their caches by choosing 
what to cache? 
 
 
To further investigate whether jays can integrate cues that correlate with another’s 
perspective and desire, I conducted a second caching experiment based on a 
complementary design. Here, on each trial, cachers were presented with two types of 
food but with a single caching tray. Thus, I tested whether jays could minimize the risk 
of their food being pilfered by adjusting which type of food to cache – rather than where 
to hide it, as in Experiment 4.1 – according to the observer’s different desire toward the 





Eight Eurasian jays (Colony 1, Appendix A) participated in this experiment. All 
individual birds that had taken part in Experiment 4.1 were tested, except Dublin who 
showed signs of distress during the Familiarization of Experiment 4.1 and was therefore 
excluded from further testing. The experiment was conducted in January-February 2018. 




I used the same set-up described in Experiment 4.1 except that here I manipulated the 
observer’s visual access using an ‘U-shaped’ barrier – henceforth U-barrier. This barrier 
consisted of two lateral Perspex sheets (26x25 cm) and one central Perspex sheet (53x25 
cm) forming two angles of approximately 45°. The U-barrier was positioned around one 





Individuals were randomly assigned to one type of food, which was consistently used in all Familiarization 








Figure 4.3: Top-view schematic representation of the set-up and procedure used in the test of 
Experiment 4.2. Trials were composed by a pre-feeding phase (left panels) and a caching phase (right 
panels). The cacher bird received two trials with the transparent U-barrier (In-view condition, top panels), 
and two trials with the opaque U-barrier (Out-of-view condition, bottom panels). Within each condition, 
trials differed in the type of food (either peanuts, P, or Macadamia nuts, M) that was provided to the 
observer in the pre-feeding phase. The cacher bird was always presented with a handful of maintenance 




Familiarization trials were conducted to ascertain that birds were comfortable in caching 
both types of food (Macadamia nuts and peanuts) in a tray placed in proximity of each 
of the barriers. Birds received two trials on separate days. On each trial, birds were 
presented with the U-barrier, a single caching tray and two food bowls, which were 
presented sequentially. Birds were given the opportunity to eat and cache for 20 
minutes: during the first 10 minutes they were provided with one type of food and 
during the next 10 minutes with the other. The order in which the birds experienced the 






















bird experienced one order on their first trial and the opposite order on their second 
trial. On each trial, birds were presented with one type of the U-barrier: opaque or 
transparent. The order in which the birds experienced the two types of the U-barrier 
was counterbalanced across birds. To proceed to testing, birds had to i) cache at least 




Following the general structure of Experiment 4.1, in the pre-feeding phase cachers 
were first able to see an observer feeding on one specific type of food (Macadamia nuts 
or peanuts). In the subsequent caching phase, cachers were provided with a single tray 
that was placed within the U-barrier, and with two food bowls, one containing 50 
Macadamia nut halves and one containing 50 whole peanuts with skin. All birds were 
tested in two conditions that differed in the feature of the barrier (Fig. 4.3). In the In-
view condition, the transparent U-barrier allowed the observer to see the caching tray. In 
the Out-of-view condition, the opaque U-barrier prevented the observer from seeing the 
caching tray. In each condition, the birds received two trials, one in which the observer 
was pre-fed on one type of food (e.g. Macadamia nuts), and one in which the observer 
was pre-fed the other type food (e.g. peanuts). Birds first received both trials of one 
condition, and then the two trials of the other condition. The order in which the two 
conditions were conducted was counterbalanced across birds. The order in which 
observers were pre-fed with the two kinds of food within a condition was 
counterbalanced across birds, but kept consistent across conditions such that the order 
of the two trials was the same in both conditions. If a bird did not cache any item in one 
or two trials, those trials were repeated at the end of the experiment. However, if a bird 
did not cache any items in more than two trials, that bird was not tested any further and 
was excluded from the analysis. 
 
Analysis 
I recorded the number of items cached in the tray on each trial. For each individual, I 
calculated the difference in the number of peanuts cached and the number of 
Macadamia nuts cached. This difference score [Pcached – Mcached], which represents an 
indication of a preference to cache P over M, was compared between the two trials 
within the In-view and the Out-of-view conditions using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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I further calculated a difference of difference scores, namely in each condition, I 
subtracted the difference score of the trial in which the was observer pre-fed M from 
the difference score of the trial in which the observer was pre-fed P: [Pcached – Mcached]pre-
fed P – [Pcached – Mcached]pre-fed M. The difference of difference scores represents an indication 
of a preference to cache P over M when the observer was sated on P relative to when 
the observer was sated on M. This variable was compared between conditions using a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Like in Experiment 4.1, I also recorded i) the number of 
items taken from the bowl by observers (during pre-feeding) and by cachers, and ii) the 
number of items recovered by cachers during recovery sessions. Again, these data were 
not relevant to the experimental question, so that they were not analysed. Statistical 
analyses were performed in R (R.3.5) using the RStudio 1.1.447 wrapper (RStudio Team, 
2018). Alpha was set to 0.5. 
If the jays can integrate information about the observer’s perspective and desire, 
they should cache in line with the following two predictions. First, the jays should 
exhibit a higher difference of difference scores in the In-view condition than in the Out-of-
view condition. This is because it is in the In-view condition that the caches are at a higher 
risk of being pilfered and thus caching the food that is less desired by the observer 
would decrease this risk. Second, in the In-view condition, the cacher should show a clear 
cache-protection strategy: the difference score (as an indication for a higher preference 
to cache P over M) should be higher when the observer is sated on P than when the 
observer is sated on M.  
 
4.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
All birds except one (Lisbon) reached the pre-specified criteria in the Familiarization 
and thus seven birds proceeded to the testing phase. The difference of difference scores 
(i.e. the indicator for a preference to cache P over M when the observer is sated on P 
relatively to when the observer is sated on M) did not differ between the In-view and Out-
of-view conditions (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: N=7, W=-4, p=0.80). Therefore, in 
contrast to the first prediction, the jays did not cache more items of the type of food 
that was less desired by the observer, when caches were at higher risk of being pilfered 
(i.e. In-view Condition). I further found that in both conditions the difference scores 
(differences between the number of peanuts and Macadamia nuts cached) did not differ 
between when the observers were pre-fed peanuts and when they were pre-fed 
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Macadamia nuts (In-view condition, Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: N=7, W=-3, p=0.86; 
Out-of-view condition, Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: N=7, W=-1, p=1; Fig. 4.4). Thus, in 
contrast to the second prediction, the jays did not protect their caches by hiding a larger 
amount of the same food that the observer had been sated on when the caching tray 





Figure 4.4: Box and whisker plot of data in Experiment 4.2. The plot shows the difference in the number 
of peanuts cached minus the number of Macadamia nuts cached for each condition. In the In-view 
condition, the observer had visual access to the caching tray, whereas in the Out-of-view condition, the 
observer did not have visual access to the caching tray. The colour of the boxes in the plot differs on the 
basis of the type of food that was provided to the observer in the pre-feeding phase: blue denotes that the 
observer had been pre-fed P and orange denotes that the observer had been pre-fed M. 
 
 
Overall, these results appear to closely match those in Experiment 4.1. As in the 
previous experiment, the observed caching pattern does not support the possibility that 
Eurasian jays are capable of integrating cues about the perspective and desire of another. 
Second, the results are also inconsistent with a previous report indicating that Eurasian 
jays can adjust their caching by responding to another agent’s desire. Ostojić et al. 
(2017) reported that when allowed to cache in the view of a conspecific, jays 
preferentially cached the type of food that was less desired by the observer over the type 
























































evidence in the condition where the U-barrier was transparent, which – apart from the 
presence of the barrier – followed the same procedure as that reported in the Seen 
condition of the study by Ostojić et al. (2017).  
 
 
4.4:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
I this chapter I investigated whether Eurasian jays can integrate cues correlating with 
others’ desires and perspective and perform the most advantageous caching strategy 
accordingly. I found no evidence that the jays were capable of integrating the cues of 
these different mental states. Specifically, in Experiment 4.1, jays did not preferentially 
cache in the out-of-view tray when they were provided with a food that was highly desired 
by the observer, and not more than when the food was not desired by the observer. 
Consistent with this result, in Experiment 4.2, jays did not preferentially cache the food 
for which observers had a decreased desire, and not more when the observer could see 
them than when they could not see them. Thus, on the whole, the results suggest that 
jays may not be able to integrate the cues about the observer’s perspective and desires.  
It is possible to raise the argument that jays’ capability to employ clear cache 
protection strategies may have been impaired by the increased cognitive requirements of 
the experimental designs. An important consideration here is that in this study I used 
experimental manipulations of the observer’s perspective and desire that – when applied 
separately, i.e. when only one of the observer’s mental states was manipulated – yielded 
a behavioural response from cachers that could be interpreted as a cache-protection 
strategy. A second consideration is that whenever an individual is supposed to process 
cues correlating with different mental states of another social agent – either through 
mental-state attribution and/or ‘behaviour-reading’ – the cognitive load imposed is 
inevitably increased. Thus, the lack of a behavioural response by cachers in this study – 
if supported by further evidence for non-integration in future studies – may be showing 
up the limits of jays’ information processing ability, at least in the caching context. If 
this is the case, then jays’ cognition may only be sufficiently flexible to allow the 
processing of one type of cue correlating with another individual’s mental state at a 
given time.  
It has been suggested that corvids evolved large brains and complex cognition 
independently from primates, yet in response to comparably challenging social and 
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ecological environments (Emery and Clayton, 2004; see also Chapter 1). In this regard, 
the social demands of caching, such as the need to limit cache loss due to pilfering, are 
considered to have played a key role in corvids’ cognitive evolution (de Kort and 
Clayton, 2006). If this is case, then the cognitive challenges imposed by caching may 
have not have exerted sufficient pressures – at least in Eurasian jays which do not live in 
stable large groups (Goodwin, 1951, 1986) – for the evolution of a cognitive machinery 
allowing to integrate different kinds of mental states. Perhaps the processing of single 
mental state at a given time is sufficient to foster effective cache protection strategies in 
this species. A relevant parallel here may be provided by Bray et al. (2014)’s discussion 
of the differences in perspective taking abilities between lemurs and monkeys. In a 
food-stealing task lemurs appear to account for the visual perspective of a competitor 
but, unlike macaques (Santos et al., 2006), they do not seem to respond to the 
competitor’s acoustic perspective (Bray et al., 2014). This finding led the researchers to 
hypothesize that – when compared to lemurs – the monkeys experienced a more 
complex social environment which may have posed a need for more sophisticated 
perspective taking abilities (Bray et al., 2014). 
The jays’ apparent inability to simultaneously respond to multiple types of 
mental states (as reported in this chapter) should also be considered in the light of the 
ecological validity of tasks. Eurasian jays form territorial pairs but do not live in large 
and stable flocks (Goodwin, 1951, 1986) so that they may have limited opportunity to 
perceive variation in desires for different types of food in conspecifics that are not 
sexual partners. It is therefore possible that the need to respond to subtle variations in 
the desires of competitors may have not played a key role in the cognitive evolution of 
this species. Yet this capability may have been far more relevant in the food sharing 
context. Supporting this view evidence that Eurasian jays can adjust their behaviour 
according to others’ desires appears substantially more solid in the cooperative food 
sharing context than in the competitive caching context (Ostojić et al., 2013, 2014, 2016, 
2017). Thus, it cannot be excluded that jays may have failed to respond to both the 
perspective and desire of a potential pilferer not because they are incapable of 
integrating different social cues per se, rather because the ability to respond to 
behavioural cues that correlate with desires, and consequently the need to integrate this 
social information with the perspective of a conspecific, may have a reduced 
applicability in real-life caching scenarios. Two complementary approaches may be used 
to investigate this possibility. On the one hand, a food-sharing task could be designed to 
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test whether Eurasian jays can account simultaneously for the perspective and desire of 
pair mates. On the other hand, one may investigate whether jays can adjust their caching 
strategy by integrating a different pair of mental states. 
In contrast with previous literature, I found no indication that Eurasian jays 
employed cache protection strategies based on one social cue alone, namely that jay 
responded to either the perspective or the desire of a conspecific. Specifically, in 
Experiment 4.1 jays did not – in the High Desire condition, i.e. when cached food was 
desired by the observer– show a preference for caching in the out-of-view tray. This is 
what would have been expected given the result reported by Legg and Clayton (2014): 
the authors found that jays preferred to cache in the out-of-view tray in the presence of a 
conspecific but not when in private. Similarly, in Experiment 4.2 jays did not – in the In-
view condition, i.e. when the observer could see the cache location – show a preference 
for caching the food on which the observer was sated on and thus for which they 
should have had a decreased desire. This is what would have been expected given the 
results reported by Ostojić et al. (2017): the authors reported that jays showed a higher 
preference for caching food A over food B when the observer was sated on food A 
than when the observer was sated on food B. These inconsistencies between the 
evidence reported in this chapter and those of previous studies are particularly 
surprisingly given the similarities in the paradigms used. In the caching phase of the 
High Desire condition (Experiment 4.1), I employed the same procedure used by Legg 
and Clayton (2014) in the Observed condition. Note however, the food used differed 
between the studies. Further, the procedure of Experiment 4.2 closely matched that 
used by Ostojić et al. (2017) in the Seen condition, with the exception that in the latter 
study, there was no transparent barrier between the caching tray and the observer’s 
compartment. From a logical and theoretical perspective, there seems to be no valid 
reason why this minor difference in the set-up would affect jays’ ability to respond to a 
conspecific’s perspective and desire. Thus, a crucial question raised by this study is to 
what extent previously reported effects are actually robust and reliable. Quantifying the 
repeatability and replicability of the original behavioural effects may be beneficial for 
future studies before progressing to the next questions. It may be useful for future 
research to acquire more detailed information about the behaviours of the observer and 
cacher birds during the testing. In particular, it would be interesting to score whether, at 
the time when the cacher bird hides the food in the tray, the observer bird is positioned 
such that it can actually see the caching location and whether it is paying attention to the 
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caching event (Brecht, 2017). Accounting for the variability in the observers’ behaviour 
may help clarifying the inconsistencies between different studies. 
In sum, this study failed to provide evidence that Eurasian jays are able to 
selectively protect those caches that are at most risk of being pilfered by processing 
simultaneously information about the perspective and desire of a conspecific. Hence 
jays’ social cognition may not be flexible enough to allow the integration of different 
cues correlating with different types of mental states, unlike human Theory of Mind. 
Yet further investigation is needed to corroborate this view. Particularly interesting 
would be to test jays’ ability to integrate others’ desire and perspective in the food 
sharing context, as well as investigating whether jays’ caching strategies can account for 
the simultaneous processing of alternative types of mental states. 
Before the issue of whether jays can integrate different kinds of social cues is 
addressed in future studies, I think it is essential to corroborate the previously reported 
effects that I could not provide support for in this study, i.e. that Eurasian jays flexibly 
adjust their caching behaviour according to another’s visual perspective and according 
to another’s desires. To this end, in Chapter 5 I report a replication of the study by Legg 
and Clayton (2014). In addition, I also report an investigation into the robustness of the 
effect reported by Ostojić et al. (2017) by testing whether a minor difference in the set-
up (i.e. presence or absence of a transparent barrier) may have caused the inconsistent 








Caching tactics based on another’s current 
desire or visual perspective: how robust is the 





In Chapter 4 I found no indication that Eurasian jays were capable of responding 
simultaneously to the visual perspective and current desire of another bird to effectively 
protect their caches. Unexpectedly, the results of these experiments were also at odds 
with those reported in previous studies. Specifically, Experiment 4.1 did not support the 
finding reported by Legg and Clayton (2014) that Eurasian jays cache predominately 
behind an opaque barrier over a transparent barrier when observed by a conspecific 
than when in private. In parallel, Experiment 4.2 could not corroborate the results 
reported by Ostojić et al. (2017), namely that Eurasian jays prefer to cache a type of 
food that had been eaten to satiety by a conspecific over a food that had not been eaten 
by a conspecific. In this chapter I aim to gain further insight into the results of the 
previous chapter by testing the robustness and reliability of the effects reported by Legg 
and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. (2017). In Experiment 5.1 I conducted a 
replication of Legg and Clayton (2014)’s study with a different group of birds to those 
used in the original study. Here, I found no evidence that jays adjusted their caching 
pattern according to the visual perspective of a conspecific. In Experiment 5.2 I 
explored whether the inconsistencies between the results in Experiment 4.2 and those in 
Ostojić et al. (2017)’s experiment may have been caused by a minor difference in set-up, 
namely the presence or absence of a transparent barrier. Here, the results showed that 
the barrier had no effect on the jays’ caching behaviour, and crucially that birds showed 
no preference for caching the same type of food that the observer had been sated on 
over another type of food. The results of these two experiments are in line with the 
negative findings reported in Chapter 4, thus challenging the robustness of the effects 
reported by Legg and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. (2017), and raising the possibility 





In Chapter 4 I investigated whether Eurasian jays can simultaneously take into account 
the visual perspective and current desire of a conspecific to most effectively protect 
their caches. Consistently across two experiments, data provided no indication that jays 
can adjust their caching behaviour by integrating different types of social cues. 
Surprisingly however, the results were also incompatible with previously reported effects, 
namely that jays adapt their caching pattern according to either the visual perspective or 
the current desire of a potential pilferer (Legg and Clayton, 2014; Ostojić et al., 2017).  
In particular, Legg and Clayton (2014) investigated whether Eurasian jays 
strategically select caching locations to reduce the risk of pilfering by conspecifics. Legg 
and Clayton (2014)’s experiment encompassed three conditions: jays could cache when 
an observer bird – either a higher ranked individual (Observed by dominant condition) or a 
lower ranked individual (Observed by subordinate condition) – was housed in an adjacent 
compartment, or when no conspecific was present (Private condition). Jays were given 
the opportunity to cache in two locations that differed as to whether they could or 
could not be seen from an adjacent compartment and thus by the observer bird (if and 
when present). To this end, the cacher jays were presented with a T-barrier (Chapter 4) 
and two caching trays, one positioned behind the opaque arm of the barrier (out-of-view 
tray) and one positioned behind the transparent arm of the barrier (in-view tray). The 
authors compared the jays’ caching pattern in the Private condition with that in the 
Observed conditions9, and found that jays cached proportionately more items in the out-of-
view tray in the presence of a conspecific than when caching in private. Thus, jays 
appeared to have adjusted their caching behaviour according to the visual perspective of 
the observer, and strategically preferred to cache in a location that could not be seen by 
the observer to reduce the risk of pilfering. If the effect reported by Legg and Clayton 
(2014) is robust, then it is reasonable to predict that a preference toward caching in the 
out-of-view tray should also be detected when jays’ performance is analysed within the 
Observed condition. In contrast with this prediction, in Experiment 4.1 I gave Eurasian 
jays the opportunity to cache in two trays while a conspecific was present, finding that 
the jays did not cache more than expected by chance in the tray that could not be seen   
																																																								
9  In Legg and Clayton (2014)’s study the two Observed conditions were merged together due to no 




by the observer.  
 Ostojić et al. (2017) investigated whether Eurasian jays and California scrub-jays 
can attribute desires to a conspecific that is not a pair-mate, and protect their caches by 
strategically caching the type of food that the observer was not currently motivated to 
pilfer. In the experiment, a cacher and an observer jay were housed in adjacent testing 
compartments. In the pre-feeding phase, the observer could feed to satiety on a specific 
type of food: maintenance diet in the baseline trial, and either food A or B on each of 
the two test trials. In the Seen condition, the cacher could witness the pre-feeding of the 
observer, whereas in the Unseen condition, a curtain was lowered in between the two 
compartments so that the cacher could not see the observer’s pre-feeding. In the 
subsequent caching phase, cacher jays were given the opportunity to cache both food A 
and B in the view of the observer. The authors found that, relatively to the baseline trial, 
jays’ preference for caching food A over food B was larger after the observer had eaten 
food A to satiety than after the observer had eaten food B to satiety. Hence, jays 
appeared to have adjusted their caching strategy on the basis of the current desire of a 
conspecific, and cached predominantly the type of food that was less desired by the 
observer. This caching strategy was exhibited consistently within both conditions – i.e. 
regardless of whether the cacher had seen or had not seen which particular food had 
been provided to the observer – thus indicating that the observer’s behaviour at the 
time of caching may have played a key role in the decision-making process of the cacher. 
Note that, when data were re-analysed by considering only the performance of Eurasian 
jays (n=7), the effect was still significant in the Seen condition – although it was not 
significant in the Unseen condition (Crosby, 2019). In contrast with Ostojić et al. (2017), 
in Experiment 4.2 I found that – if allowed to cache in a location that was visible to an 
observer bird (In-view condition) – Eurasian jays did not prefer to cache a type of food 
that was not currently desired by an observer over a food that was highly desired by an 
observer.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the procedures I have employed in Experiments 4.1 
and 4.2 were very similar to those devised by Legg and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. 
(2017), respectively. Specifically, Experiment 4.1 and Legg and Clayton (2014)’s test 
involved the same procedure apart from the type and quantity of the food that was 
provided to the cachers. Similarly, the In-view condition of Experiment 4.2 and the Seen 
condition of Ostojić et al. (2017)’s experiment employed the same procedure, with the 
exception that in the former study the observers could see the caching location through 
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a transparent barrier, whereas in the latter study no barrier was present. Therefore, in 
the light of the methodological similarities between the studies it is challenging to 
explain the inconsistencies between the results reported in Chapter 4 and in the 
previous studies. 
The aim of this chapter is gain further insight into the unexpected outcomes of 
the experiments in Chapter 4 by testing the robustness and reliability of two caching 
strategies reported in Eurasian jays, namely to i) preferentially cache in locations that 
cannot be seen by a conspecific, and ii) preferentially cache a type of food that is 
currently not desired by a conspecific. Specifically, in Experiment 5.1 I attempt at 
reproducing the finding reported by Legg and Clayton (2014) by conducting a direct 
replication of the original study. In Experiment 5.2 I investigate whether the presence or 
absence of a transparent barrier – i.e. the minor difference in the set-up between 
Experiment 4.2 and Ostojić et al. (2017)’s experiment – affect Eurasian jays’ capability 
to cache by responding to another’s current desire.  
 
 





Two colonies of adult Eurasian jays were tested. Colony 1 was formed by eight birds 
(four females, four males): Caracas, Lima, Lisbon, Dublin, Rome, Wellington, 
Washington and Quito. These were the same individuals that participated in the 
experiments reported in Chapter 4. All birds in Colony 1 took part in the experiment. 
Colony 2 was formed by seven birds, five of which could be used for testing (two males, 
three females): Hoy, Romero, Hunter, Webb, and Adlington. The remaining two birds 
of Colony 2 were excluded a priori because they regularly exhibited agitated behaviour 
when inside individual testing compartments. Birds in Colony 2 participated in the 
original study by Legg and Clayton (2014). Three of the birds that took part in the 
original study (i.e. Hoy, Hunter, and Adlington) were also tested here. Thus, 13 birds 
(eight from Colony 1, five from Colony 2) participated in Experiment 5.1. I tested the 




Each colony was housed in a large outdoor aviary (20x10x3 m) at the Sub-Department 
of Animal Behaviour, University of Cambridge, Madingley. The aviaries housing the two 
colonies were largely similar (e.g. size, gravelly soil), yet they differed in the location and 
material of perches (wood or metal poles). In addition, testing compartments were 
indoor areas for Colony 1, whereas they were outdoor areas delimited by wooden walls 
and covered by a roof for Colony 2. Outside of testing the birds had ad libitum access to 
their maintenance diet of vegetables, eggs, seed and fruits. Water was available at all 
times. All procedures were approved by the University of Cambridge Animal Ethics 
Committee. The experiment was conducted in October-December 2018. 
 
Experimental set-up 
Birds were tested in testing compartments (2x1x3 m) that were accessible from the 
aviary through flap windows. During the Pre-test, each bird was tested in private, i.e. 
with no other birds present in the test area. Compartments used during the Pre-test 
were not used in the test phase. During the test, birds could cache in private (Private 
Condition) or while being observed by a conspecific (Observed Condition). In the latter 
condition, a cacher bird and an observer bird were located in adjacent compartments. 
Compartments were separated by opaque sheeting except for a mesh window (30x55 
cm) through which the birds had visual access to the adjacent compartment.  
Each testing compartment contained a suspended platform (1x1 m) 
approximately 1 m from the ground, on which caching trays, Perspex barriers, and food 
bowls could be placed. Rectangular seedling trays (5 x 3 pots filled with sand) were used 
as caching trays. Trays were painted different colours and were trial-specific to minimise 
the probability that birds’ caching behaviour in one trial would be influenced by its 
memory from previous trials.  
The same Perspex barrier used in Experiment 4.1 and in Legg and Clayton 
(2014)’s study was used here to manipulate the observer’s visual perspective of the 
caching trays. The T-barrier consisted of three plastic sheets (25x40 cm) forming two 
arms and one stem. One arm of the ‘T’ was made out of transparent Perspex, while the 
other arm and the stem were made out of white opaque Perspex. The T-barrier could be 
placed around two caching trays (Fig. 5.1), such that the observer could see the tray 
behind the transparent arm (in-view tray) but could not see the tray behind the opaque 
arm (out-of-view tray). Due to the height of the barrier, the observed could always see the 
cacher when the it was standing upright in proximity of the trays. However, the 
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observer could not see the location where the cacher hid the food when it was caching 




Figure 5.1: Top-view schematic representation of the set-up and procedure used in Experiment 5.1. In 
the Familiarization (left panels), the cacher bird received two trials, one in which the caching tray was 
placed near the opaque arm of the barrier (top panel), and one in which the tray was placed near the clear 
arm of the barrier (bottom panel). In the test (central and right panel), birds were tested in three 
conditions: Observed by dominant, Observed by subordinate, Private. In each condition, cachers received two 




To ensure that the birds were mildly hungry and thus likely to interact with food 
provided during testing, their maintenance diet was removed from the aviary 
approximately 1.5h prior to each trial. Before the start of the trial, a bird (i.e. the cacher) 
was given access to the testing compartment where the caching tray(s) and the T-barrier 
had already been positioned. In the test trials of the Observed condition, a second bird (i.e. 
the observed) was also induced to enter the adjacent compartment. Subsequently, a 
bowl containing 30 peanut halves was placed on the suspended platform in the cacher’s 















opportunity to eat and cache food during 15 minutes. Next, the experimenter entered 
again in the test room and released the bird(s) in the outdoor aviary. At the end of the 
trial, the experimenter recorded the amount of food eaten and the number and location 
of caches.  
Approximately three hours after each trial, the cacher was allowed to re-enter 
the caching compartment. During 10 minutes, the cacher could retrieve the hidden 
items and re-cache them in the compartment and in the adjacent small outdoor aviary. 
Observers were not present during recovery. This retrieval phase was conducted only to 
reduce the probability that birds would stop caching in the trays. Birds received a single 
test trial per day. 
 
Dominance Hierarchy 
In Legg and Clayton (2014)’s experiment, cacher birds received four trials in the Observed 
condition: two trials in which they were observed by a higher ranked individual (Observed 
by dominant condition), and two trials in which they were observed by a lower ranked 
individual (Observed by subordinate condition). Thus, to replicate the original design it was 
necessary to determine the dominance hierarchy within each aviary. To this end, ad 
libitum observations were conducted for each colony. Birds were observed while as a 
group in the outdoor aviaries, after they were deprived of food for approximately 2h. 
For each observation session, maintenance diet was presented on a single food platform 
in the aviary. The identity of birds involved in any displacement (i.e. bird x approaches 
bird y causing bird y to leave) was recorded. To solicit competitive interactions among 
birds, higher value food items (e.g. wax worm larvae) were also presented in a bowl or 
scattered around on the floor of the aviary. If necessary, higher ranked birds were 
locked into separate compartments to favour interactions among low ranked birds. 
Observation sessions were conducted on multiple days, until data allowed to establish a 
clear social hierarchy within the colonies. Sessions lasted approximately 40 min each.  
 
Pre-test 
A Pre-test was conducted to ascertain that the birds were comfortable to cache in 
proximity of both the transparent and the opaque arm of the T-barrier. Birds received 
two trials, on separate days. Testing occurred in private, i.e. no other bird was present in 
the adjacent compartment. On each trial, the bird was presented with a bowl containing 
30 peanuts halves, the T-barrier and a caching tray, which was placed in proximity of 
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either the transparent or the opaque arm of the barrier. The cacher could eat and cache 
for 15 minutes; subsequently it was allowed to re-join the rest of the group in the aviary. 
The order in which birds were given the two trials was counterbalanced among 
birds, so that half of the birds could cache in proximity of the opaque arm of the barrier 
on the first trial, whereas the remaining birds could cache close the transparent arm on 
the first trial. The position of the barrier (e.g. opaque arm facing left) was 
counterbalanced among birds, but kept consistent between multiple trials received by 
the same individual. The compartments used in the Pre-test were not used in the 
subsequent test. In addition, the T-barrier was positioned differently within the 
compartment during the Pre-test and the test (Fig. 5.1). These procedural precautions 
were set to ensure that the birds were not more familiar with one of the two 
orientations of the barrier (e.g. opaque arm facing left) during the test.  
To proceed to the test, birds were required to cache at least one item in each of 
the two Pre-test trials, i.e. birds had to cache at least one item when the tray was placed 
in proximity of both the transparent and also when the opaque arm of the barrier. If no 
item was cached in a trial, then that trial was repeated for a maximum of three times. 
Thus, a bird could receive a maximum of 6 trials in total. The repeated trials were 
conducted at the end: for example, if a bird’s first trial had to be repeated, then the bird 
received the second, pre-planned trial on day 2, and subsequently it received the first 
trial again on day 3. 
 
Test 
Following Legg and Clayton (2014), the experiment encompassed three conditions. In 
the Private condition, the cacher could eat and cache when no other bird was present. In 
the Observed by dominant condition, the cacher was given the possibility to eat and cache 
while a higher ranked individual of the groups was present in the adjacent compartment. 
In the Observed by subordinate condition, the cacher could cache while a lower ranked 
individual was housed in the adjacent compartment. 
On each trial, the cacher was given access to the testing compartment and 
presented with the T-barrier, the in-view tray (i.e. the tray placed behind the transparent 
arm of the barrier), the out-of-view tray (i.e. the tray placed behind the opaque arm of the 
barrier) and a bowl containing 30 peanuts halves. The bowl was placed close to the stem 
of the ‘T’ such that it was equidistant from the two caching trays (Fig. 5.1). The cacher 
could eat and cache for 15 minutes and was subsequently released back into the aviary. 
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In each condition, birds received two trials, which differed in the orientation of the T-
barrier. In half of the trials, the opaque arm of the barrier was facing the outdoor aviary, 
whereas, in the other half of the trials it was facing the opposite direction. Each bird 
was first tested in all conditions with the barrier being kept consistent in one specific 
orientation, subsequently it received the remaining trials with the barrier being kept 
consistent in the alternative orientation. The order in which the two orientations of the 
barrier were experienced, was counterbalanced among birds. All birds were tested in all 
three conditions, except the highest and lowest ranked bird in each colony. The formers 
could only be tested in the Private and Observer by subordinate conditions. On the other 
hand, the latter could only be tested in the Private and Observer by dominant conditions. 
Thus, most birds received six trials (two trials per condition), whereas the highest and 
lowest ranked individuals in each colony received only four trials because they could 
only be tested in two of the three conditions. 
This experiment was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/8p4tx/). The pre-registration was conducted after the pre-tests were 
completed but before the start of the test.  
 
Analysis 
I conducted the same statistical analysis used by Legg and Clayton (2014). For each trial, 
I calculated the proportion of items cached in the out-of-view tray out of the total number 
of items cached in both trays. For the Private condition, these data were averaged across 
the two orientation trials. For the Observed condition, data were averaged across the two 
orientation trials and across the Observed by dominant and the Observed by subordinate trials 
(i.e. the four trials in the Observed conditions). Thus, the Observed by dominant and the 
Observed by subordinate conditions were merged. The average proportion of the caches in 
the out-of-view tray was then compared between the Observed and Private conditions using a 
one-tailed permutation test. Following Legg and Clayton (2014) I also tested whether 
the average number of items cached across both trays differed between the Observed and 
Private conditions by using a two-tailed permutation test. Statistical analyses were 
performed in R (R.3.5) using the RStudio 1.1.447 wrapper (RStudio Team, 2018) and 
the package coin (Hothorn et al., 2006). Alpha level was set to 0.05. 
If Eurasian jays can adjust their caching behaviour according to the visual 
perspective of a conspecific, then cachers should – as reported by Legg and Clayton 
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(2014) – cache proportionately more items in the out-of-view tray when being observed by 
another bird than when in private. 
 
5.2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
All birds in Colony 1, but only one bird of Colony 2 (Hunter) met the criterion of the 
Pre-test. Therefore, nine birds in total proceeded to the test. 
After Dublin had received the first trial in the Observed by dominant condition, 
Rome – the individual acting as dominant observer for Dublin – appeared to experience 
problems with her wing and with flying. Out of welfare reason I therefore decided to 
exclude Rome from acting as the observer in Dublin’s second trial in the Observed by 
dominant condition. Caracas, who was the highest ranked individual in the colony, was 
used instead. Because all other birds were tested with the same individual in the two 
Observed by dominant trials, I decided to re-do Dublin’s first trial with Caracas. This 
ensured that the trials from which data for the Observed by dominant condition for 
Dublin were used for the analysis consistently had Caracas as the observer. 
The jays cached a median of 1.82 item per trial (IQR = 2.50). The Private and 
Observed conditions did not differ in the number of items cached per trial (n=9, Z=-0.79, 
p=0.43; Fig. 5.2). Dublin and Lisbon consistently did not cache in any of the Private and 
Observed trials. Consequently, these two birds were excluded from further analyses 
because, given their performance, it was not possible to compare the proportion of 
items cached in the out-of-view tray between conditions. The remaining seven birds did 
not cache a higher proportion of items in the out-of-view tray in the Observed condition 








































Figure 5.2: Box and whisker plot of data 
in Experiment 5.1. The plot shows the 
average number of items cached (in both 
trays) Private and Observed conditions. 
Note that data in the Observed by dominant 















These results are only to some extent compatible with those reported by Legg and 
Clayton (2014). In line with the original study, I found that jays cached a comparable 
amount of items (across both trays), when they were observed by a conspecific and 
when they were in private. Further jays in Legg and Clayton (2014)’s experiment cached 
a median of 2.5 items, a result seemingly comparable to the performance of the jays in 
this experiment. Crucially however, the original study reported that jays cached 
proportionately more items in the out-of-view tray when a conspecific was present than 
when in private. I could not find equivalent evidence in this experiment, thereby 
supporting the results of Experiment 4.1 (Chapter 4). Hence, Experiment 5.1 failed to 
replicate the effect reported by Legg and Clayton (2014), thereby possibly challenging 
the idea that Eurasian jays adjust their caching strategy by responding to the visual 






Figure 5.3: Box and whisker plot of data in Experiment 5.1 (left) and in Legg and Clayton (2014; right). 
The plot shows the proportion of items cached in the out-of-view tray out of the total number of items 
cached, in the Private and Observed conditions. Note that data in the Observed by dominant and Observed by 
subordinate conditions were averaged. 
 
 
5.3: EXPERIMENT 5.2 
 
The results reported in Chapter 4 were not only at odds with Legg and Clayton (2014)’s 
experiment but also with the study by Ostojić et al. (2017). In Experiment 5.2, I 
explored whether a minor difference in the set-up, i.e. presence or absence of a 
transparent barrier, may have caused the inconsistency in the results between 
Experiment 4.2 and Ostojić et al. (2017)’s study. To this end, I employed the same 
experimental set-up and procedures used in Experiment 4.2, except that here jays were 
presented either with the transparent U-barrier (Barrier condition) or with no barrier 



















































Experiment 5.1 Legg and Clayton (2014)
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Thus, in contrast to Experiment 4.2 – where observer jays could either see the caching 
tray (In-view condition) or not see the caching tray (Out-of-view condition) – here observer 





All eight birds in Colony 1 (as reported in Experiment 5.1; see also Appendix A) were 
tested. Six birds had participated in the test in Experiment 4.2. (Chapter 4). In contrast, 
of the remaining two birds, Lisbon took part only in the Familiarization but not in the 
test, while Dublin did not participate in any experimental phase in Experiment 4.2. In 
addition, five birds that were tested here (Caracas, Dublin, Rome, Quito and 
Washington) had also participated in the caching experiment conducted by Ostojić et al. 
(2017). All procedures were approved by the University of Cambridge Ethics Review 
Committee. The experiment was conducted in November 2018. 
 
Experimental set-up 
Birds were tested in indoor testing compartments (2x1x3 m) that were accessible from 
the aviary through flap windows. In the Familiarization birds was tested in private, i.e. 
with no other bird present in the test room. Testing compartments used during the 
Familiarization were not used in the test phase. In the test, a cacher bird and an 
observer bird were housed in adjacent compartments that were separated by opaque 
sheeting except for a mesh window (30x55 cm) through which the birds had visual 
access to the adjacent compartment.  
The compartment contained a suspended platform (1x1 m) approximately 1 m 
from the ground, where caching trays, food bowls, and Perspex barriers could be placed. 
Rectangular seedling trays (5 x 3 pots filled with sand) were used as caching trays. Trays 
were painted different colours and were trial-specific to minimise the probability that 
birds’ caching behaviour in one trial would be influenced by its memory from previous 
trials. The bowls contained i) a handful of maintenance diet (MD); ii) 50 Macadamia nut 
halves (M), or; iii) 50 whole peanuts with skin (P). Each type of food was presented in a 




The same transparent U-barrier as in Experiment 4.2 was used. This barrier consisted of 
two lateral Perspex sheets (26 x 25 cm) and one central Perspex sheet (53 x 25 cm) 
forming two angles of approximately 45°.  
 
General Procedure 
Approximately 1.5h prior to the start of Familiarization and test trials, the birds’ 
maintenance diet was removed from the aviary to ensure that the birds were mildly 
hungry and thus likely to interact with food provided during testing. Test trials involved 
a pre-feeding phase followed by a caching phase. Before the start of the trial, two birds 
(one cacher and one observer) were given access to two adjacent compartments. 
Subsequently, I placed a bowl containing pre-feeding food (Macadamia nuts or peanuts) 
on the suspended platform in the observer’s compartment and a bowl containing a 
handful of maintenance diet on the platform in the cacher’s compartment. The bowls 
were placed in front of the mesh window (Fig. 5.4) to ensure that the birds could see 
each other whilst eating and to maximise the chances that the cacher could see on which 
food the observer was pre-fed. I then left the test room and the birds could eat the pre-
feeding food for 15 minutes. Next, I entered the test room again and removed the 
bowls as well as any food remains on the platforms. In the subsequent caching phase, I 
positioned the caching tray, two food bowls, as well as the barrier (if required), in front 
of the mesh window in the cacher’s compartment (Fig. 5.4). One bowl contained 50 
Macadamia nut halves, while the other bowl contained 50 whole peanuts. I then left the 
test room and the birds were given 15 minutes, during which the cacher could eat and 
cache the foods in the tray. At the end of the trial, I opened the flap windows to allow 
the birds to re-join the rest of the group in the aviary and recorded the amount of food 
eaten and the number and location of caches in the tray. Approximately three hours 
after each trial, the cacher was allowed to re-enter the caching compartment. At this 
stage, the flap window was kept open so that the bird had access not only to the indoor 
compartment but also to the adjacent outside run. Note that the door connecting the 
outside run to the aviary was kept closed, thus no other bird could enter the cacher’s 
run or compartment. The cacher could retrieve the hidden items and re-cache them in 
the compartment and in the adjacent small outdoor run for 10 minutes. Observers were 
not present during retrieval. This retrieval phase was conducted only to reduce the 
probability that birds would stop caching in the trays so that these data were not 




Familiarization trials were conducted to ensure that birds were motivated to cache both 
types of food and were comfortable caching in a tray both when it was positioned close 
to the U-barrier and when no barrier was present. Birds received two trials on separate 
days. On each trial, birds were presented with a single caching tray and two food bowls, 
which were presented sequentially. Birds were given the opportunity to eat and cache 
for 20 minutes: during the first 10 minutes they were provided with one type of food 
and during the next 10 minutes with the other. The order in which the birds 
experienced the two types of foods was counterbalanced across birds and across trials, 
such that each bird experienced one order on their first trial and the opposite order on 
their second trial. In one trial, the transparent U-barrier was positioned close to the 
caching tray, whereas in the other trial no barrier was present. The order in which the 
birds received the two trials (i.e. with or without the barrier) was counterbalanced across 
birds. The compartments used in the Familiarization were not used in the subsequent 
test. To proceed to testing, birds had to i) cache at least one item on each trial (i.e. both 
with barrier present and with no barrier present), and ii) cache at least one item of each 
type of food across the two trials. If no item was cached in a trial, then that trial was 
repeated for a maximum of three times. Thus, a bird could receive a maximum of six 
trials in total. The repeated trials were conducted at the end: for example, if a bird’s first 
trial had to be repeated, then this bird received the second, pre-planned trial on day 2, 
and subsequently it received the first trial again on day 3. 
 
Test 
Following the procedure of Experiment 4.2, in the pre-feeding phase cachers were first 
able to see an observer feeding on one specific type of food (Macadamia nuts or 
peanuts). In the subsequent caching phase, cachers were provided with a single tray and 
with two food bowls, one containing 50 Macadamia nut halves and one containing 50 
whole peanuts with skin. All birds were tested in two conditions that differed in whether 
the transparent barrier was present or absent. In the Barrier condition, the caching tray 
was positioned within the transparent U-barrier, whereas in the No-barrier condition, no 
barrier was placed in the caching compartment (Fig. 5.4). Crucially, the observer bird 






Figure 5.4: Top-view schematic representation of the set-up and procedure used in the test of 
Experiment 5.2. Trials were composed by a pre-feeding phase (left panels) and a caching phase (right 
panels). The cacher bird received two trials with the transparent U-barrier (Barrier condition, top panels), 
and two trials with no barrier (No-barrier condition, bottom panels). Within each condition, trials differed 
in the type of food (either peanuts, P, or Macadamia nuts, M) that was provided to the observer in the 
pre-feeding phase. The cacher bird was always presented with a handful of maintenance diet (md) in the 
pre-feeding phase of all trials. 
 
 
In each condition, the birds received two trials: one in which the observer was pre-fed 
on one type of food (e.g. Macadamia nuts) and one in which the observer was pre-fed 
the other type food (e.g. peanuts). Birds first received both trials of one condition (e.g. 
Barrier condition), and then the two trials of the other condition. The order in which the 
two conditions were conducted was counterbalanced across birds. The order in which 
observers were pre-fed the two kinds of food within a condition was counterbalanced 


















for each bird was the same in both conditions. If a bird did not cache any items in one 
or two trials, those trials were repeated at the end of the experiment. Each trial could be 
repeated no more than two times. If a bird cached no item in more than two trials, that 
bird was not tested any further and was excluded from the analysis. 




The statistical approach that was originally planned (as described in the Pre-registration, 
OSF) involved the transformation of raw data (i.e. the number of peanuts and 
Macadamia nuts cached) into proportions of items cached in the out-of-view tray out of 
number of items cached in both trays. I subsequently opted to use a slightly different 
approach, namely to transform raw data into difference scores (for example, number of 
items cached in out-of-view tray minus number of items cached in in-view tray). This was 
done to be more consistent within the thesis and thus to facilitate the comparison with 
Experiment 4.2, in which difference scores were used to analyse the data. Note however, 
that the two approaches yielded the same results. In what follows, I provide the details 
of the statistical approach that was used. 
For each individual, I calculated the difference in the number of peanuts cached 
minus the number of Macadamia nuts cached. This difference score – [Pcached – Mcached] – 
represents an indication of a preference to cache P over M. I tested whether – within 
the Barrier and the No-barrier conditions – the difference score was greater when 
observers were sated on P than when they were sated on M, using a one tailed Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. I further calculated a difference of difference scores, namely in each 
condition, I subtracted the difference score of the trial in which the was observer pre-
fed M from the difference score of the trial in which the observer was pre-fed P: [Pcached 
– Mcached]pre-fed P – [Pcached – Mcached]pre-fed M. This difference of difference scores represents 
an indication of a preference to cache P over M when the observer was sated on P 
relative to when the observer was sated on M. This variable was compared between 
conditions using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Statistical analyses were performed in R 




If Eurasian jays can adjust their caching behaviour according to the current desire of a 
conspecific, then cachers should – in both conditions – cache preferentially P when the 
observers were sated on P than when they were sated on M. If this caching strategy is 
not affected by the presence of a transparent barrier, then the difference of difference 
score should not differ between the Barrier and the No-barrier conditions. 
 
5.3.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
All birds passed the Pre-test and therefore proceeded to the test. One bird (Lisbon) 
consistently cached no items in the first three test trials and was thus excluded from 
further testing. Thus, a total of seven birds completed the test. 
In both conditions, the difference score – [Pcached – Mcached] – was not greater 
when the observer was sated on peanuts than when it was sated on Macadamia nuts 
(Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Barrier condition, n=7, W=1, pone-tail=0.50; No-barrier 
condition: n=7, W=-9, pone-tail=0.91; Fig. 5.5). Thus birds did not preferentially cache the 
food that was less desired by the observer, regardless of whether the transparent barrier 




Figure 5.5: Box and whisker plot of data in Experiment 5.2. The plot shows the difference in the number 
of peanuts cached minus the number of Macadamia nuts cached in the Barrier condition (left) and No-
barrier condition (right). The colour of the boxes in the plot differs on the basis of the type of food that 
was provided to the observer in the pre-feeding phase: blue denotes that the observer had been pre-fed P 





















































Supporting this result, the difference of difference score – [Pcached – Mcached]pre-fed P – [Pcached 
– Mcached]pre-fed M – was comparable between conditions (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: n=7, 
W=15, p=0.14). Therefore, the presence or absence of the barrier had no significant 
effect on the caching behaviour. 
Taken together, these results appear to corroborate the findings of Experiment 
4.2 and in parallel, question the robustness of the effect reported by Ostojić et al. (2017) 
and the claim that Eurasian jays take into account the current desire of a conspecific to 
most effectively protect their caches. 
 
 
5.4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, I explored the robustness of two established caching strategies in 
Eurasian jays. In Experiment 5.1, I conducted a replication of Legg and Clayton (2014)’s 
study in which it was reported that, when observed by a conspecific, Eurasian jays 
protect their caches by hiding a larger proportions of items behind opaque barriers than 
when they are alone. My results could not support the findings of the original study: I 
found that jays did not cache proportionately more in the out-of-view location when a 
conspecific was present than when in private. In Experiment 5.2, I tested whether jays’ 
ability to adjust their caching behaviour according to the current desire of a conspecific 
– as reported by Ostojić et al. (2017) – is affected by the presence of a transparent 
barrier positioned in proximity of the caching location. I decided to investigate this issue 
with the aim of clarifying the results of Experiment 4.2. Results Experiment 5.2 showed 
that jays’ caching pattern did not differ between when the barrier was present and when 
it was absent. Crucially however, results were not in line with Ostojić et al. (2017)’s 
evidence: I found that jays exhibited no preference for caching more items of the same 
type food that the observer jay had been sated on over an alternative food that was not 
eaten by the observer. 
From a theoretical perspective, two alternative explanations can account for the 
inconsistent results between Experiment 5.1 and Legg and Clayton (2014)’s study. First, 
if Eurasian jays are actually capable of caching according to the visual perspective of 
another bird, then the replication represents a false negative. Second, if jays are not 
endowed with this capability, then the original study was a false positive. Based on this 
evidence alone, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on which of the two 
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explanations should be given more credit, also because the small sample size 
(Experiment 5.1, n=7; Legg and Clayton (2014), n= 6) may have fostered the chance of 
false positive in the original study, and limited the power of the replication (Farrar and 
Clayton, 2019). However, some considerations can be made. On the one hand, the 
possibility that the effect reported in the original study is a true effect would fit with the 
current corvid literature. Shaw and Clayton (2013) found that Eurasian jays prefer to 
cache in non-noisy substrates when with a conspecific that could hear but not see them 
caching, thus raising the possibility that these jays may take into account the acoustic 
perspective of competitors to protect their caches. Further, a number of experiments 
indicated that fellow corvids employed cache protection strategies based on the visual 
perspective of conspecifics. For instance, in the presence of a conspecific California 
scrub-jays seems to cache preferentially in shadow or out-of-view locations (Dally et al., 
2004, 2005), and both California scrub-jays and ravens appear to cache further away 
from competitors (Dally et al., 2005; Heinrich and Pepper, 1998) and protect their 
caches if a non-visible conspecific had the opportunity to witness the caching event but 
not if the conspecific could not have seen it (Bugnyar et al., 2016; Dally et al., 2006). Yet, 
as discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis, it is problematic to assume that a 
given cognitive ability is widespread within a taxon based on sporadic reports in a few 
species. On the other hand, the possibility that the replication I have conducted yielded 
a false negative outcome seems particularly hard to reconcile with the results of Chapter 
4. Consistently with Experiment 5.1, jays did not prefer to cache behind an opaque 
barrier (over caching behind a transparent barrier) in Experiment 4.1. Additionally, 
comparable results also emerged from an exploratory study employing a procedure very 
similar to that of the original study but involving a lower number of trials, i.e. Eurasian 
jays (n=7) received only one trial in the Private condition and one trial in the Observed 
condition (Ostojić, unpublished data10). 
In principle, these lines of reasoning are also applicable to the comparison 
between the results of Experiment 5.2 and those reported by Ostojić et al. (2017). On 
the one hand, if Eurasian jays can adjust their caching behaviour by taking into account 
the current desire of a competitor, then the findings of Experiment 5.2 are a false 
negative. Alternatively, if jays are not capable of this caching strategy, then Ostojić et al. 
(2017)’s result is a false positive. It is possible to raise the argument that Experiment 5.2 
was not an exact replication of Ostojić et al. (2017)’s experiment, so that limited 
																																																								
10 Further details of the procedure and results can be found at https://osf.io/8p4tx/. 
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conclusions can be drawn. However, Experiment 5.2 – and, with a minor difference in 
set-up, Experiment 4.2 – faithfully replicated the Seen condition of Ostojić et al. (2017)’s 
experiment but consistently failed to reproduce the effect described in the original study. 
In addition, further support for the possibility that Eurasian jays might not adjust their 
caching pattern on the basis of a competitor’s desires comes from another study. 
Crosby (2019) replicated both the Seen and Unseen conditions of Ostojić et al. (2017)’s 
experiment but could not corroborate the original results. Specifically, in both 
conditions, the author found that jays had no preference for caching the food that 
observer was motivated to pilfer over the alternative food. Interestingly, in the 
cooperative context of food sharing, the original finding by Ostojić et al. (2013) that 
male Eurasian jays choose which food to cater to their mate according to latter’s desires 
was consistently replicated in follow-up studies (Ostojić et al., 2014, 2016). Therefore, 
caution should be taken in generalizing across contexts the reliability with which jays are 
capable of responding to others’ desires. 
In the light of these considerations, it is not possible to conclude that the 
caching strategies reported by Legg and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. (2017) 
represent robust and reliable effects in Eurasian jays. It cannot be excluded that jays’ 
inability to integrate others’ perspective and current desire (as reported in Chapter 4) 
may have more simply resulted from their limited skills to respond to each social cue 
independently, rather than from their lack of ability to process different types of social 
cues simultaneously. 
Finally, some thoughts should also be given to an alternative explanation for 
why I could not replicate previously reported caching strategies. The Eurasian jays that I 
tested in Chapter 5 (and Chapter 4) have participated in a number of caching 
experiments with similar set-ups (e.g. caching occurring when a conspecific is housed in 
an adjacent compartment) over the years. It is theoretically possible that the repeated 
exposure to similar experimental settings may have affected the jays’ performance, thus 
impairing the replication of original effects in the subsequent studies. For instance, if the 
Eurasian jay can learn over trials/studies that all items that are cached are always given 
back at recovery (i.e. there is no actual pilfering risk), then the bird may progressively 
stop protecting the caches when observed by a conspecific. Given the potential wide-
reaching implications of this issue on our understanding of cognition in the Eurasian jay 
(or perhaps in corvids), it would be particularly important for future studies to 
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investigate the influence of an individual experimental history on his performance in 
subsequent tests.  
The first objective of this thesis is to gain further insight into the process of 
convergent cognitive evolution between corvids and apes. To explore whether corvids, 
as apes, are endowed with a flexible and domain general cognitive tool-kit, Chapters 2 to 
5 reported four empirical studies investigating problem solving, future planning and 
social abilities in the Eurasian jay. In Chapter 6 I turn my attention to the second 
objective of the thesis, namely to explore the potential of coleoid cephalopods as a 





Cephalopods: a new model group for studying 





In Chapters 2 to 5 I explored whether corvids are endowed with a flexible cognitive 
tool-kit by testing physical problem solving, future planning and social cognition in the 
Eurasian jay. In this chapter, I turn my attention to the second objective of this thesis, 
namely the aim to lay theoretical and methodological groundwork for the study of 
convergent cognitive evolution between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates. To 
this end, I first review the most remarkable examples of behavioural flexibility in 
cephalopods and propose that current evidence may be sufficient to hypothesize a case 
of first-level convergence (Seed, 2007), i.e. convergence at the behavioural level, 
between these molluscs and large-brained vertebrates. Subsequently, I consider the 
evolutionary process(es) that may have triggered the emergence of large brains and 
flexible behaviour together with short life-history in cephalopods. I suggest that the 
disappearance of the protective shell may have (i) produced a dramatic increase in 
unavoidable mortality thus selecting fast life histories, and, in parallel (ii) facilitated 
widespread colonization of complex niches, thus driving cephalopods to cope with 
novel challenging problems. Cephalopods’ cognitive sophistication might have emerged 
primarily in response to predation and complex feeding contexts but social challenges, 
particularly during mating, might have acted as additional selective pressures. Finally, I 
conclude by presenting a number of novel paradigms that could be used to investigate 
tool use, future planning and social cognition in the octopus, and thus to explore 
convergent cognitive evolution between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates at a 
deeper level of analysis. 
  
																																																								
11 Part of this chapter has been published as: Amodio P., Boeckle M., Schnell A. K., Ostojić L., Fiorito G., 
& Clayton N. S. (2019). Grow Smart and Die Young: Why Did Cephalopods Evolve Intelligence?. Trends 





In the first part of this thesis (Chapters 2 to 5) I investigated the Eurasian jay’s cognitive 
sophistication in different domains to explore Emery and Clayton (2004)’s hypothesis 
that corvids may have evolved – convergently with apes – a flexible and domain general 
cognitive tool-kit. In this chapter I continue my study of convergent cognitive evolution 
by turning my attention to the second objective of this thesis and by focusing on 
another model group, namely the cephalopods. Here, I will lay theoretical and 
methodological groundwork for studying convergent cognitive evolution between 
cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, indicators of complex cognition such as large brain 
and behavioural flexibility have been reported in distantly related lineages, most notably 
primate, cetaceans, elephants, corvids, and parrots (Emery and Clayton, 2004; Fox et al., 
2017; Plotnik and Clayton, 2015). Differences in evolutionary history and brain structure 
among these taxa suggest that i) complex cognition may have emerged multiple times 
independently (Roth, 2015); and ii) distinct neural substrates, such as the avian 
nidopallium and the mammalian cortex, can support equivalent cognitive sophistication 
(Güntürkün and Bugnyar, 2016). Despite their differences in evolutionary history and 
neural substrates, primates, cetaceans, elephants, corvids, and parrots appear to share 
comparable socio-ecological challenges and slow life histories. Thus large-brained 
vertebrates may have evolved enhanced cognition convergently, in response to similar 
selective pressures, namely the need to navigate complex social environments and to 
find and process food (Emery and Clayton, 2004; Fox et al., 2017; Plotnik and Clayton, 
2015). Further, the positive correlation between brain size and the long developmental 
trajectory reported in mammals and birds (Gonzales-Lagos et al., 2010; Minias and 
Podlaszczuk, 2017; Street et al., 2017; Wirthlin et al., 2018) suggests a co-evolutionary 
scenario for the evolution of these traits: the slow life history might have been necessary 
to overcome the costs of a large brain and/or a consequence of the reduced extrinsic 
mortality resulting from enhanced intelligence (Barton and Capellini, 2011; Sol, 2009a) 
This convergent evolutionary route, however, cannot explain why large brains 
and complex behaviours emerged in cephalopods (Fig. 6.1). Coleoid cephalopods 
(cuttlefish, squid, and octopuses) are shell-less molluscs that are considered to be the 
most cognitively advanced group of invertebrates. They evolved a unique mixture of 
convergent and divergent features relative to the main groups of intelligent vertebrates 
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(Tab. 1). On the one hand, cephalopods are endowed with a sophisticated nervous 
system, which both resembles that of vertebrates in relative size (Packard, 1972) and 
complexity (Hochner et al., 2006; Young, 1991) and supports strikingly flexible 
behavioural repertoires (Darmaillacq et al., 2014; Hanlon and Messenger, 2018; Marini 
et al., 2017; Mather and Dickel, 2017). On the other hand, cephalopods do not appear 
to engage in complex social bonds (Boal, 1996; Schnell and Clayton, 2019) and have fast 
life histories with typical lifespans shorter than two years, no parental care, and in some 




Figure 6.1: Cephalopods. (A) Cuttlefish, Sepia officinalis (credit egiverga, stock.adobe.com), (B) Caribbean 
reef squids, Sepioteuthis sepioidea (credit kirk, stock.adobe.com), (C) Nautilus, Nautilus pompilius (credit carljf, 
stock.adobe.com), (D) Common octopus, Octopus vulgaris. 
 
 
In what follows, I first review current evidence of cognitive sophistication in 
cephalopods and discuss the level at which they may have converged with cognitively 
advanced groups of vertebrates. Subsequently, I consider the factors selecting for large 
brain, complex behaviour together with fast life histories in cephalopods, highlighting 
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the convergent and divergent aspects between these molluscs and large-brained 
vertebrates. Finally, I propose novel paradigms that may allow researchers to gain a 
deeper understanding of convergent cognitive evolution in cephalopods by measuring 
cognitive sophistication in the common octopus, an iconic model species for the study 
of behaviour and cognition in cephalopods. 
 
Table 6.1: Convergent and divergent features between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates. The 
colours of the cells refer to traits that are highly variable across the groups (blue), or shared (green) or not 






6.2: HOW COMPLEX IS CEPHALOPODS’ COGNITION?  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, cognitive sophistication cannot be measured directly and is 
thus typically estimated through morphological and behavioural proxies, namely brain 
features and behavioural flexibility. Although cephalopods’ brains differ from those of 
vertebrates in many aspects, they are similar in relative size and complexity to those of 
vertebrates that are considered intelligent. Further, there appears to be considerable 
convergence in behavioural complexity between cephalopods and large-brained 
vertebrates. 
  
Trait Cephalopods Corvids Cetaceans Apes
Manipulative Appendages Suckered arms and tentacles Beak and Feet Rostrum Hands
Dexterity High High Limited High
Vision High High High High
Acustic Limited High High High
Smell
Chemotactic
Brain-Body Size Ratio High High High High
Substrate for Complex Cognition Vertical lobe Nidopallium Cortex Cortex
Life Style Aquatic Flight Aquatic Terrestrial/Arboreal
Diet Carnivores Generalistic Carnivores Generalistic
Extractive Foraging Present Present Absent Present
Predation High Limited Limited Limited
System Solitary/Anonymous schools Pairs/Groups Family Groups Groups
Long-term Bonds Absent pair mate multiple individuals multiple individuals
Find and Process Food High High High High
Social Interactions Limited? High High High
Predator Avoidance High ? ? ?
Life Span 0.5-2 years > 15 years > 40 years > 40 years

















6.2.1 Nervous system 
Cephalopods have a remarkably large nervous system (up to 500 million neuronal cells 
in the octopus) that comprises a unique mixture of classic molluscan features and more 
complex vertebrate-like traits (Shigeno et al., 2018). The brain is formed by the 
aggregation of several ganglia (i.e. lobes) that show the typical neuronal arrangement of 
invertebrates, with cell bodies surrounding internal layers of synaptic connections 
(Young, 1971). However, the relative size of the cephalopods’ brain (Packard, 1972) and 
the high density of inter-neurons resemble that of some vertebrates (Shomrat et al., 
2015; Young, 1991, 1995).  
The number and function of the lobes differ substantially across cephalopods, 
depending on species-specific lifestyles (Nixon and Young, 2003). Among the various 
lobes that constitute the cephalopod brain, the vertical lobe plays a pivotal role in 
learning and memory in all coleoids (Fiorito and Chichery, 1995; Grasso and Basil, 
2009) and has been compared to regions of the mammalian cortex and the avian 
nidopallium (Edelman and Seth, 2009; Young, 1995). In contrast to birds and mammals, 
the processing of motor and sensory inputs in cephalopods is only partially dependent 
on the central brain. The optic lobes, a pair of large nervous structures located outside 
the cartilaginous capsule of the brain and connected to the retinae of the lens eyes, are 
essential for the computation of visual input (Young, 1995). Furthermore, the 
processing of chemo-tactile information and motor programmes is performed through 
the concerted action of higher centres (i.e. the inferior frontal lobe system; Young, 1991, 
1995) and the nervous system of the arms. In the octopus, the peripheral neural 
components encompass up to 60% of the total number of cells and embed the neural 
information for the execution of basic movements of the arms (Hochner, 2012) in a 
stereotyped autonomous way (Sumbre et al., 2005). Thus, the nervous system of 
cephalopods represents a striking example of embodied organization in which the 
central brain acts as a decision-making unit that integrates multi-modal sensory 
information and coordinates the motor commands executed by the periphery. These 
idiosyncratic features of the nervous system as well as the suggested lack of somatotopic 
organization of the central brain (Zullo et al., 2009; but see Marini et al., 2017; Shigeno 
et al., 2018) might have evolved to allow cephalopods to cope with the computational 
constraints associated with their body plan and physiology (for instance, the need to 
coordinate the movement of eight arms and hundreds of suckers in the lack of a skeletal 





Problem solving and tool use  
Problem solving and flexible tool use are considered hallmarks of physical intelligence 
(Byrne, 1997). Cephalopods, particularly octopuses, show considerable skills in these 
tasks. In the wild, octopuses express high flexibility in solving demanding problems, 
such as feeding on bivalves. According to the size and species of the prey, these animals 
can use their suckered arms to pull open the valves or drill holes through the shell to 
inject paralyzing toxins into the prey (Fiorito and Gherardi, 1999). These extractive 
foraging techniques are thought to improve with experience. For example, adult 
octopuses prey more efficiently on bivalves than juveniles by optimizing the site and 
number or holes drilled in the shell (reviewed in Marini et al., 2017). Therefore, like in 
tool use in corvids (Kenward et al., 2006), learning can play a key role in octopus 
problem solving by allowing the fine-tuning of innate predispositions.  
Critically, octopuses exhibit flexibility not only when solving problems in their 
natural environment, but also when faced with artificial tasks. For instance, common 
octopuses remove lids from jars and open opaque boxes to acquire hidden prey 
(Amodio and Fiorito, 2013; Fiorito et al., 1990), as well as retrieve L-shaped food 
containers from crevices with or without visual access to the container and regardless of 
the spatial orientation of the container (Richter et al., 2016). The performances of the 
octopuses in these experiments were incompatible with simple learning mechanisms (e.g. 
trial-and-error learning; Fiorito et al., 1990; Richter et al., 2016), supporting the idea that 
problem solving might entail more complex cognitive underpinnings.  
Just like some species of apes, cetaceans, and corvids, some cephalopod species 
are tool users. These animals squirt water jets from their funnels (using water as a tool) 
for a variety of purposes, such as to distance scavenger fishes, aid burrowing or remove 
food remains (Mann and Patterson, 2013). These behaviours may not represent 
stereotyped actions triggered by undesired stimuli because they are also performed 
during interactions with floating objects that have been classified as play (Kuba et al., 
2003; Mather and Anderson, 1999). In addition to water, octopuses also use solid 
objects as tools. Several octopus species use stones to block the entrance of their dens 
(Mather, 1994, 2016). Furthermore, veined octopuses (Amphioctopus marginatus) assemble 
pairs of coconut shells into mobile dens and carry them around for future use (Finn et 
al., 2009). This rare example of composite tool use in invertebrates might – potentially – 
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be underpinned by cognitive sophistication for two reasons. First, this tool use might 
represent a behavioural innovation allowing octopuses to protect themselves from 
predator attacks in habitats where rocky shelters are scarce. Second, because coconut 
shells are transported to meet apparent future needs and despite considerable costs (e.g. 
conspicuous locomotion), this behaviour might rely on planning capabilities (Finn et al., 
2009). However, future controlled experiments are required to exclude lower-level 
explanations. For instance, octopuses may carry around coconut shells only because 
these objects have previously become associated with a positive outcome, such as a 




The camouflage abilities of cephalopods are perhaps the most iconic evidence of their 
behavioural flexibility. Through the neuromuscular control of peculiar skin organs (e.g. 
chromatophores), these animals can alter their body patterns almost instantaneously to 
deceive predators (Borrelli et al., 2006; Messenger, 2001). By changing the colour and 
the texture of their skin, cephalopods can mimic dangerous heterospecifics (e.g. sea 
snakes; Norman et al., 2001) and achieve different kinds of camouflage (e.g. crypsis, 
countershading, masquerade; Hanlon and Messenger, 2018). Cephalopods adjust their 
anti-predatory strategies not only to the features of the substrate (Hanlon, 2007; Josef et 
al., 2012, 2015) but also to the type of threat. For instance, young cuttlefish (Sepia 
officinalis) express false eyespots towards visual predators but perform immediate flee 
responses towards chemosensory predators (Langridge et al., 2007). Similarly, cuttlefish 
and squid conceal themselves on the substrate when approached by pelagic fishes but 
flee away from the bottom when ambush predators are detected (Staudinger et al., 2011, 
2013a). The recent discovery that cephalopods can change their appearance (e.g. break 
camouflage) to receive food rewards (Hough et al., 2016) suggests that these anti-
predatory responses are not entirely hard-wired but instead entail learning and complex 
decision-making.  
Future research might uncover further anti-predatory strategies that are 
candidates for complex cognition. The BBC Blue Planet II series recently showed a 
common octopus using his suckered arms to create spherical armour of stones and 
shells against hunting sharks (Jeffs and Brownlow, 2017). This behaviour is functionally 
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similar to the use of coconut shells as a tool by the veined octopuses and might provide 
further insight into the flexibility of their anti-predatory behaviours.  
 
Social behaviour 
Although cephalopods primarily evolved dynamic skin as an anti-predatory weapon 
(Packard, 1972), their ability to rapidly alter their appearance is also used to 
communicate visually with conspecifics (Hanlon and Messenger, 2018; Lin et al., 2017; 
Moynihan, 1985). This sophisticated communication system allows cephalopods to 
convey honest and deceptive signals simultaneously. By longitudinally splitting the body 
into two parts, small male cuttlefish can express courtship displays towards a receptive 
female on one side of their body and deceptive female colourations towards a rival male 
on the other side of their body (Brown et al., 2012). Male mourning cuttlefish (Sepia 
plangon) have been reported to use this strategy only in front of one female and a single 
rival male, perhaps because the effectiveness of the female mimicry will be impaired in 
the presence of multiple males (Brown et al., 2012). In a similar vein, male giant 
cuttlefish (Sepia apama) adjust their fighting strategy in response to the size and fighting 
ability of their competitor (Schnell et al., 2015). Comparable levels of flexibility in a 
mating context are also observed among squids (Marian et al., 2019) and octopuses. In 
algae octopuses (Abdopus aculeatus), males adjust their mating tactics to their chances of 
winning agonistic encounters. Specifically, males avoid mate guarding if larger rivals are 
around to minimise the risk of fights and of being cannibalized (Huffard et al., 2010).  
Cephalopods’ behavioural flexibility in social contexts might extend beyond 
competitive interactions with conspecifics. Preliminary observations indicate that reef 
octopuses (Octopus cyanea) associate with hunting groupers in the Australian Great 
Barrier Reef (Unsworth and Cullen-Unsworth, 2012; Vail et al., 2013). In addition, 
groupers employ the same visual signal to communicate the location of hidden prey to 
their usual hunting partners, moray eels, and to octopuses (Vail et al., 2013).  
On a superficial level, these interspecific interactions might look like cooperative 
hunting based on the complementary skills of the two species: speed for chasing prey in 
open water by the grouper and capability of reaching prey hidden in narrow crevices by 
the octopus. Critically, however, no predation by an octopus has been observed in this 
context, thus this interpretation remains speculative. Nevertheless, these observations 
indicate that hunting might provide one useful context within which to investigate 
cephalopods’ flexibility in social interactions. 
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6.2.3: Level of convergence 
Based on this evidence, can we consider cephalopods to have evolved complex 
cognition convergently with large-brained vertebrates? If this is the case, at what level of 
analysis did cognition evolve convergently in these groups? According to Mather (2019) 
cephalopods: ‘[…] can perform the operations suggested by Emery and Clayton (2004) 
as indicative of cognitive ability in mammals and birds — flexibility, causal reasoning, 
prospection, and imagination’ (page 2; see also Mather and Dickel, 2017). Within the 
hierarchical framework proposed by Seed (2007), Mather’s view corresponds to the 
third and deeper level of convergence: cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates 
independently evolved similar cognitive mechanisms underlying complex behaviours. In 
my view, this hypothesis is to date highly speculative. The current understating of 
cephalopods cognition is still very limited because the cognitive underpinnings of their 
behaviours have rarely been tested (but see Jozet-Alves et al., 2013; Yang and Chiao, 
2016). Given that flexible behaviours can be supported by simple cognitive mechanisms 
(Mikhalevich et al., 2017; Seed et al., 2009a; Shettleworth, 2010), it is not possible to 
draw conclusions about whether cephalopods’ behavioural flexibility is matched by 
equivalent cognitive complexity, as it appears to be the case in, for example, apes and 
corvids. For instance, Mather (2019) suggests that the Passing Cloud display (Packard and 
Sanders, 1971) and the avoidance of stinging anemones (Ross, 1971) provide evidence 
that cephalopods are capable of causal reasoning – the ability to identify the functional 
relationship between a cause and its effect. The Passing Cloud is a sophisticated skin 
display characterized by a well-defined dark area that seems to ‘move’ directionally on 
the animal’s body (Packard and Sanders, 1971). Cephalopods most often exhibit this 
behaviour to startle prey, as well as conspecifics or other animals. While it is 
theoretically possible that the Passing Cloud could involve causal reasoning, this 
interpretation is premature without careful empirical testing (Amodio, 2019). It cannot 
be ruled out that Passing Cloud has a strong genetic component and/or it is the 
expression of simple learning mechanisms. Similar arguments can be raised in regard to 
the second putative behavioural evidence of causal reasoning. Ross (1971) reported that 
octopuses: i) progressively inhibit their predatory response selectively toward hermit 
crabs that had a stinging anemone attached to their shells, and ii) behave as if they have 
received a ‘punishment stimulus’ after touching an anemone. Therefore it seems 
possible that octopuses may develop avoidance of stinging anemones as a result of 
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associative learning when physical interactions with the anemone have previously 
become associated with a negative outcome (Godfrey-Smith, 2019). 
Despite the fact that a deep-level cognitive convergence between cephalopods 
and large-brained vertebrates is currently unwarranted, the richness and flexibility of 
cephalopods’ behavioural repertoire is absolutely remarkable, not just among molluscs 
but in absolute terms. Thus – in my view – current evidence is sufficiently strong to 
support the hypothesis of first-level convergence between these groups: cephalopods and 
large-brained vertebrates may have converged behaviourally, i.e. they may have 
independently evolved behaviours that superficially appear comparably complex and 
flexible. Only through a careful testing of cephalopods’ cognitive abilities in different 
domains will it be possible to explore convergence at the second level of analysis (Seed, 
2007) and thus to evaluate whether cephalopods’ behaviour is actually underpinned by 




6.3: CEPHALOPODS’ ROUTE TO COGNITIVE 
SOPHISTICATION 
 
If – as I have proposed – cephalopods’ evolution can be taken as a case of first-level 
convergence with large-brained vertebrates, then it is necessary to consider why 
cephalopods – as short-lived invertebrates facing simple social environments – should 
have evolved large brain and behavioural flexibility, and thus potentially cognitive 
sophistication. The answer to this question is likely to be tightly linked to the dramatic 
changes in the shells that marked cephalopods’ divergence from other molluscs.  
Around 530 MYA a group of snail-like molluscs experienced a major shift in 
their morphology and physiology: their protective shell became a buoyancy device 
(Kröger et al., 2011; Tanner et al., 2017). The comparison with nautiluses, the only 
extant cephalopods who retained the external shell, suggests that this key event co-
occurred with the emergence of arms, funnel, and crucially, a centralized brain (Grasso 
and Basil, 2009; Packard, 1972; Sasaki et al., 2010). The increase in computational power 
at this stage might have been selected to support arm coordination for locomotion and 
object manipulation (Godfrey-Smith, 2016; Packard, 1972), as well as navigation in the 
water column and basic learning processes (Grasso and Basil, 2009). Next, around 275 
Chapter	6	 	
	 135	
MYA the external shell was internalized (in the ancestors of cuttlefish and squid) or lost 
(in the ancestors of octopuses; Kröger et al., 2011; Tanner et al., 2017). It has been 
speculated that competition with marine vertebrates (Packard, 1972) was a driving factor 
that led to dramatic changes in the lifestyles of these animals (but see Aronson, 1991). 
First, the disappearance of the external shell allowed animals to occupy a wide array of 
ecological niches. Consequently, modern cephalopods are found in all marine habitats, 
from tropical to polar waters, and from benthic to pelagic niches (Jerep et al., 2014). 
Second, the loss of the protective shell likely increased predatory pressures drastically 
and consequently the rates of extrinsic mortality. These novel ecological conditions 
might not have only played a major role in the emergence of sophisticated biological 
adaptations (e.g. lens eye, chromatophores) but also in the co-evolution of cognitive 
sophistication and fast life history of cephalopods.  
 
Which factors drove the evolution of intelligence in cephalopods? 
The Ecological Intelligence Hypotheses (Chapter 1, for a recent review see Rosati, 2017) 
posits that intelligence evolves in response to challenging foraging niches. Cephalopods 
face ecological problems that seem comparable to those of apes and corvids. First, 
cephalopods exhibit a high level of diet generalism. For instance, South African 
common octopuses predate on more than 35 species, including crustaceans, gastropods, 
fishes, other cephalopods, and even conspecifics (Smith, 2003). Secondly, cephalopods 
prey on ephemeral resources that require substantial periods of exploration to be 
spotted and seized. In the wild, octopuses avoid visiting the same spots that were 
depleted on previous days (Forsythe and Hanlon, 1997; Mather, 1991b), suggesting that 
they might need to flexibly update their memory to optimize food-searching activities.  
Finally, octopuses rely extensively on extractive foraging to feed on bivalves and 
extract prey from crevices. Extractive foraging is considered a key factor in the 
evolution of intelligence because these techniques i) are typically more costly than 
alternative foraging strategies (e.g. due to learning and higher predation risk associated 
with long-lasting procedures), ii) might require cognitive complexity (e.g. 
innovativeness) to be developed, and iii) allow individuals to cover the high energetic 
demands of large brains (Dunbar and Shultz, 2017; Rosati, 2017). Therefore, the 
ecological challenges faced by cephalopods indicate that the Ecological Intelligence 
Hypothesis can be an appropriate framework within which to study the evolution of 
intelligence in this group (Godfrey-Smith, 2013, 2016).  
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According to another influential view, the Social Intelligence Hypothesis, cognitive 
sophistication evolves as a tool to compete with, cooperate with, or learn from 
conspecifics (Chapter 1; for recent reviews see Byrne, 2018; Whiten, 2018; Whiten and 
van de Waal, 2017). Some cephalopod species live in simple social environments 
encompassing large but anonymous aggregations (e.g. squid), while others appear to 
experience only sporadic social interactions (e.g. octopuses; Boal, 1996; Schnell and 
Clayton, 2019). Thus, they do not engage in complex social bonds like those between 
mated partners in corvids (Emery et al., 2007) or group members in apes and cetaceans 
(Connor, 2007; Tomasello and Call, 1994). Building on this, one might conclude that 
cephalopods have not faced sufficiently challenging social problems to trigger the 
emergence of intelligence. However, our understanding of the social pressures 
experienced by different cephalopod species is still very sparse, and therefore a detailed 
evaluation of the Social Intelligence Hypotheses in this group might be premature.  
Although octopuses are typically described as strictly solitary animals (Boal, 
1996; Hanlon and Messenger, 2018), recent studies have reported long-term occupancy 
of clumped dens and frequent social interactions in some populations (Guerra et al., 
2014; Scheel et al., 2016, 2017). Mated partners have been observed sharing dens and 
food in the ‘Larger Striped Pacific Octopus’ (Caldwell et al., 2015; Rodaniche, 1991), an 
elusive species that still needs to be assigned a scientific name. Furthermore, an 
important consideration here is that different kinds of social challenges might have 
participated in shaping cephalopod cognition. The mating system of these molluscs is 
characterized by high promiscuity (Franklin et al., 2012) and short reproductive periods 
(Anderson et al., 2002; Rocha et al., 2001). In addition, cannibalism is widespread 
among cephalopods (Ibáñez and Keyl, 2010). These animals have evolved several 
behavioural and morphological features (e.g. mating tactics, Marian et al., 2019; Sauer et 
al., 1992; mating position, Hanlon and Forsythe, 2008; Huffard and Godfrey-Smith, 
2010; secondary sexual traits, Packard, 1961) to reduce the risk of cannibalism during 
mating. It is, therefore, possible that large brains supporting fast decision-making and 
flexible mating strategies (Brown et al., 2012; Huffard et al., 2010) might have emerged 
in cephalopods to navigate challenging reproductive environments, in which mating 
attempts can become fights for life. 
A third hypothesis suggests that intelligence can emerge in response to the 
challenges exerted by predators (Chapter 1; Skelhorn and Rowe, 2016; van der Bijl et al., 
2015; van der Bijl and Kolm, 2016; Zuberbühler and Byrne, 2006; Zuberbühler and 
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Jenny, 2002). Lacking a protective shell, cephalopods are highly vulnerable to a wide 
range of predators (e.g. cetaceans, seabirds, fishes, other cephalopods; Hanlon and 
Messenger, 2018; Sprogis et al., 2017) that differ substantially in their sensory ecology 
and hunting strategies (e.g. acoustically-, visually-, olfactory-guided). It is well accepted 
that cephalopod evolution has been influenced by high predation pressures exerted by 
marine vertebrates (Packard, 1972; Tanner et al., 2017). An iconic example of this is the 
sophisticated camouflaging behaviour of cephalopods, facilitating rapid and effective 
concealment from visual predators despite being colour blind (Chiao et al., 2011). 
Predator attacks can have dramatic fitness consequences and predator-prey interactions 
can be as cognitively challenging as intraspecific interactions (Byrne and Bates, 2007). 
Consequently, predation risk might have played a crucial role in the evolution of 
cephalopods’ cognition. 
 
Why did cephalopods not evolve slow life history? 
Traditionally, the evolution of fast life histories in cephalopods has been discussed in 
terms of physiological constraints (e.g. inefficiency in fat storage metabolism, high 
energetic cost of jet swimming; O’Dor and Webber, 1986). Focussing on ultimate 
causes, there might be a complementary interpretation. Fast life histories and terminal 
reproduction are favoured in species with high extrinsic mortality because high 
investment in early reproduction is the safer strategy when chances of survival are low 
in adulthood (Crespi and Teo, 2002). By increasing the rates of unavoidable mortality 
due to predation, the loss of the protective shell might have favoured early senescence, 
thus preventing slow life history trajectories in cephalopods. The opposite trend might 
have characterized the evolution of large brained vertebrates. A few lines of evidence 
support this view.  
First, cephalopod species experiencing reduced predation have unusually slow 
life histories. For instance, having retained the protective shell, nautiluses live up to 20 
years and reproduce several times during their life (Wood and O’Dor, 2000). 
Furthermore, as highlighted by Godfrey-Smith (2016), the scarcity of predators in 
abyssal habitats (Seibel and Drazen, 2007) can explain why vampire squids have multiple 
reproductive cycles (Hoving et al., 2015) and why deep-sea octopuses have the longest 
egg-brooding period ever reported in the animal kingdom (>50 months, Robison et al., 
2014). Second, a negative correlation between longevity and predatory pressure can also 
be seen in other groups, such as bivalves (Moss et al., 2016) and social insects (Keller 
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and Genoud, 1997). Finally, in opisthobranch molluscs, several groups have lost their 
protective shell independently from cephalopods. These key events favoured the 
evolution of sophisticated defence strategies (e.g. crypsis, synthesis of toxic metabolites, 
storage of cnidocysts) and crucially, fast life histories in opisthobranchs (Wägele and 
Klussmann-Kolb, 2005). Interestingly, opisthobranchs did not evolve large brains and 
flexible behaviour. This difference between opisthobranchs and cephalopods might, in 
some cases, be explained by the increase in brain size and complexity that preceded the 
disappearance of the shell in the latter. Although some groups of opisthobranchs might 
have lost their shell after the development of alternative defence mechanisms, in other 
groups the disappearance of the shell might have pre-dated the emergence of alternative 
defence strategies (e.g. toxicity; Wägele and Klussmann-Kolb, 2005). Thus, lacking a 
sufficiently complex brain, opisthobranchs might have been constrained to evolve 
‘cognitively undemanding’ adaptations to cope with novel ecological niches. In contrast, 
similar conditions might have favoured a further investment in brain growth in 
cephalopods. Consequently, the camouflage behaviours of cephalopods might require 
more enhanced cognitive complexity relative to the anti-predatory strategies in 
opisthobranchs. 
In summary, the disappearance of the protective shell in the ancestors of 
cephalopods may have (i) produced a dramatic increase in unavoidable mortality thus 
selecting fast life histories and (ii) in parallel facilitated widespread colonization of 
complex niches, thus driving cephalopods to cope with novel challenging problems. 
Cephalopod flexible behaviour and large brains might have emerged primarily in 
response to predation and complex feeding contexts. However, social challenges, 
particularly during mating, may have acted as additional selective pressures in their 
cognitive evolution. Thus, indicators of intelligence may have evolved in cephalopods 
and large-brained vertebrates through alternative routes, in response to partially 






6.4: BEHAVIOURAL PARADIGMS TO TEST COMPLEX 
COGNITION IN THE OCTOPUS 
 
As pointed out earlier, the only way to test whether convergent evolution between 
cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates extends beyond behavioural similarities is to 
conduct a systematic investigation of the cognitive mechanisms underpinning 
cephalopods’ behaviour. To this end, it is crucial to select promising model species 
among cephalopods and devise appropriate paradigms that will allow researchers to 
measure these animals’ cognitive complexity in different domains. An intriguing 
candidate for this line of research is the common octopus. This octopus is an 
established model species for the study of learning and problem solving in cephalopods 
(Boycott, 1954; Fiorito et al., 1990; Fiorito and Chichery, 1995; Mackintosh and 
Mackintosh, 1963; Richter et al., 2016; Wells, 1959) due to its remarkable manipulative 
inclination and neophilia (e.g. Kuba et al. 2003, 2006). In what follows, I describe novel 
behavioural paradigms that can be used to investigate physical, future planning and 
social cognition in the octopus. Importantly, the proposed experiments represent a tool 
to collect baseline data. As discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (see also Chapter 7), it is 
problematic to draw solid conclusions on the cognitive abilities of a species based on a 
single study. Thus, in case the paradigms presented here will prove to be effective to test 
for instance, social cognition in common octopuses, then results should be considered 
as indicative rather than as final. To corroborate the findings, it will be crucial to 
conduct further research in the octopus, and especially to test the robustness of the 
results through replication studies and to employ a range of different tasks to investigate 
the same cognitive capacity in this species. 
 
6.4.1: TOOL USE 
 
Octopuses use a variety of tools for different purposes, including stones to block the 
entrance of their dens, coconut shells to assemble movable dens and water jets to 
distance scavenger fish (Finn et al., 2009; Mann and Patterson, 2013; Mather, 2016). 
According to anecdotal observations octopuses also engage in tool-mediated foraging: 
common octopuses have been observed to insert a pebble in between the two shells of 
large bivalves (Pinna nobilis), thus preventing the mussel to seal up the shells, and 
consequently to prey the mussel by pulling open the shells (Pliny the Elder, 1983; Power, 
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1857). To date, octopuses’ ability to use tools has never been tested in the laboratory, 
thereby it is not clear how flexible the cognitive underpinnings of these behaviours are. 
Here I propose two experimental paradigms to investigate whether octopuses can i) 
learn a novel tool use behaviour to solve an artificial task, and ii) flexibly achieve the 
same goal through different strategies, namely by employing perceptually different – but 
functionally equivalent – objects as tools, or by using both solid objects and water as 





i) Can octopuses learn a novel tool use behaviour to solve an artificial task? 
ii) Can octopuses employ different tool use strategies to solve the same task? 
 
Set-up  
The apparatus consists of a small plastic platform suspended above the octopus’ tank 
through a fishing line (Fig. 6.2). A baited container (i.e. a two-parts hollow ball) is placed 
on the apparatus. To solve the task, the octopus has to use a tool to knock down the 
container. 
 
Protocol and Predictions 
Familiarization: The aim of the Familiarization is to give the octopus the 
opportunity learn that the food container is baited and detachable from the platform. 
Thus, the platform is suspended a few centimetres below the water surface so that the 
octopus can directly grab the food container by extending one of its arms (Fig. 6.2a). 
After having acquired the container and fed on the bait during five consecutive trials, 
the octopus proceeds to the next stage.  
 
Training:  The Training consists of two stages. The aim of Stage 1 is to 
foster an association between the tool and the reward, i.e. the octopus should learn that 
the out-of-reach food container can be acquired by using an object as a tool. The aim of 
Stage 2 is to allow the octopus to learn the specific sequence of actions required to 
knock down the food container through an object. In both training stages, the apparatus 
is suspended above the water surface such that the food container cannot be reached 
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without a tool. A plastic rod with both ends sealed is provided as a tool. To ensure the 
vertical buoyancy of the rod, a weight is fixed inside it close to one end. In Stage 1, the 
rod is connected to the platform through a plastic linker (Fig. 6.2b). This set-up 
facilitates the successful solving of the task because any manipulation of the tool by the 
octopuses (e.g. pulling downward or pushing upward) causes the container to fall from 
the platform. In Stage 2, the rod is loose (Fig. 6.2c) such that the octopus must knock 
the container by pushing the rod upward. After five consecutive successful trials in each 
training stage, the octopus proceeds to the test. 
If the octopus can pass the Training, then results would demonstrate that the 




Figure 6.2: Schematic representation of Experiment 6.1. In the Familiarization (a), the baited container is 
in-reach. In the Training (b, c), a plastic rod (green line) is provided as tool. The rod is connected to the 
container in Stage 1 (b), but it is loose in Stage 2 (c). In Test 1 (d), a perceptually different object is 
provided as tool. In Test 2 (e) no to is provided: the octopus can only knock down the baited container 
through water squirts (water as tool). 
 
 
Test:   The tests aim at investigating the cognitive flexibility of tool use 
behaviour in the octopus. Specifically, Test 1 investigates whether octopuses can acquire 
the reward from the same apparatus by using a novel and perceptually different object 
a                  b                  c                d                e
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as tool. Test 2 aims at testing whether octopuses can solve the task through an 
alternative strategy, namely by using water as tool. 
In Test 1, the octopus is provided with a novel tool, namely a loose object that 
differs from the tool used in the Training in colour, shape and material. Thus, test 1 is a 
transfer task for the behaviour acquired during training. Positive performance in Test 1 
would show that the octopus can solve a familiar task through a novel object, thus 
indicating some level of cognitive flexibility and capability to generalize to use 
perceptually different – yet functionally equivalent – tools. 
In Test 2, no tool is provided such that the octopus can knock down the baited 
container only by aiming water squirts (water as tool) at the container. If the octopus is 
not capable of spontaneously devising this alternative strategy over 10 trails, i.e. if no 
attempt to solve the task by using water is observed, demonstrative trials are conducted 
to facilitate the emergence of the behaviour. This is because the demonstrative trials 
provide the opportunity for the octopus to see that the food reward can be knocked 
down by using water. Here, the experimenter introduces one hand in the tank holding a 
squeezable plastic receptacle out of the view of the octopus. By compressing the object, 
the experimenter directs water jets toward the apparatus thus causing the food container 
to fall in the water. Subsequently the octopus is allowed to recover the container and to 
feed on the bait. Following five demonstrative trials, octopuses are tested again. 
If the octopus can pass Test 2, then results would support remarkable cognitive 
flexibility because i) the sequence of actions required to knock down the baited with 
water jets differ substantially from that required to solve the task through a solid object; 
ii) the octopus was not previously trained to solve the task by using water as a tool, and 
iii) octopuses are not known for squirting water jets to acquire food.  
 
Pilot 
To evaluate whether the paradigm of Experiment 1 is appropriate for investigating tool 
use in the octopus, I have conducted a pilot study involving the Familiarization and 
Training (Stage 1). Given the exploratory aim of the pilot, and because of time 
constraints, I did not employ a standardized protocol but rather presented individual 
octopuses with the set-up and observed the behavioural responses of the animals. I 
tested two common octopuses (approximately 300 g). The study was carried out in July 
2017 at the Stazione Zoologica Anton Dohrn, Napoli, Italy, in collaboration with Dr. 
Graziano Fiorito. Preliminary results were promising: both octopuses i) consistently 
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grabbed the baited container when it was in reach (Familiarization), and ii) were capable 
of solving Stage 1 training trials: they could acquire the out-of-reach container by pulling 
a tool that was connected to the container (Fig. 6.3). Therefore, the paradigm appears to 




Figure 6.3: A common octopus (Octopus vulgaris) solving a training trial (Stage 1). The animal is pulling a 





i) Can octopuses learn a novel tool use behaviour to solve an artificial task? 
ii) Can octopuses employ different tool use strategies to solve the same task? 
 
Set-up 
The apparatus consists of a clear plastic pipe with one sealed end and one baited lateral 
chamber (Fig. 6.4). The apparatus is fixed on a heavy platform. An obstacle – either a 
stone or a stinging anemone attached on the base – is positioned in front of the non-
sealed opening of the pipe. To solve the task, the octopus has to displace the obstacle 
and grab the food reward by inserting one arm inside the apparatus. 
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Protocol and Predictions 
Familiarization: The aim of the Familiarization is to give the octopus the 
opportunity to learn the basic requirement of the task, i.e. to remove the obstacle to 
gain access to the reward. Here, a stone is used as the obstacle. The octopus can easily 
displace the obstacle by grabbing it with the arms and moving it away. After five 
consecutive successful trials, the octopus proceeds to the Training. 
Training:  The Training encompasses two stages and involves a 
stinging anemone as the obstacle. In Stage 1, the octopus should learn that the obstacle 
can be displaced only by using an object as a tool because a direct physical contact with 
the obstacle would result in a painful experience. In Stage 2, the octopus should learn 
the specific sequence of actions required to remove the obstacle: it should hold the 
object and push it against the obstacle to displace it. Following the basic design of 
Experiment 6.1, the two stages of the Training differ in whether or not the object 
provided as a tool is loose. In Stage 1, the tool (e.g. a plastic stick) is attached to the 
obstacle through a fishing line such that any displacement of the tool would also cause 
the displacement of anemone. In Stage 2, the tool is loose; the octopus has to hold the 
tool and push it against the anemone to remove the obstacle. After five consecutive 
successful trials in each training stage, the octopus proceeds to the test. 
If the octopus can pass the Training, then results would demonstrate that the 





Figure 6.4: Schematic representation of the apparatus used in Experiment 6.2. The apparatus is visible 
from a lateral view (left) and top view (right). The apparatus consists of clear Perspex pipe with one sealed 
end, and a baited lateral chamber (F). An obstacle (e.g. a stinging anemone attached on a plastic disc) is 




Test:   The aim of the Test is to investigate the cognitive flexibility of 
tool use behaviour in the octopus. In particular, the Test investigates whether octopuses 
can solve a familiar task by using a novel and perceptually different object as a tool or 
through an alternative strategy, namely by using water as a tool. 
In the Test, no tool is provided. The octopus can solve the task through two 
alternative strategies. First, the octopus can displace the obstacle by using a perceptually 
different tool, namely a pebble that together with sand from the substrate of the 
octopus’ tank. Second, the octopus can displace the obstacle by aiming water squirts at 
the anemone. If the octopus is not capable of spontaneously performing this alternative 
strategy (nor to use a pebble as a tool), demonstrative trials (as described in Experiment 
6.1) are conducted to facilitate the use of water as a tool. 
Successful performance in the Test, through either strategy, would support 
remarkable cognitive flexibility. In contrast to Experiment 6.1, here the tool that can be 
used in the Test (i.e. the pebble) is not presented together with the apparatus in the trials. 
This procedure requires higher cognitive flexibility than that of the transfer task (Test 1) 
in Experiment 6.1. The octopus cannot solve the task by following a simple rule – ‘any 
novel object provided can be used to acquire the reward’ – instead the octopus must 
spontaneously consider that a familiar object that is always available (i.e. the pebble) is 
functionally equivalent to the training tool, and therefore can be used to solve the task.  
As in Experiment 6.1, solving the task by using water as tool requires cognitive 
flexibility because: i) the sequence of actions required to displace the obstacle through 
water jets differ substantially from that required to solve the task through a solid object; 
ii) the octopus was not previously trained to solve the task by using water as a tool, and 
iii) octopuses are not known for squirting water jets to acquire food. 
 
 
6.4.2: FUTURE PLANNING 
 
Jozet-Alves et al. (2013) reported that cuttlefish can remember the what, where and 
when features of past events (episodic-like memory). Given that episodic memory and 
future planning are thought to be based on the same cognitive machinery (Clayton et al., 
2003; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007), this evidence raises the possibility that 
cephalopods are capable of prospection cognition (see also Billard et al., 2020). The 
carrying of coconut shells by veined octopus (Finn et al., 2009) is in line with this 
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hypothesis because the transport of tools has a cost (e.g. increased risk of being spotted 
by a predator due to the conspicuous locomotion) and it does not provide benefits 
when the behaviour is performed but only in the future, i.e. the tools do not protect the 
octopus while being carried but they can be assembled into a safe shelter after a new 
location is reached. Building of Finn et al. (2009)’s observations, here I propose a 
paradigm that investigates whether octopuses choose to carry a movable den to a new 
location only when this behaviour results in a future benefit. To this end, octopuses are 
exposed to two locations: one Safe location where a shelter is available and no predator 
is visible, and one Dangerous location where no den is available and predators can be 
seen. As a result of these manipulations, the movable den is beneficial to the octopus 




i) Do octopuses carry a movable den only when it provides benefits in the future? 
 
Set-up 
The octopus’ tank is divided in three compartments through opaque PVC walls: a 
Resting compartment where the octopus is housed and two smaller Testing 
compartments that can be accessible during the experiment (Fig. 6.5). A den that can be 
carried around (e.g. a plastic pipe, two coconut shells) is positioned in the Resting 
compartment, whereas an unmovable den (e.g. two heavy bricks arranged to form a 
cavity) is placed in one Testing compartment (Safe compartment) and no den is placed 
in the other (Dangerous compartment). The octopus can move from the Resting 
compartment to each of the two Testing compartment through two holes in PVC wall. 
The holes are adjustable, i.e. they can be opened at different sizes or completely closed. 
A video screen is positioned outside the octopus’ tank, allowing the animal to watch 
videos when it is housed in the Testing compartments. Videos are used to manipulate 
the perceived predatory risk associated in each Testing compartment: a natural predator 
(e.g. a grouper, moray eel) is showed in trials in which the octopus is confined in the 
Dangerous compartment, while a non-threatening species (e.g. dreamfish) is used in trials 







Figure 6.5: Top view schematic 
representation of the set up used in 
Experiment 6.3. The experimental tank is 
divided in two Testing compartments (a, 
b) and one Resting compartment (c). An 
unmovable den (e.g. two bricks arranged 
to form a cavity) is available in the Safe 
compartment (a). No shelter is available 
in the Dangerous compartment (b). A 
movable den (e.g. two coconut shells) is 
available in the Resting compartment. 
Videos are presented to the octopus 
when it is housed in Testing 
compartments, through video screens 
positioned outside the tank. 
 
 
Protocol and Predictions 
The experiment encompasses an Experience phase (three consecutive days) followed by 
a Test phase (one day).  
Experience phase:   The aim of the Experience phase is to give the 
octopus the opportunity to learn that i) a shelter is available in the Safe compartment but 
not in the Dangerous compartment, and ii) predators can be found only in the Dangerous 
compartment. 
In the Experience phase, the octopus receives two trials per day, one in the 
morning and one in the afternoon. On each trial, the octopus is allowed to enter either 
the Safe or the Dangerous compartment through one hole in the wall. The octopus cannot 
carry the movable den from the Resting compartment because the object cannot fit 
through the hole. Once locked inside the Testing compartment, the octopus is given a 
live crab and allowed to eat the prey during two hours12. Crucially, only in the Safe 
compartment does the octopus have a safe shelter to consume the prey. During this 
time, short videos are presented (e.g. a 5 minutes video is played 3 times/hour) through 
the video screen. A natural predator (Dangerous compartment) or a non-threatening 
species (Safe compartment) is showed in trials in which the octopus is confined in the 
																																																								
12 Octopuses require substantial time to feed on crustaceans and bivalves. Two hours is an appropriate 
time frame for an octopus to consume a crab. 
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compartment. At the end of each trial, the experimenter re-opens the hole in the wall 
and induces the octopus to return to the Resting compartment through gentle 
movements of one hand. The octopus experiences both Testing compartments on each 
Experience day in a randomized order. For instance, on day 1, the octopus may be 
confined in the Safe compartment in the morning and in Dangerous compartment in the 
afternoon, whereas, the animal may experience the alternative order on day 2. At the 
end of the Experience phase, the octopus has experienced each Testing compartment 
three times.  
Test:   The Test aims at investigating whether the octopus chooses to 
transport the movable den only when the den provides a future benefit, i.e. a safe 
shelter to consume a prey in a location where no den is available but predators can be 
spotted. On day 4 of the experiment, the octopus receives two test trials: one trial in the 
Safe compartment (e.g. in the morning) and one trial in the Dangerous compartment (e.g. 
in the afternoon). The same procedure used in Experience trails is also employed in 
Test trials except that: i) video stimuli are not presented, and crucially ii) the holes in the 
wall are opened more widely such that the movable den can fit through it. Therefore, in 
contrast to the Experience phase, here the octopus has the opportunity to carry the 
movable den into each Testing compartment and use it as a shelter during the trial. 
If the octopus can remember that in the Dangerous compartment no shelter is 
available and predators can be found, it is expected to carry the movable den from the 
Resting compartment only in the Test trial in the Dangerous compartment. In contrast, 
the octopus should not transport the den into the Safe compartment because in this 
location an unmovable shelter is available and predators were never encountered. The 
expected performance would be consistent with the hypothesis that octopus can plan 
for the future and demonstrate that the carrying of dens is a behaviour that can be 
flexibly adjusted according to future needs. Importantly, the transport of the movable 
dens into the Dangerous compartment may represent the expression of prospection 
because i) the behaviour provides no benefit while it is performed, but only after it has 
been completed, ii) octopuses were not trained to exhibit the behaviour prior to the test. 
However, if octopuses will be capable to solve the task, follow-up studies should be 
conducted to exclude the possibility that throughout the Experience phase the octopus 
could have developed a negative association with the Dangerous compartment (e.g. stress 
caused by lack of shelter), and consequently it may have carried the movable dens in this 
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6.4.3: SOCIAL COGNITION 
 
Octopuses are most often described as solitary animals exhibiting weak social tolerance 
and cannibalistic attitudes (Hanlon and Messenger, 2018; Ibáñez and Keyl, 2010; Schnell 
and Clayton, 2019), thereby one may not expect them to have evolved complex and 
flexible social cognition. However, a number of studies have reported populations living 
in high densities in the wild (Guerra et al., 2014; Hanlon and Messenger, 2018; Scheel et 
al., 2016, 2017), thus challenging the idea that octopus may rarely encounter 
conspecifics and face social problems (e.g. competition over shelters). Experimental 
evidence also suggest that octopus may learn vicariously (Fiorito and Scotto, 1992), 
individually recognize conspecifics (Tricarico et al., 2011), and maintain social 
hierarchies in artificial settings (Cigliano, 1993). Further, the apparent cooperative 
hunting with fish (Unsworth and Cullen-Unsworth, 2012; Vail et al., 2013) may 
represent an additional scenario in which flexible cognition is required to interact with 
another individual, namely a heterospecific. Here I present two novel protocols to 
explore octopuses’ social cognition in a competitive (Experiment 6.4) and a cooperative 
context (Experiment 6.5). Building on Hare et al. (2000)’s study in chimpanzees, 
Experiment 6.4 investigates whether octopuses can maximize individual benefit by 
responding to the visual perspective of a competitor. Experiment 6.5 relies on a novel 
paradigm in which two octopuses are presented with hidden rewards that can only be 








The testing tank is divided into three areas: a narrow central area delimited by two clear 
Perspex walls, and two large adjacent compartments, in which two octopuses are 
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individually housed (Fig. 6.6). A den is available in each compartment. Food rewards 
(e.g. pieces of anchovy) are presented in the central area. The bait is attached to a plastic 
ball which is fixed to one end of a rod (Fiorito and Scotto, 1992), therefore being easily 
manoeuvrable. Octopuses can reach the food rewards through holes (spaced 20 cm) in 
the Perspex walls. Importantly, the experimenter can manipulate whether the bait is 
visible or not visible to the octopuses by adjusting the orientation of the ball. 
Specifically, the ball can be oriented such that the bait faces one octopus, thus being not 
visible to the other octopus; alternatively the rod can be spun 90°, thus resulting in the 




Figure 6.6: Schematic representation of the set-up of Experiment 6.4. Two clear Perspex panels divide 
the experimental tank in two compartments where octopuses are housed individually and one central area 
where baits (yellow square) are presented. The bait is attached to a plastic ball (red circles) at the end of a 
rod (white line). The rod has a handle (black square). The ball can be oriented so that the bait is visible to 
both octopuses, i.e. the bait faces the other ball (upper bait). Alternatively (lower bait), the ball can be 
oriented so that the bait faces the subordinate octopus (white) and therefore it is only visible to the 
subordinate but not to the dominant octopus (grey). Octopuses can acquire the baits through the holes in 
the Perspex panels. 
 
 
Protocol and Predictions 
Familiarization:  This phase is conducted to allow the octopus to 
gain familiarity with the set-up and learn that it can acquire food rewards attached to the 
plastic balls. One octopus is moved into the experimental tank and given 15 minutes to 
acclimatize before the start of the testing. In each trial, two balls are presented in the 
central area. The balls are oriented so that the baits are visible to the octopus. After the 
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animal has reached the baits through the holes in the Perspex wall, the balls are 
removed. Sessions of ten trials are conducted. The octopus proceeds to the next stage 
after successfully getting the bait in five consecutive trials. 
Test:   The Test aims at investigating whether, when presented with two 
identical food rewards, subordinate octopuses take into account the visual perspective 
of a dominant conspecific, thereby choosing preferentially the reward that cannot be 
seen by the competitor. Trials involve an Acclimatization phase followed by a Testing 
phase. At the start of the Acclimatization, two octopuses are moved into the 
experimental tank and individually housed in the two compartments. At this stage, an 
opaque Perspex panel is positioned into the central area to temporarily prevent visual 
interaction between the two octopuses. Octopuses can acclimatize to the new tank for 
15 minutes. Next, the opaque panel is removed. For 15 minutes, social interactions (e.g. 
agonistic/avoidance behaviours) are observed to establish the dominance relationship 
between the individuals. In case of limited or no interactions (e.g. if octopuses remain in 
their dens), a live crab may be presented in the central area to induce the octopuses to 
move close to the central area. Octopuses cannot seize the prey: the crab (attached to a 
cotton line) is promptly removed from the tank before an octopus can grab it. Next, the 
Testing phase starts. An additional clear Perspex wall is introduced in the compartment 
housing the dominant octopus to temporarily prevent it from reaching into the central 
area. When both octopuses are in a standardized position (i.e. at their dens), two baited 
balls are presented simultaneously inside the central area, in correspondence of the holes 
in the Perspex walls. Octopuses have to choose which bait to grab because the baits are 
spaced too far apart to be grabbed together at the same time. The subordinate octopus 
is given a head start: after it has left the den and is in proximity (e.g. 10 cm) of the 
central area, the additional wall is removed so that the dominant octopus can also reach 
the baits. The trial ends when both baits are taken by the octopuses and the two balls 
are subsequently removed from the tank. Pairs of octopuses receive sessions of ten trials, 
with an inter-trial-interval of 2 minutes. 
Octopuses are tested in two conditions. In the Visible-Visible condition, the balls 
are oriented so that the two baits are visible to both octopuses. In the Visible-Non visible 
condition, the balls are oriented so that one bait is visible to both octopuses but the 
other bait is visible only to the subordinate (Fig. 6.6). Within each session, octopuses 
receive five trials of each condition in a pseudorandomized order, i.e. the same 
condition is not performed for more than two consecutive trials. In Visible-Non visible 
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trials the relative position of the two balls (i.e. left/right) is randomized. The bait 
selected by the subordinate octopus is scored in each trial. 
If octopuses can respond to the visual perspective of conspecifics, subordinate 
octopuses should prefer the bait that cannot be seen by the dominant in the Visible-Non 




i) Can octopuses solve a problem solving task cooperatively? 
 
Set-up 
The experimental tank comprises two individual compartments divided by a clear 
Perspex wall (Fig. 6.7). The wall allows the housing of the apparatus in between the two 
compartments. The apparatus consists of a rectangular flat box made of clear Perspex. 
The box has two crevices in the ceiling, at the opposite sides of the box. One live crab is 
hidden in each of the crevices. A weight (e.g. a brick) is placed on the top of the 
apparatus to cover the opening of the crevices. To gain access to the crab, the octopus 
must displace the weight and insert the arms inside the crevice. The weight can be 
displaced in different directions: the octopus can drag the weight sideways, push it back 




Figure 6.7: Schematic representation of the set-up of Experiment 6.5. A clear Perspex wall divides the 
experimental tank in two individual compartments. The apparatus consists of a flat clear box (grey 




Protocol and Predictions 
Familiarization:  A Familiarization is conducted to allow the 
octopus to learn the basic requirement of the task, i.e. to displace the weight to gain 
access to the prey. In this phase, octopuses are tested individually in the experimental 
tank. After 15 minutes of acclimatization, the octopus is presented with the apparatus. 
Only one crevice is baited. The weight is light enough to be removed by a single 
octopus. The octopus proceeds to the test after five consecutive successful trials. 
Test:  The Test aims at investigating whether octopus can solve a 
foraging task cooperatively. In the test, two octopuses are individually housed in the two 
compartments. The animals are allowed to acclimatize to the experimental tank and the 
sight of the conspecific for 15 minutes. Octopuses cannot interact physically because an 
additional clear wall (with no space for housing the apparatus) is positioned in between 
the two compartments. Next, this additional wall is removed and the apparatus is 
presented. Both crevices are baited, i.e. each octopus has the opportunity to gain access 
to one crab. The weight covering the crevices is as heavy as is required for two 
octopuses to displace it together. To solve the task, octopuses have to synchronize their 
actions, either through the same strategy (e.g. sliding the brick toward left) or 
complementary strategies (i.e. one octopus pulls and the other pushes the weight 
simultaneously). Each pair of octopuses receives a single trial per day. If two octopuses 
cannot solve the task in five consecutive trials, the individuals are assigned to a different 
pair. Positive results in the Test would show that, despite being solitary creatures, 





In this Chapter I focused on the second objective of my thesis, namely the attempt to 
lay theoretical and methodological groundwork for the study of convergence cognitive 
evolution between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates, such as the corvids I 
focussed on in Chapters 2 to 5. Following a review of the most striking evidence of 
behavioural complexity in cephalopods, I proposed that current evidence may be 
sufficient to hypothesize a first-level convergence (i.e. behavioural convergence) among 
these groups. Subsequently, I discussed cephalopods’ cognitive evolution in relation to 
the main hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence in vertebrates and suggested that 
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ecological factors (i.e. predatory and foraging pressures) may have played a key role in 
the emergence of cognitive sophistication together with fast life history. Finally, I 
presented a number of novel paradigms that can be used in the future to investigate 
cognitive complexity in the octopus, and thus to explore whether cephalopods’ 
convergence with vertebrates may extend to a deeper level of analysis. 
In the final Chapter of this thesis, I discuss the implication of my empirical 
findings in the Eurasian jays and theoretical considerations regarding cephalopods. I 
conclude by evaluating future steps in the study of convergent cognitive evolution in 
corvids and cephalopods. 
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The general aim of this thesis was to gain further insights into the process of convergent 
cognitive evolution: the independent emergence of comparable cognitive sophistication 
in distantly related lineages. To this end, I decided to focus on corvids and cephalopods, 
two lineages that evolved complex and flexible behavioural repertoires despite the fact 
that their evolutionary histories and brain structures differ dramatically from those of 
the most established model group for the study of intelligence, namely primates (Emery 
and Clayton, 2004; Mather and Dickel, 2017; Schnell and Clayton, 2019; Seed et al., 
2009a). As discussed in Chapter 1, the study of cognitive convergence is a challenging 
task because i) cognition can only be measured through proxies, ii) intelligence (or 
complex cognition) is not clearly defined, and iii) the principle of convergence is elusive: 
a trait exhibited in different groups can be said to be convergent or divergent depending 
on the level at which the trait is analysed. In this thesis I have adopted Seed (2007)’s 
hierarchical framework to investigate cognitive convergence. According to the author, at 
the first and more superficial level, convergence (i.e. behavioural convergence) can be 
hypothesized if two lineages exhibit behaviours that seem comparable complex and 
flexible. At the second level of analysis, cognitive convergence between two groups can 
be invoked when their behavioural flexibility is not underpinned by hardwired 
predispositions or simple learning processes. Finally, at the third and deeper level, 
cognitive convergence occurs when similar cognitive mechanisms underlie behavioural 
flexibility in distantly related groups.  
In the introduction of this thesis (Chapter 1) I have considered at which level of 
Seed (2007)’s framework the currently available evidence supports a case of convergent 
cognitive evolution between corvids and apes, as well as between cephalopods and 
large-brained vertebrates. With regard to the former case, I argued that current evidence 
is consistent with a second-level convergence, yet not sufficient to support a third-level 
convergence. In particular, I contended that the currently available evidence limits the 
proper evaluation of Emery and Clayton (2004)’s proposition, namely that corvids may 
share with apes a flexible and domain-general cognitive tool kit. This is because, in 
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contrast to apes, evidence of cognitive sophistication within the same species of corvids is 
limited. Consequently, it is not possible to distinguish whether the cognitive complexity 
reported at the level of the corvid family results from complementary cognitive 
specializations in different species/subgroups or from a domain general cognitive tool-
kit shared by individual species of the corvid family as hypothesized by Emery and 
Clayton (2004; cf. Seed 2007). With regard to the latter case, I highlighted that a proper 
assessment of cognitive convergence between cephalopods and large-brained 
vertebrates is currently problematic because cephalopods’ cognitive sophistication is still 
largely untested, and the process (e.g. evolutionary pressures) selecting for large brain 
and flexible behaviour in cephalopods has been largely overlooked. Building on these 
considerations, the present thesis was guided by two objectives. The first objective was 
to take one step further in understanding how deep the cognitive convergence between 
corvids and apes may be. The second objective was to investigate the potentials of 
cephalopods as a novel model group for the study of convergent cognitive evolution.  
In what follows, I will summarize the outcomes of each chapter and discuss the 
implications of my findings, relating back to the two objectives of my thesis. Finally, I 
will provide inputs for future research. Following the general structure of the thesis, I 
will first discuss the research on corvids and then that on cephalopods. 
 
 
7.1:  CORVIDS 
 
7.1.1: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
To address my first objective, in Chapters 2 to 5 I investigated three cornerstones of 
cognitive sophistication – physical problem solving, future planning and social cognition 
– in the Eurasian jay (Tab. 7.1), in an attempt to investigate whether the hypothesis that 
corvids are endowed with a flexible and domain general cognitive tool-kit (Emery and 
Clayton, 2004) is supported in this species. 
In Chapter 2, I focused on tool use behaviour, perhaps the most iconic 
expression of physical problem solving. Building on previous research on rooks (Bird 
and Emery, 2009), I employed two object-dropping tasks – requiring the bird to insert a 
tool (e.g. stone) into a vertical tube to acquire a reward – to test whether these jays can 
select functional tools according to two physical properties, namely size (Experiment 
2.1) and shape (Experiment 2.2). Additionally, I conducted a third experiment 
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(Experiment 2.3) aimed at exploring jays’ capability of using novel tools (sticks) to solve 
a task involving a familiar apparatus. Consistently across the two selectivity tests, I 
found that jays could not spontaneously adjust their selection according to the 
functionality of the tools. In Experiment 2.1, jays initially preferred large stones as tools, 
regardless of whether these objects could fit or could not fit into the apparatus. 
However, jays progressively developed a preference for the small tool, which was 
functional in all trials, thus supporting a previous finding that these corvids can learn to 
choose functional tools on the basis of density (Cheke et al., 2011). In Experiment 2.2, 
jays exhibited a preference for long stones (over round stones) but tended to achieve the 
correct manipulation only when required, i.e. they oriented vertically the long stone 
when this was necessary for the tool to fit into the apparatus. Most often however, the 
correct orientation of the long stone was achieved after a few unsuccessful attempts of 
insertion, so that it is likely that this performance may have resulted from trial-and-error, 
in the lack of a full understanding of the objects’ properties and functionality. In 
Experiment 2.3, jays were able to use sticks and adopt a novel technique on the same 
object-dropping apparatus, thus providing the first evidence that Eurasian jays can use 
sticks as tools. Taken together, the results of these experiments may suggest that 
Eurasian jays are endowed with limited tool selectivity abilities but that they can 
nonetheless use different kinds of tools to achieve the same goal, thus indicating some 
degree of cognitive flexibility. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Contribution of the present thesis to the state of art of Eurasian jays’ cognitive complexity in 
physical problem solving, future planning and social cognition. The ‘Reliability’ column outlines whether a 
given effect was corroborated by subsequent studies (✓), is supported by a single study (no sign), or was 
not supported by subsequent studies (✗). 
 
  
Tab Chp7 Domain Reported Effects Reliability References
Physical    Learn to use tools (object dropping tasks) through training ✓ Cheke et al. 2011; Miller et al. 2016; Chapter 2
Problem    Learn to select functional tool based on density Cheke et al. 2011
Solving    Learn to select functional tool based on size and shape Chapter 2
   Solve a familiar task through novel tools (sticks) and alterntive strategies Chapter 2
Future    Distribute caches to maximize future benefit, in line with planning abilities ✗ Checke and Clayton 2012, but see Chapter 3
Planning    No evidence that Ej' future-oriented caching is underpinned by either Chapter 3
   predisposition or prospection abilities
   Protect caches by responding to the visual perspective  of a conspecific ✗ Legg and Clayton 2014; but see Chapter 4 and 5 
Social    Protect caches by responding to the acoustic perspective of a conspecific Shaw and Clayton 2013
Cognition    Protect caches by responding to the current desire of a conspecific ✗ Ostojic et al. 2017; but see Chapters 4, 5, Crosby 2019
   Adjust food sharing by responding to the current desire of the pair mate ✓ Ostojic et al. 2013, 2014, 2016
   No evidence that Ej can integrate cues about others’ desires and Chapter 4
   perspectives to protect their caches
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In Chapter 3, I turned my attention to a second cornerstone of cognitive sophistication, 
namely future planning abilities. Previous research indicated that jays adapt their caching 
behaviour according to future needs. Specifically: i) de Kort et al. (2007) showed that 
California scrub-jays can learn where not to cache when they are provided with one tray 
in which caches are always pilfered and another tray in which caches are always 
returned; ii) Raby et al. (2007) found that scrub-jays tend to cache more in locations 
where food will be absent on the next morning or preferentially cache a specific type of 
food (relatively to another type of food) in a location where that food will not be 
available on the next morning; iii) Correia et al. (2007) and Cheke and Clayton (2012) 
reported that scrub-jays and Eurasian jays select what food to cache according to their 
motivational state at the time of recovery, as opposed to their motivational state at the 
time of caching. Although being consistent with prospection abilities (Future Planning 
Hypothesis), this evidence could equally be interpreted through alternative explanations. 
In particular, the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis – which specifically challenges jays’ 
apparent future planning behaviour in Raby et al. (2007)’s study – suggests that jays may 
‘have a propensity to cache a particular food type in a given location that differs from 
the foods that have been previously associated with that location, a strategy that would 
provide more uniform distribution of resources’ (Shettleworth personal comm., as cited 
in Dickinson, 2011, page 90; see also Chapter 3 for more details). In Chapter 3 I 
reported a novel paradigm aimed at disambiguating whether jays’ apparent caching for 
the future is underpinned by future panning abilities or by a natural predisposition to 
allocate caches evenly among different locations. Consistently across two experiments, 
jays did not cache as predicted by either hypotheses, thereby questioning both cognitive 
mechanisms proposed to account for jays’ caching for the future. 
In Chapter 4, I continued my multifaceted investigation of cognition in the 
Eurasian jay by focusing on the social domain. Building on previous reports that these 
jays can adjust their caching behaviour by responding to the visual perspective (Legg 
and Clayton, 2014) and current desire (Ostojić et al., 2017) of a competitor, I conducted 
two experiments aimed at testing whether the jays could respond to both social cues 
simultaneously to most effectively protect their caches. In Experiment 4.1, the jays 
could cache only one type of food – either the same food the observer was sated on or a 
different food – but could choose to distribute their caches across locations that were 
in-view and out-of-view for the observer. In Experiment 4.2, jays could hide food only 
in one location (either visible or not visible to the observer) but could choose between 
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two types of cacheable foods: one that was currently desired and one that was not 
currently desired by the observer. In both experiments, I found no evidence that 
Eurasian jays can limit the risk of cache loss by integrating cues correlating with the 
visual perspective and current desire of another agent. Crucially, jays’ performance was 
also inconsistent with previous literature: Eurasian jays did not employ cache protection 
strategies based on one of the two social cues alone. This result was surprising 
considering that in Experiment 4.2 and 4.3 I employed two paradigms that closely 
matched those used by Legg and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. (2017) and which 
showed, respectively, that Eurasian jays responded to others’ visual perspective and 
desire in the caching context.  
In Chapter 5, I therefore decided to further investigate this unexpected 
outcome by assessing the reliability of the two original effects, independently. To this 
end, Experiment 5.1 was a direct replication of Legg and Clayton (2014)’s study. In 
contrast with the original study but in line with the outcome of Experiments 4.1, I 
found no evidence that Eurasian jays prefer to cache behind an opaque barrier when a 
conspecific is present relatively than when a conspecific is not present. In Experiment 
5.2, I tested whether the inconsistencies between the results of Experiment 4.2 and 
Ostojić et al. (2017)’s study may have been caused by a minor difference in the set-up, 
namely the present/absence of a transparent barrier in proximity of caching tray. I 
found that jays’ caching pattern was not affected by the slightly different set-ups, and 
crucially again that jays did not adjust their caching pattern by taking into account the 
current desire of another bird, thus further corroborating the results of Experiment 4.2. 
Taken together, the experiments reported in Chapters 5 and 4 appear to challenge the 
reliability and robustness of previous literature on Eurasian jays’ social cognition. 
 
 
7.1.2: IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Overall, the four empirical studies reported in this thesis allow limited conclusions 
about whether the Eurasian jay is endowed with a flexible and domain general cognitive 
tool-kit. Consequently, my findings cannot support Emery and Clayton (2004)’s 
hypothesis that cognitive convergence between corvids and apes may extent to the third 
and deeper level of analysis (Seed, 2007). 
With regard to physical problem solving, Experiment 2.3 demonstrated that 
Eurasian jays – as rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009) and New Caledonian crows (e.g. 
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Auersperg et al., 2011) – are capable of solving a task with a familiar apparatus by using 
objects that they were not previously trained to use as tools, namely sticks. The 
performances of the jays in the experiment also showed that they could employ an 
alternative strategy to solve the task. When provided with sticks, jays could collapse the 
internal platform of the apparatus by actively pushing the tool against it, a behaviour 
that differed from the one they had learned in the training, i.e. simply dropping a tool 
into the apparatus. Therefore, it seems likely that physical problem solving in the 
Eurasian jays may be underpinned by some degree of cognitive flexibility. On the other 
hand, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 tentatively suggests that the tool selectivity abilities of the 
Eurasian jay may be less developed that those of fellow corvids, most notably the rook 
(Bird and Emery, 2009) and the New Caledonian crow (Chappell and Kacelnik, 2002; 
Jelbert et al., 2019; Knaebe et al., 2017), although a number of arguments impose this 
consideration to be taken with caution (see Chapter 2). Thus, when the outcomes of the 
three experiments reported in Chapter 2 are considered together, evidence cannot 
support the idea that Eurasian jays share comparable cognitive sophistication in the 
physical domain with members of the Corvus genus (e.g. rooks, New Caledonian crows). 
However, it will be crucial for future research to continue the investigation of physical 
problem solving in the Eurasian jay, particularly by presenting jays with paradigms that 
have been already used in other corvids. For instance, it will be extremely interesting to 
test whether, as rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009), Eurasian jays could modify objects (e.g. 
remove side branches from twigs) or shape raw materials (e.g. craft hook from straight 
wire) to obtain functional tools. This approach will ultimately allow a deeper 
understanding of the physical cognition of these jays, as well as fostering insights into 
whether the remarkable problem solving ability reported in the Corvus genus is a 
cognitive specialization of this group or rather a feature widely spread within the corvid 
family.  
With regard to future planning and social cognition abilities, the findings 
reported in Chapters 3 to 5 limit solid conclusions on the cognitive flexibility of the 
Eurasian jay in these domains; yet, these findings appear to challenge previous literature. 
This is because jays’ performance in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 was not consistent with 
either of the two cognitive mechanisms that have been proposed to possibly underpin 
jays’ caching for the future. In contrast, both alternative scenarios – i.e. data in line with 
either the Future Planning or the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis – would have 
represented a significant contribution to our understanding of the apparent prospection 
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cognition in these jays. In a similar vein, Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 not only provided no 
indications that Eurasian jays can integrate another’s visual perspective and current 
desire to limit cache loss but – together with the findings reported in Chapter 5 – also 
questioned jays’ ability to respond to one of the two social cues independently, as 
reported by Legg and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. (2017). 
In the discussion sections of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I put forward a number of 
thoughts that may help to interpret the negative finding of each study, and considered 
next steps for future research. In what follows, I will attempt to convey a more broad 
and systemic discussion about why three out of four of the empirical studies I 
conducted may have yielded outcomes inconsistent with previous literature. 
In recent years, science has faced a ‘replication crisis’ (Baker, 2016). A number 
of studies across fields have attempted at replicating published results, finding that only 
a small proportion of the original effects could be replicated (e.g. medicine, Prinz et al., 
2011; behavioural economics, Camerer et al., 2016; genetics, Munafò, 2009; 
neuroscience, Button et al., 2013). Psychology appears to be particularly challenged by 
the current crisis (Braver et al., 2014; Maxwell et al., 2015; Shrout and Rodgers, 2018). 
For instance, over 100 published studies in psychology, only in the 39% of cases results 
could be considered as successful replications (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 
Science hinges on confirming evidence by replicating previous findings, so that this 
unexpected scenario is posing a serious challenge to the very credibility of research. In 
other words, the replication crisis is forcing scientists to ask themselves: how much of 
what we think to know is actually true? Further, how could science have produced such 
a large body of apparently unreliable lines of evidence? In the attempt of addressing 
these questions, a number of issues have been proposed as the factors that may have 
participated in producing high rates of spurious results. Some of these issues are 
systemic and apply to all scientific disciplines, for instance, unconscious biases of 
researchers (e.g. confirmation bias), journals’ bias towards publishing positive results 
over negative findings, questionable research practice (e.g. p-hacking, stop data 
collection on the basis of interim analyses), ‘blind’ reliance and misuse of the null-
hypothesis testing approach (Farrar and Clayton, 2019; Farrar and Ostojić, 2019; 
Ioannidis, 2005; Stevens, 2017). In addition, other issues can exacerbate the proportion 
of false positives in certain fields (Ioannidis, 2005). With regard to comparative 
cognition, a number of factors are likely to make this field particularly susceptible to 
false positive discoveries and in parallel, resilient at recognizing such spurious results 
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through replication studies. First, the typical small sample sizes employed in 
comparative cognition increase the risk of false positives (Ioannidis, 2005) and decrease 
the chance of replicating previously reported effects (Stevens, 2017) due to 
underpowered statistical analyses. Second, similar effects are caused by a common focus 
on phenomena characterized by small effect size and noisy measurements, with the 
latter being, in some cases, aggravated by paradigms involving a single/few test trials 
and/or between-subjects designs (Farrar and Clayton, 2019; Farrar and Ostojić, 2019). 
Third, the repeated testing of the same individuals in multiple studies over years (or 
decades!) affects the replicability of findings because: i) it undermines the possibility of 
conducting truly independent replications; ii) specific experimental histories may alter 
individuals’ performance in subsequent studies, and impair the collections of consistent 
results among different laboratories; iii) aging may affect cognitive performance of 
individuals over time (Farrar and Clayton, 2019; Farrar and Ostojić, 2019; Stevens, 
2017). With this in mind, it is possible that the line of evidence constituting the 
theoretical and methodological foundations of this thesis may represent false positive 
findings. My future planning experiments (Chapter 3) built on two studies: Cheke and 
Clayton (2012)’s evidence that Eurasian jays cache according to future needs, and Raby 
et al. (2007)’s paradigm which inspired the design of Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 because it 
provided evidence in line with both the Future Planning and Compensatory Caching 
Hypotheses in California scrub-jays. My social cognition experiments (Chapter 4, 5) also 
stemmed from two previous studies, namely Legg and Clayton (2014) and Ostojić et al. 
(2017) that showed, respectively, that Eurasian jays respond to others’ visual perspective 
and desire in the caching context. These four studies bear some of the key issues 
fostering the chance of false positive findings in comparative cognition, such as small 
sample size, which range from n=4 in Cheke and Clayton (2012) to n=16 in Ostojić et 
al. (2017), and protocols involving only a single/few test trials. Further, no follow-up 
experiment that confirmed/contradicted the effects reported in these four studies – or 
the effectiveness of the paradigm in the case of Raby et al. (2007) – was published prior 
to this thesis. For instance, in contrast to the ability to attribute desires in the food-
sharing context which was detected in multiple studies (Ostojić et al., 2013, 2014, 2016), 
Ostojić et al. (2017)’s experiment represents the only evidence that Eurasian jays (or 
corvids in general) may be capable of taking into account the current desire of a 
competitor to protect their caches. Therefore, it is possible that some of these studies 
may have yielded spurious effects. Crucially however, the experiments I have conducted 
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are not exempt from similar concerns. For instance, having access to a limited number 
of Eurasian jays – as typical in comparative cognition – my studies were also 
characterized by limited sample sizes. The protocols employed were also constrained by 
the number of testing trials, most notably Experiment 3.1 and 3.2 – like Raby et al. 
(2007) – involved a single test trial, to prevent jays’ performance from being affected by 
learning process. Consequently, it cannot either be excluded that my data resulted in 
underpowered statistical analyses, which may have led to false negatives. Additionally, 
given that all individuals tested in Chapters 3 to 5 were born in 2006/8 and participated 
in a number of future planning and social cognition studies through their lives, it is also 
possible that their experimental histories or age may have fostered contrasting results in 
my studies and the previous literature (see also Chapter 5).  
Overall, these considerations cannot shed light on whether the inconsistencies 
between the studies I have conducted here and the previous literature are due to false 
positives in the former or in the latter case. However, the points raised above have 
fundamental implications for framing my findings into a wider picture and crucially, for 
recognizing objectives for future research. 
In my view, it is essential for comparative psychologists to consider taking one 
step sideways and attempt at evaluating the robustness and reliability of what has been 
envisioned as ‘established’ phenomena, before to rush toward the search of more 
complex and ground-breaking effects. With the regard to the study of convergent 
cognition in corvids, this approach could translate into a careful re-evaluation of the 
hypothesis of a second-level convergence through the systematic re-assessment of the 
evidence available. A series of tools can allow to attain this goal, including critical re-
analysis of reported effects (Farrar and Clayton, 2019), replications of published studies 
and simulations. Additionally, meta-analyses can also play a key role (Braver et al., 2014; 
Maxwell et al., 2015). For instance, recent meta-analyses of water displacement 
experiments in New Caledonian crows, rooks, Eurasian jays and California scrub-jays 
indicated that corvids’ performance in these studies may have been underpinned only by 
simple learning and/or initial predispositions, thus challenging the original 
interpretations that some level of causal understanding may have guided the birds’ 
behaviour (Ghirlanda and Lind, 2017; Hennefield et al., 2018).  
Ultimately, as corvids researchers, cognitive psychologists or simply scientists, 
we should embrace the idea that science is a slow and stepwise process. Without 
verifying the reliability of the evidence available we will take the risk that next generation 
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researchers may build their research questions on spurious effects, thereby forcing 





7.2.1: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
To address the second objective of my thesis, in Chapter 6 I endeavoured at laying 
theoretical and methodological groundwork for the study of cognitive convergence 
between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates. In the first part of the chapter I 
reviewed the most compelling instances of behavioural flexibility in octopus, cuttlefish 
and squid, and building on this, I proposed that current evidence may be sufficient to 
hypothesize a case of behavioural convergence (first-level convergence) among these 
groups. Subsequently, in the second part of the chapter, I discussed the process that 
may have led to the evolution of large brains and behavioural flexibility in cephalopods. 
I suggested that a first key step in this process may have occurred together with the 
modification of the protective shell into a buoyance device; yet the major cognitive leap 
may have followed the internalization/loss of the shell in the ancestors of coleoids. This 
is because the disappearance of the external shells may have produced a dramatic 
increase in unavoidable mortality and facilitated widespread colonization of complex 
niches, thus in turn selecting fast life histories and driving cephalopods to cope with 
novel challenges. Cephalopods’ cognitive sophistication might have emerged primarily 
in response to predation and complex feeding contexts but social challenges, particularly 
during mating, might have acted as additional selective pressures. Finally, in the last part 
of the chapter, I described novel paradigms that could allow to explore cognitive 
convergence between cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates at a deeper level by 
providing baseline data of the cognitive flexibility of the octopus in the physical, 
prospection and social domains.  
 
7.2.2: IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
My analysis tentatively suggests that cephalopods and large-brained vertebrates may 
have evolved cognitive sophistication through a partially different process, namely in 
response to different sets of evolutionary pressures and together with divergent life 
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histories. If supported by empirical evidence, this hypothesis will have fundamental 
implications for our understanding of the evolution of intelligence.  
With regard to the factors triggering the evolution of intelligence, evidence in 
primates, corvids and other groups of large-brained vertebrates indicates that 
challenging foraging niches (Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis, Rosati, 2017) and 
complex social environments (Social Intelligence Hypothesis, Byrne, 2018; Whiten, 
2018) are the key drivers (see also Chapters 1 and 6). Cephalopods may question this 
view (Amodio et al., 2019b, 2019a). On the one hand, the problems faced by 
cephalopods in finding and processing food appear comparable to those experienced by 
large-brained vertebrates (e.g. reliance on extractive foraging, ephemeral resources, 
generalist diets), thus indicating that the complexity of foraging niches may have 
participated in selecting for higher cognitive power also in these molluscs. On the other 
hand, cephalopods are not known for engaging in complex and enduring social bods 
(Boal, 1996; Hanlon and Messenger, 2018; Schnell and Clayton, 2019), so that the Social 
Intelligence Hypothesis may not be applicable to this group. Yet alternative selective 
pressures may have participated in shaping cognitive evolution in cephalopods. In 
particular, I proposed that high predatory pressures – resulting from the disappearance 
of the external shell – may have represented a major drive in cephalopods cognitive 
evolution, thus extending the classic view of this factor as a trigger for sophisticated 
behavioural and physiological adaptations (e.g. dynamic skins; Hanlon and Messenger, 
2018; Packard, 1972). Empirical support for the hypothesis that intelligence may evolve 
as a cognitive adaptation to cope with the challenges of predator–prey interactions has 
been found in fish (van der Bijl et al., 2015; van der Bijl and Kolm, 2016), carnivores 
and herbivores (Jerison, 1973; Köhler and Moyà-Solà, 2004). Further, from the opposite 
perspective, the recent finding that morphological defence structures (e.g. spines in 
hedgehogs, dermal plates in armadillos) co-evolved with reduced encephalization 
quotients in mammals provides additional support to this hypothesis because it 
corroborates the idea that effective anti-predator adaptations may relax the cognitive 
challenges posed by predators (Stankowich and Romero, 2017). 
I also hypothesized that cognitive sophistication may also have emerged in 
response to challenging reproductive scenarios: cephalopods need to employ flexible 
mating strategies to reduce the risk of being cannibalized and to maximize their 
reproductive efforts within a single, short interval (see also Schnell and Clayton, 2019). 
In other words, a different kind of social problems may have shaped cognitive evolution 
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in cephalopods, relatively to primates, in which the challenges of competing and 
cooperating with multiple groups members are considered the key social driver (Dunbar, 
1992; Dunbar and Shultz, 2007; Kudo and Dunbar, 2001), or corvids, in which the need 
to maintaining a life-long monogamous bond with their mate may have played an 
equivalent role (Emery et al., 2007). A recent study in Squamata (lizards and snakes) 
supports the idea that different factors may account for variability in cognitive 
sophistication among different group. De Meester et al. (2019) found no correlation 
between that brain size and either habitat or social complexity within Squamata, thus 
raising the possibility that alternative pressures may account for the variability in 
cognitive complexity among lizards and snakes. 
With regard to the co-evolution of intelligence and slow life history, evidence 
from birds and mammals consistently support the existence of tight link between these 
factors (Gonzales-Lagos et al., 2010; Minias and Podlaszczuk, 2017; Street et al., 2017; 
Wirthlin et al., 2018). Yet, given their fast life histories, cephalopods pose a challenge to 
the idea that intelligence must coevolve with slow life history, thereby questioning the 
hypotheses that a slow development is necessary to overcome the costs of a large brain 
and/or a consequence of the reduced extrinsic mortality resulting from enhanced 
cognition (Barton and Capellini, 2011; Sol, 2009a). Interestingly, a recent simulation 
study showed that short life spans can select for cognitive complexity (i.e. learning 
speed), thus providing preliminary support to this view (Liedtke and Fromhage, 2019).  
Cephalopods’ cognitive evolution may inspire new angles in the study of large-
brained vertebrates. For instance, the role played by predation in the evolution of 
intelligence has been discussed in primates (Byrne and Bates, 2007; Zuberbühler and 
Jenny, 2002), yet it received substantially less attention in this group or in other large-
brained vertebrates. In this thesis I have hypothesized that predation risk may have 
acted as key trigger for the emergence of complex sophistication in cephalopods. It is 
possible that this factor may also have had a significant impact on the evolution of 
large-brained vertebrates, both directly and indirectly (van der Bijl and Kolm, 2016). 
Dunbar and Schultz (Dunbar and Shultz, 2017), suggest that predation was the main 
driver for group size in primates. Larger groups then created a demand for enhanced 
cognitive complexity to cope with the more challenging social environment, thus 
favouring ecological intelligence to meet the energetic demands of larger brains. If this 
was the case then in contrast to cephalopods, predation might have represented an 
indirect driver for the emergence of intelligence at the initial stage. In addition to group 
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living, other anti-predator adaptations such as arboreality, large body size and flight 
might have reduced extrinsic mortality in apes, cetaceans, elephants, corvids, and parrots 
(Healy et al., 2014), thus favouring the co-evolution of slow life histories and 
intelligence. Subsequently, key features of slow life histories, such as high investment in 
a limited number of offspring and long periods of dependency might have resulted in 
higher demands for cognitively complex anti-predator strategies. Since young dependent 
offspring are subject to higher predation rates (Connor, 2007; e.g. due to weaker motor 
coordination, smaller size, less experience) than adults, there might be strong selection 
pressure on the parents’ intelligence to protect offspring from predators. Such selection 
pressure can explain, for instance, the emergence of complex group coordination in 
cetaceans to fight against predatory assaults on calves (Connor, 2007). Thus, at a later 
stage, predation on offspring might have acted as direct pressure for the evolution of 
intelligence in large-brained vertebrates. If so, predation might have favoured the 
evolution of both cognitive (e.g. intelligence) and non-cognitive (e.g. life history) 
adaptations in large-brained vertebrates and in cephalopods - albeit through different 
evolutionary pathways. It must also be noted that adult apes, cetaceans, corvids, and 
parrots are not exempt from lethal aggression from predators. Thus, it cannot be 
excluded that predatory pressures in adulthood also participate in shaping their 
cognition. Supporting this idea, complex communication systems allowing the signalling 
of distinct kinds of predators have evolved in arboreal primates (Seyfarth et al., 1980). 
Furthermore, it has been recently shown that crows can identify new predators 
according to their proximity to dead conspecifics (Swift and Marzluff, 2015) and other 
corvids avoid areas in which a dead conspecific was spotted and actively share this 
information with other individuals (Iglesias et al., 2012). Hence, it is possible that 
predation risk on adults might also have participated in selecting intelligence in large-
brained vertebrates. Future research may investigate whether predatory pressure acted 
only as an indirect trigger, for instance, by favouring the arising of novel socio-
ecological challenges, or whether it also played a direct role in selecting for enhanced 
intelligence. Furthermore, it may also be interesting to test the cognitive underpinnings 
of antipredatory strategies in large-brained vertebrates, particularly those involving the 
defence of offspring. 
All things considered, cephalopods’ cognitive evolution has the potential to 
impose a reappraisal of the factors fostering the emergence of intelligence, thereby 
raising the possibility that cognitive sophistication is not constrained to a single 
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evolutionary route. Therefore, the theoretical analysis reported in Chapter 6 together 
with the points raised above strongly support the notion that cephalopods as a 
promising novel model group for the study of convergence cognitive evolution.  
Nonetheless, further research will be essential to widen our understanding of the 
cognitive evolution of this groups. In particular, there are two fundamental approaches 
that should be pursued. On the one hand, correlational analyses should be conducted to 
test the relative influence ecological, predatory, and social pressures in the evolution of 
cephalopods’ cognition. For instance, morphological and behavioural proxies for 
intelligence could be measured in species that are subject to different levels of predation 
(e.g., density and number of predator species) in order to investigate the influence of 
predation in the evolution of intelligence. Given the remarkably large geographic range 
of some species (e.g. common octopus, Jerep et al., 2014), correlational analyses could 
also focus on within-species differences, an approach recently employed in birds 
(Ashton et al., 2018). On the other hand, it will be equally important to pursue a parallel 
line of research aimed at assessing the cognitive underpinning cephalopods’ behavioural 
flexibility. This approach will ultimately lead to gain insight into whether cephalopods 
can perform cognitive process more complex than hardwired predispositions and 
simple learning, and thus to evaluate the hypothesis of a second-level convergence 
between these molluscs and large-brained vertebrates. 
Testing cephalopods’ cognition will pose challenges. For instance, tasks and 
apparatuses devised for primates or birds are unlikely to be directly applicable to 
cephalopods, due to the dramatic difference in in morphology and perception. 
Consequently, researchers must dedicate efforts to modify or design tasks ad hoc for 
these animals. However, the use of cephalopods as a model may also carry benefits, 
such to relieve some of the endemic issues fuelling unreliable findings in comparative 
cognition. For instance, the long and repeated testing of the same individuals for 
multiple studies/years is not a concern for cephalopods research because of their short-
life spans. Further, cephalopods research can, in most cases, sustain larger sample size 
than equivalent research on primates, corvids, cetaceans, or elephants. Cephalopods 
laboratories typically acquire specimens from the wild and following data collection, 
euthanize or release them back into the sea, depending on the purpose of the study. It is 
therefore achievable for a single laboratory with limited housing facilities, to obtain 
sample size larger than the average for comparative cognition (e.g. tens of individuals) 
by testing multiple stocks of individuals in sequence. Such a strategy would not only 
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raise limited ethical concerns, but also keep the costs of husbandry low because for 




7.3: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Taken together, my empirical research in Eurasian jays challenges Emery and Clayton 
(2004)’s hypothesis that corvids evolved – convergently with apes – a flexible and 
domain-general cognitive tool kit. Although I showed that the Eurasian jay is capable of 
some level of flexibility in using tools, my results indicated limited tool selectivity 
abilities in this species and my findings in other domains were inconsistent with 
previous studies reporting sophisticated abilities in planning for the future and in 
solving social problems. The lack of consistency between previous literature and the 
present thesis may have resulted either from false positives in the former or false 
negatives in the latter. In parallel, my research on cephalopods strongly suggested that 
these molluscs are an intriguing new model group for studying convergent cognitive 
evolution, and laid theoretical and methodological groundwork for this purpose.  
Overall, the present thesis represented a step forward in understanding the 
cognitive evolution of corvids and cephalopods. However, future research will be 
essential to acquire deeper insights into this topic. With regards to corvids, I contended 
that a key goal will be to re-evaluate the hypothesis of a second-level convergence 
between these large-brained birds and apes. This could be achieved by using a 
multifaceted approach (e.g. replications, meta-analyses, simulations) to assess the 
reliability of the evidence in support of cognitive sophistication in corvids. 
With regards to cephalopods, the systematic investigation of complex cognition in 
different domains will be vital to test whether the behavioural convergence between 
these molluscs and large-brained vertebrates extends to cognitive similarities. Ultimately, 
a further focus on corvids and cephalopods can shed light on fundamental aspects of 
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Table A1: Individual jays data. Number in round brackets indicate an experiment in which the bird acted 
only as observer of the focal bird. Number in square brackets indicate an experiment in which the bird was 
either unable to complete testing or was excluded from the analysis based on pre-determined criteria. 
Note that Jerusalem was euthanized out of welfare reasons (unrelated to the testing) before the start of 





Colony Bird Sex Born Experiment
1 Caracas M May 2006 3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.2
1 Dublin M May 2006 [3.1]; [3.2]; [4.2]; 5.1; 5.2
1 Jerusalem F May 2006 3.1; 4.1; 4.2
1 Lima M May 2006 [3.1]; [3.2]; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.2
1 Lisbon M May 2006 3.1; 3.2; (4.1); [4.2]; 5.1; [5.2]
1 Quito F May 2006 3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.2
1 Rome F May 2006 [3.1]; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.2
1 Washington F May 2006 3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.2
1 Wellington F May 2006 3.1; 3.2; 4.1; 4.2; 5.1; 5.2
2 Hunter F May 2008 5.1
2 Adlington F May 2008 (5.1)
3 Chinook F May 2015 2.1a
3 Homer M May 2015 2.1; 2.2; 2.3
3 Jaylo F May 2015 2.1; 2.2; 2.3
3 Stuka F May 2015 2.1; 2.2; 2.3
























Table B1: Test data of Experiment 4.1. ‘Barrier Orientation’ denotes the orientation of the barrier within 
the cacher’s compartments: ‘out-in’ means that opaque arm of the T-barrier was facing the out-door 
aviary and the clear arm of the T-barrier was facing the door of the testing compartment; ‘in-out’ 
corresponds to the opposite orientation. The ‘Prefeeding’ columns denote the kind of food and the 
number of items taken out of the bowl by the observer bird in the prefeeding phase. ‘IV’ (in-view) and 
‘OV’(out-of-view) denote, the number of items cached in (or retrieved from) the tray placed behind the 
clear arm and the opaque arm of the T-barrier respectively. ‘P’ and ‘M’ refer to peanuts and Macadamia 







Orientation Trial Food Taken Food IV OV IV OV IV OV
1 M 6 M 8 8 1 0 0 0
2 P 6.5 M 4 0 4 n/a 0 n/a
1 P 11 P 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
2 M 2 P 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
1 Rep. P 10.5 P 0.5 0 0 n/a 0.5 n/a
1 Rep. M 0 P 0.5 0 0.5 n/a 0 n/a
1 M 6 P 5 1 0 0 1 0
2 P 7 P 0 1 n/a 0 n/a 0
1 P 13 P 3 0 2 n/a 0 n/a
2 M 1 P 6 1 5 0 0 0
1 P 0 M 6 4 0 0 0 0
2 M 4 M 5 6 0 0 0 0
1 M 1 P 13 17 0 0 0 0
2 P 0 P 0 7 n/a 0 n/a 0
1 P 10 M 3 8 0 0 0 0
































Table B2: Test data of Experiment 4.2. The ‘Prefeeding’ columns denote the kind of food and the 
number of items taken out of the bowl by the observer bird in the prefeeding phase. The ‘Barrier’ column 
denotes the U-barrier used in the trial (clear, ‘C’; opaque, ‘O’). ‘P’ and ‘M’ refer to peanuts and Macadamia 
nuts respectively. Yellow cells denote the trials that were repeated because no item was cached. Note that 





Cacher Observer Trial Food Taken Barrier P M P M P M P M
1 M 2 C 27 12 22 9 0 0 0 0
2 P 2 C 31 1 28,5 1 0 0 0 0
3 M 1 O 29 0 24 0 0 na 0 na
4 P 1 O 10 0 8 0 0 na 0 na
1 M 1 O 2 1 1 0 1 na 0 na
2 P 1 O 0 2 0 1 na 0 na 0
3 M 3 C 3 4 1 1 1 1 0 0
4 P 2 C 1 6 0 4 na 2 na 0
1 P 14,5 C 6 8 1 2 0 0 0 0
2 M 2 C 12,5 0 3 0 0 na 1,5 na
3 P 7 O 9 12 0 1 na 1 na 0
4 M 1 O 11 0 0 0 na na na na
4 Rep. 1 M 1 O 10 10 0 0 na na na na
4 Rep.2 M 2 O 3 15 0 1 na 1 na na
1 P 4 O 1 4 1 2 0 0 0 0
2 M 3 O 1 16 1 15 0 0 0 0
3 P 5 C 5 2 5 1 0 0 0 0
4 M 2 C 3 3 3 1 0 0 0 0
1 M 6 C 8,5 14 1,5 6 1 1 0 0
2 P 6,5 C 13,5 1 0 0 na na na na
3 P 3 O 10 8 3 0 2 na 0 na
4 M 4 O 2 13 0 0 na na na na
2 Rep. P 1 C 11,5 2 2 0 2 na 0 na
4 Rep. M 2 O 15 10 3,5 0 2,5 na 0 na
1 P 11 O 6,5 8 0 4 na 2 na 0
2 M 5 O 3 8 0 5 na 1 na 1
3 M 5 C 5 4 1 2 1 2 0 0
4 P 7 C 2 8 0 3 na 0 na 0
1 M 3 O 0 1 0 0 na na na na
2 P 9 O 0 4 0 2 na 0 na 0
3 P 5 C 0 3 0 3 na 0 na 0
4 M 8 C 0 3 0 2 na 0 na 0



















Table B3: Test data of Experiment 5.1. ‘Barrier Orientation’ denotes the orientation of the barrier within 
the cacher’s compartments: ‘out-in’ means that opaque arm of the T-barrier was facing the out-door 
aviary and the clear arm of the T-barrier was facing the door of the testing compartment; ‘in-out’ 
corresponds to the opposite orientation. ‘IV’ (in-view) and ‘OV’(out-of-view) denote, the number of 
items cached in (or retrieved from) the tray placed behind the clear arm and the opaque arm of the T-
barrier respectively. ‘P’, ‘S’ and ‘D’ (‘Condition’ column) refer to the Private, Observed by Subordinate, and 
Observed by Dominant condition respectively. Yellow cells denote Dublin’s trial 2 which was repeated with a 
different individual as dominant observer, due to the unusual behaviour by the pre-planned observer, 




Bird Trial Condition Observer Barrier Orientation OV IV OV IV OV IV
1 P na out-in 2 2 0 0 0 0
2 S Washington out-in 3 2 0 0 0 0
3 S Washington in-out 0 4 na 0 na 0
4 P na in-out 3 5 0 0 0 0
1 D Caracas out-in 1 1 0 0 0 0
2 P na out-in 2 1 1 0 1 1
3 D Caracas in-out 1 1 1 0 0 0
4 P na in-out 2 3 0 0 0 0
1 D Caracas in-out 0 0 na na na na
2 P na in-out 0 0 na na na na
3 S Washington in-out 1 3 0 0 0 0
4 P na out-in 0 0 na na na na
5 D Caracas out-in 0 0 na na na na
6 S Washington out-in 10 7 0 0 0 0
1 P na in-out 0 1 na 0 na 0
2 S Washington in-out 1 2 0 0 0 0
3 D Caracas in-out 1 1 0 0 0 0
4 S Washington out-in 2 0 0 na 0 na
5 P na out-in 0 2 na 0 na 0
6 D Caracas out-in 1 0 0 na 0 na
1 S Quito out-in 0 0 na na na na
2 D Caracas out-in 0 0 na na na na
3 P na out-in 1 0 0 na 0 na
4 D Caracas in-out 0 0 na na na na
5 P na in-out 0 0 na na na na
6 S Quito in-out 0 2 na 0 na 0
1 D Lisbon out-in 0 0 na na na na
2 S Quito out-in 0 0 na na na na
3 P na out-in 1 2 0 0 1 2
4 S Quito in-out 0 0 na na na na
5 D Lisbon in-out 0 1 na 1 na 0
6 P na in-out 0 0 na na na na
1 P na in-out 2 4 0 0 1 1
2 D Rome in-out 0 0 na na na na
3 S Washington in-out 0 0 na na na na
4 S Washington out-in 0 0 na na na na
5 P na out-in 0 0 na na na na
6 D Caracas out-in 0 0 na na na na
2 Repl D Caracas in-out 0 0 na na na na
1 S Wellington in-out 11 11 1 11 0 0
2 D Caracas in-out 0 0 na na na na
3 P na in-out 3 13 0 12 0 0
4 P na out-in 0 0 na na na na
5 D Caracas out-in 0 0 na na na na
6 S Wellington out-in 0 0 na na na na
1 P na in-out 0 0 na na na na
2 S Adlington in-out 1 0 0 na na na
3 S Adlington out-in 0 0 na na na na














Table B3: Test data of Experiment 5.2. The ‘Prefeeding’ columns denote the kind of food and the 
number of items taken out of the bowl by the observer bird in the prefeeding phase. The ‘Barrier’ column 
denotes whether the clear U-barrier was used in the trial (Barrier, ‘B’) or no barrier was used in the trial 
(No barrier, ‘N’). ‘P’ and ‘M’ refer to peanuts and Macadamia nuts respectively. Yellow cells denote the 
trials that were repeated because no item was cached. Note that Lisbon consistently cached no item in 
trials 1-3 (blue cells), thereby this individual did not receive trial 4 (see Chapter 5 for details regarding the 




Cacher Observer Trial Food Taken Barrier P M P M P M P M
1 M 2 B 7 7 5 4 0 0 0 0
2 P 4 N 0 0 0 0 na na na na
3 M 2 N 7 2 4 1 0 0 0 0
4 P 3 N 2 14 1 5 0 0 0 0
2 Rep. P 5 B 4 9 2 7 0 0 0 0
1 P 14 B 0 16 0 1 na 0 na 0
2 M 20 B 0 12 0 0 na na na na
3 P 24 N 0 7 0 0 na na na na
4 M 20 N 0 13 0 1 na 1 na 0
2 Rep. 1 M 21 B 0 11 0 0 na na na na
3 Rep. P 19 N 2 13 1 2 1 2 0 0
2 Rep. 2 M 24 B 0 6 0 1 0 na 1 na
1 M 7 N 4 2 0 0 na na na na
2 P 17 N 0 4 0 0 na na na na
3 M 2 B 6 5 0 0 na na na na
1 P 17 N 4 0 2 0 1 na 1 na
2 M 9 N 18 0 10 0 2 na 0 na
3 P 8 B 14 1 4 0 2 na 1? na
4 M 3 B 13 0 4 0 3 na 0 na
1 M 3 B 11 26 9,5 26 0 2 0 0
2 P 2 B 20 10 16 9 0 0 0 0
3 M 4 N 7 36 6 32 0 0 0 0
4 P 1 N 6 28 3,5 26 0 0 0 0
1 P 4 B 0 11 0 9 na 0 na 0
2 M 12 B 0 6 0 5 na 0 na 0
3 P 5 N 0 7 0 6 na 0 na 0
4 M 6 N 0 7 0 6 na 0 na 0
1 M 0 N 20 12 7,5 0 5,5 na 1 na
2 P 14 N 12 13 0,5 7 0 5 0,5 0
3 M 0 B 12,5 12 1 9 0 1 0 0
4 P 5 B 14,5 17 0,5 8 0 6 0 0
1 P 21,5 N 4 6 0 3 na 0 na 1
2 M 11 N 4 7 2 6 1 2 0 0
3 P 21,5 B 2,5 9 1 5 0 2 0 0




















STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF  





To determine the factors that best explain the caching behaviour, the number of items 
"#$%  of food type (f) cached by bird (b) in compartment (c) were treated as random 
variables drawn from Multinomial distributions with 7 or 4 categories – 2 × 3 for each 
food–compartment combination in Experiment 3.1, and 3 for each compartment in 
Experiment 3.2, respectively, plus one for not caching anything – and a uniform prior 
over 25 to 55 caching trials in total. Given the 15 minutes duration of the whole test 
trial, 25 trials correspond to an average time of 36 seconds per caching trial and 55 trials 
corresponds to 16 seconds per trial, during which each bird may decide to not cache 
anything or cache one item of the two food types in one of the three compartments. 8 
and 6 different possibilities (models) were compared to set the rates &#$%  of the 
Multinomial distributions for Experiment 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Models with rates 
independent of the food type are characterized by equal rates &#$'% = &#$)%  for both 
food types, whereas in models with food type dependent rates both &#$'% and &#$)% are 
treated as independent parameters. Similarly, models with rates independent of the bird 
identity have equal rates for all birds &#'$% = &#)$%	+	⋯+	-./01  and models with rates 
independent of the compartment have equal rates for all 3 compartments &#$%' 	=
	&#$%) 	= 	 &#$%2 . Each model is characterised by the triple (food type dependence, bird 
identity dependence, compartment dependence), yielding 8 = 23 different models for 
experiment 3.1 and a triple (bird identity dependence, compartment dependence, 
condition dependence), yielding 6 = 23 – 2 different models for Experiment 3.2, where 
the subtraction of 2 is due to a between-group design regarding the condition of the 
bird, i.e. each bird was only tested on one condition. Uniform conjugate priors were 
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used for the Bayesian model comparison. More explicitly, it is assumed that the 
probability of observing the actual counts "#$% are given by: 
 










where colons indicate index ranges, e.g. "∶∷ 	=
	J"#'$'%', "#'$'%), "#'$'%2, "#'$)%',⋯ , "#L.$L0%L1M , where N# , N$  and N%  are the 
numbers of birds, food types and compartments, respectively. If the rates are 
independent of the food type, i.e. &#% 	= 	 &#$'% 	= 	⋯ 	= 	 &#$L0%  , it is possible to 































Note that h%N$&#% 	= 	h$%&#$% 	= 	1 . Equation 2 has the natural interpretation of a 
hierarchical data generation process: First, sample the number of cached items per birds 
and compartment h$"#$%  according to rates N$&#% , second, sample for each bird and 
compartment the different food types from a uniform multinomial distribution 




Extra care should be given to the case, where the rates are independent of the bird, e.g. 














where k	 = 	 Cl.01H.01E	!m01Cl.H.01E	! . Combining the rewritings of Equation 2 and Equation 3 
allows to treat all other cases. 
For the Bayesian model comparison, the posterior 3	("∶∷|nopqr) 	=
	∫ p&∶∷3("∶∷|&∶∷)	3(&∶∷|nopqr) is obtained by integrating out the parameters weighted 
by a flat Dirichlet prior 3(&∶∷|nopqr) with parameter a = 1. 
 
 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
In Experiment 3.1, the Bayesian model comparison revealed that a model in which the 
caching rate depends on the identity of the bird and the type of food but not on the 
compartment is supported by the data better than any model in which the caching rate 
depends on the compartment (Fig. C1). Therefore, the overall pattern of results do not 
provide support for either the Compensatory Caching Hypothesis or the Mental Time 
Travel Hypothesis. 
In Experiment 3.2, the Bayesian model comparison revealed that models with 
equal caching rates for all compartments have higher support than models with 







Figure C1: Bayesian model comparison. In Experiment 3.1 (top) the data is best explained by a model 
where the caching rate depends on the bird identity and the food type but not on the compartment, i.e. 
red crosshatch bar in the compartment independent group. In Experiment 3.2 (bottom), the data is best 
explained by a model where the caching rate depends on the bird identity but not on the compartment, i.e. 




In sum, across both experiments the model with the best fit to the data was dependent 
on the identity of the bird and, in Experiment 3.1, the type of food cached. This means 
that birds seem to have cached predominantly their preferred food across the different 































Figure 2: Individual caching patterns allow no conclusion. If a bird caches according
to hypothesis Planning 1, it will provision only for the next day, where it expects to be in
compartment K1 with food of type f2 available; thus it would cache food f1 in K1. If it also takes
into account subsequent days (hypothesis Planning 2), it will distribute the caches to complement
the food type it expects to find in the respective compartment. If the bird caches according to
some compartment specific preferences that are lowered by abundantly available food (hypothesis
Compensation), the bird caches less of food type f in compartments K, where it has previously
encountered many items of food type f . Only Lisbon shows a caching pattern consistent with
hypothesis Planning 2.












bird independent bird dependent food independent food dependent
Figure 3: Distributing caches uniformly among compartments explains data best. The
data is best explained by a model where the caching rate depends on the bird identity and the
food type but not on the compartment (red crosshatch bar at comp. independent).
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Figure 4: Individual caching patterns allow no conclusion. A bird in the FN group should
expect not to receive powdered food on test day 10. If it caches according to hypothesis Planning
FN 1, it will provision only for the next day, where it expects to be in compartment K1 with no
food available; thus it would cache exclusively in K1. If it takes into account the next three days
(hypothesis Planning FN 2), it will distribute the caches in compartment K1 and K2. If the
bird caches according to some compartment specific preferences that are lowered by abundantly
available food (hypothesis Compensation FN), the bird caches more in compartment K2, where
it has only once encountered the powdered food. For the NF group the predictions are interchanged.












bird independent bird dependent condition independent condition dependent
Figure 5: Distributing caches un formly amongst compartments ex lains data b s . The
data is best explained by a model where the caching rate depends on the bird identity but not on
the compartment (solid red bar at comp. independent).
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Figure 2: Individual caching patterns allow no c nclusion. If a bird caches according
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Figure 2: Individual caching patterns allow no conclusion. If a bird caches according
to hypothesis Planning 1, it will provision only for the next day, where it expects to be in
compartment K1 with food of type f2 available; thus it would cache food f1 in K1. If it also takes
into account subsequent days (hypothesis Planning 2), it will distribute the caches to complement
the food type it expects to find in the respective compartment. If the bird caches according to
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hypothesis Planning 2.
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Figure 2: Individual caching patterns all w no conclusion. If a bird caches according
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Figure 4: Individual caching patterns allow no conclusion. A bird in the FN group should
xpect not to receive powdered food on test day 10. If it caches according to hypothesis Planning
FN 1, it will provision only for the next day, where it expects to be in compartment K1 with no
food available; thus it would cache exclusively in K1. If it takes into account the next three days
(hypothesis Planning FN 2), it will distribute the caches in compartment K1 and K2. If the
bird caches according to some compartment specific preferences that are lowered by abundantly
available food (hypothesis Compensation FN), the bird caches more in compartment K2, where
it has only once encountered the powdered food. For the NF group the predictions are interchanged.
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Figure 5: Distributing caches uniformly amongst compartments explains data best. The
data is best explained by a model where the caching rate depends on the bird identity but not on
the compartment (solid red bar at comp. independent).
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